Tax compliance, corruption and deterrence: An application of the slippery model.
Data
2014
Embargo
Orientador
Coorientador
Título da revista
ISSN da revista
Título do volume
Editora
Idioma
Inglês
Título Alternativo
Resumo
Palavras-chave
Tax compliance, Slippery model
Tipo de Documento
Capítulo de livro
Versão da Editora
Dataset
Citação
Carvalho, D., & Pacheco, L. (2014). Tax compliance, corruption and deterrence: An application of the slippery model. In A. Teixeira, et al. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Insights on Fraud (pp. 87-104). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Identificadores
TID
Designação
Tipo de Acesso
Acesso Aberto
Apoio
Descrição
Tax evasion has been a common problem in some countries with
damaging consequences to national budgets. It is thus important to
understand what informs attitudes towards tax compliance. Trust,
perceptions of fairness and corruption have consistently been found
to play a crucial role in compliance behaviour. However, research
findings have been inconsistent regarding the use of deterrence
power to discourage tax evasion. The current study aims at
examining the influence of perceived fairness and corruption plus
sanctions used by authorities to enforce tax compliance attitudes
with a sample of Portuguese economics and management students
(N= 330). Findings suggest that trust in authorities and their capacity
to deter and punish tax evaders are interrelated and that both are
important in securing tax compliance. Findings are discussed in the
current Portuguese context.