Jesus, Paulo Renato
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Jesus
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Paulo Renato
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Paulo Renato Jesus
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Paulo Renato Cardoso de Jesus (Paulo Jesus) tem formação em Teologia, Filosofia e Psicologia, realizou o seu doutorado na EHESS (Paris) em 2006, foi Visiting Scholar em NYU e Columbia University assim como estagiário pós-doc no CREA (Paris). A Atualmente, é Investigador no Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL) e Professor Auxiliar Convidado (tempo parcial) de Filosofia do Direito na Universidade Portucalense. A sua investigação concentra-se na obra de Kant e Filosofia Moderna, nomeadamente as conceções modernas da subjetividade (especialmente entre Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant e Fichte) e os projetos de Paz Perpétua e de justiça cosmopolita. Na interseção entre Filosofia e Psicologia, Paulo Jesus tem pesquisado os processos da empatia, a construção da identidade pessoal e a personalidade narrativa autobiográfica, estabelecendo alianças teóricas entre a Fenomenologia e a Psicanálise.
341A-6BE0-202D
35362004900
C-4078-2013Research Projects
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CINTESIS.UPT - Centro de Investigação em Tecnologias e Serviços de Saúde
Centro de Investigação em Tecnologias e Serviços de Saúde (CINTESIS.UPT), former I2P, is an R&D unit devoted to the study of cognition and behaviour in context. With an interdisciplinary focus, namely on Education, Translational and Applied Psychology
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Publication Open Access Ethical and Political Constellations: Fichte, Schlegel and Hegel on Kantian Peace2024-01 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoThe reception of the Kantian essay on Perpetual Peace by Fichte, Schlegel and Hegel gives rise to a contrastive constellation of ethical, juridical and political ideas revolving around the idea of freedom, and the relationship between rights and duties within a constitutional State. In his review of the Kantian essay, Fichte (1796, Werke I, 3: 221-228; SW 08: 427-436) emphasizes the rational foundation of Kant’s Hauptidee, thus endorsing also the metaphysical status of the historical process through which Republican Constitutions are generated; for the progressive fulfillment of peace would testify both to the rational essence of Right and to the unfolding of the inexorable ends of Nature. The imperative of peace reveals the “supreme question of right” which concerns the purely rational condition of possibility of a community of free beings, i.e., the very possibility of humanity-as-community, encompassing necessarily the law of coexistence or compatibility of all possible free beings that relies on the reciprocal capacity of free self-limitation of freedom. Such capacity belongs to the people alone, and therefore it entails also the capacity to judge, without rebellion, how rightfully freedom is realized; hence, the proposition of creating a new institution, the Ephorat. In a nutshell, according to Fichte, peace and right are one and the same process of self-ordering freedom. Unsurprisingly enough, F. Schlegel accepts the equation that conjoins freedom and republicanism, and draws the logical conclusion that the true definitive article of perpetual peace would be the practically necessary political imperative of “universal and perfect republicanism” (1796, Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus, in Ausgabe 07: 11-25). Grounded in “primordial freedom,” source of individuality and independence, the Hegelian idea of State cannot surrender any degree of internal and external sovereignty. Consequently, the actualization of the individuality of the State implies negation, and thereby requires the continuous creation of the enemy and the continuous readiness to wage war against the enemy. Only the dialectical power of war does avoid vegetative and feminine stagnation, and by the same token it guarantees the protection and development of the State’s individuality. Peace must always be overcome by the “ethical moment” of war in which patriotic courage signifies a “universal duty” and a “formal virtue” consisting of self-sacrifice and self-abandonment or self-alignment with the universal (Grundlinien der PR, §§. 259, 324-327).Publication Open Access Processos de análise narrativa: desenvolvimento e personalidade como ser-em-estórias2010 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoA “narratividade” tornou-se uma abordagem transversal a diversas áreas da Psicologia, remetendo para conteúdos assaz heterogéneos, nomeadamente: um paradigma epistemológico geral (concebendo a Psicologia como “ciência do sentido vivido”), uma teoria psicológica da personalidade ou do desenvolvimento, uma “família” de metodologias de investigação e um modelo de intervenção psicológica (visando a “reescrita de estórias de vida”). Contudo, se nos centrarmos especificamente na intersecção entre psicologia da personalidade e psicologia do desenvolvimento, o paradigma narrativo oferece um ângulo teórico-metodológico que permite aceder a processos semióticos de auto-representação, essenciais para compreender a organização da personalidade e um dos seus eixos dinâmicos de desenvolvimento. Neste sentido, o objectivo do presente texto consiste em rever e avaliar algumas das posições teóricas e dos métodos de recolha e de interpretação de dados psicológicos narrativos que se têm revelado pertinentes para o estudo da construção da identidade pessoal.Publication Restricted Access Poétique de l'ipse: Une hypothèse sur le cogito postmétaphysique2017 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoToute philosophie du sujet s’égare inévitablement dans les labyrinthes des malentendus ou se heurte aux impasses des antinomies non-éclairées de la raison, tant qu’elle ne repose pas sur les règlesinhérentes au développement de la pensée et, par conséquent, tant que la pensée ne se découvre pas elle-même comme système épigénétique nomologique, et système toujours en état de processus ou en acte. Pour maîtriser l’art de se comprendre soi-même et d’être d’accord avec soi-même, la subjectivité doit pouvoir se saisir sur le mode de l’opération constructrice. Il n’est point de cohésion possible en moi si « cela qui pense en moi [dieses Ich, oder