The vulnerability of the embryo arises from its terminology

Abstract

The law is made of concepts. Each legal concept contains a bottom layer and preceding philosophic synonym. Each word has its meaning, as a sign which represents an axiom. For this reason, traditionally, legal sciences are averse to polysemy. Therefore, 'adoption' of embryos and 'donation of embryos' are entirely distinct concepts. Moreover, nowadays medically assisted procreation procedures are answer to numerous issues that touch the lives of an uncountable number of families. However, at the pace that procedures develop the law has to follow the new realities which science has present to us. The eternal purpose of MAP's is the creation of life. It seems undeniable. The trial that consciously we intent to held relies on surplus embryos - a trial with ethical, scientific, legal, religious and even philosophic claims. In light of this adoption of embryos and donation of embryos are different classifications for the same reality. We oppose one and agree with the other. The conceptual terminology that we choose comes from the recognition and valuation of life in its embryonic stage. We even consider that it comes from naturally valuing life, in whatever stage that it might be. The vulnerability comes in different stages of human life. However, in this case, it seems to extend, not exclusively but also, to the classification that is being wrongly applied, concerning the acceptance of surplus embryos. Whit this article we aim to attend the different European Laws to appraise which concepts are used, the reason for using those and not others, and evenly, interpret the impact on the consensus we desire to build considering the prenatal adoption.