Er, oder Es (das Ding), welches denket] » (CRP, A 346/ B404) ne parvient pas à se penser comme l’exercice même d’être sujet : exercice de se penser Soi-même comme règle ou loi d’action – la loi la plus universelle cernée dans le cas le plus singulier, l’unité unificatrice : Je pense X.Publication Open Access Poétic de l’ipse: Étude sur le je pense Kantien2008 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoPublication Open Access Podem as razões subjacentes a uma acção ser as causas (eficientes) dessa Acção? O labirinto do Descontínuo: Gramática, Fenomenologia e ontologia da Acção2011 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoRazões e causas tipificam duas gramáticas ou jogos de linguagem que tendem para a inco‑ mensurabilidade. Estas gramáticas instituem uma discriminação qualitativa entre a auto‑efi‑ cácia de se ser alguém e a eficácia simétrica, impessoal, de se ser algo. As razões podem comportar‑se como causas, embora seja profundamente absurdo interpretar razões como causas e vice‑versa. Contudo, para que as razões possam assumir tal eficiência causal, é necessário admitir vários postulados: primeiro, uma ontologia monista assegurando a comu‑ nicação de eficiência dinâmica entre duas cadeias de fenómenos, ou seja, a série de repre‑ sentações intencionais e a série de movimentos corporais, que implicaria a coexistência entre uma homogeneidade ontológica profunda e uma aparente heterogeneidade superficial; segundo, uma fenomenologia auto‑vigilante, capaz de reconhecer a peculiaridade do “Eu sinto” que deve poder acompanhar o “meu agir” e o “meu fazer acontecer”, ainda que acei‑ tando a validade de uma incerteza metafísica invencível. A exploração das relações entre razões e causas ilustrará o modo como a subjectividade emerge sob o signo de um processo unificador – mas instável – de construção de sentido.Publication Open Access Le Je pense comme facteur de vérité: Adéquation, cohérence et communauté sémantique2010 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoAbstract: This article proposes a reading of the Kantian transcendental apperception that attempts both to reinforce the cognitive efficacy of its spontaneity (described as poetics of the self) and to determine the modus operandi of its unifying function (described as self-regu- lated cognition). Thus, being irreducible to a pure logical form (or form of representation in general), the I think is meant to constitute the qualitative unity of all possible represen- tational system, insofar as it performs an infinite process of semantic or narrative unifi- cation. From this standpoint, the I think denotes the key operation that produces meaning, and thereby the very possibility of truth. It follows, from such a framework of a procedural and constructivist theory of truth, the absolute primacy of the establishment of a semantic community by and under the Self. This community lays the foundation of coherence or organic cohesion of contents, and coherence provides the ground where correspondence emerges, which, in the last analysis, expresses nothing but the ever unfinished agreement of donation and action, agreement of Self with Itself.Publication Restricted Access Autonomie avec et contre théonomie: Kant et Lévinas sur la généalogie de la loi morale2015 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoLa vigoureuse mise en valeur de la liberté et de l’autonomie du sujet moral en tant que législateur de soi-même, principe rationnel de causalité pratique, constitue certes la matrice de la morale kantienne. Mais il n’en reste pas moins vrai que, si l’autonomie engendre la subjectivité morale et s’oppose à l’hétéronomie, sa négation absolue, l’autonomie évoque la théonomie, comme sa source primordiale, encore que chez Kant on puisse repérer une tendance de reconduction de la théonomie à l’autonomie. Or c’est précisément dans cette reconduction qui réside, pour Levinas, le danger de l’insensibilité de la raison pratique qu’il faudrait soumettre à une métacritique éthique pour réinterpréter la possibilité et la nécessité d’un moment hétéronome premier dans la genèse de la bonne volonté. Cette communication vise à discerner le rapport entre autonomie et théonomie à l’intérieur du sujet éthique kantien et levinassien pour mieux comprendre le passage laborieux qui mène de la conscience de soi à la responsabilité, ou vice versa.Publication Open Access Le Moi entre barbarie et messianisme: critique et jouissance du non-sens comme tâches éthiques2012 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoPublication Open Access On the natural history of emotions: Darwin’s legacy2009 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoOne of the most striking applications of Darwinian principles resides in the evolutionary account of expression of emotions. The main purpose of this paper is to ask some fundamental questions concerning this realm of Darwinian investigations and its implicit or explicit legacy in contemporary psychology of emotions, which appears inhabited by the essential tension between the primacy of embodiment (from James to Damasio) and that of cognitive mediation (from Peirce to Lazarus). One should ask again: what is an emotion? Is it reducible to a bodily expression or is there any qualitative difference between emotion and expression? Why do emotions belong to the phenomena of life? How do the grammar of life and the grammar of culture interact in emotional expressions? What is the ―truth‖ of Darwin’s principles on expressions and what degree of coherence can be detected when one attempts at integrating the theory of emotions in the larger picture of the evolution of life forms and cultural meaningful phenomena? Darwin is systematically attracted towards normative invariants, that is, nomological relationships and functions which organise a dynamic morphogenetic process. Thus, Darwin’s theory of expression of emotions identifies a set of three universal principles that complement each other. These comprise not only the notion of adaptive behaviour, association of learned habits and evolution of instinct, but also that of body structure (specially the web of muscles that define and constrain the landscape of the face), inheritance of movements and independent action of the nervous system. Darwin develops a fine dynamic bio-semiology: he sheds light on a presupposed unconscious universal grammar of emotional expression, communication and comprehension, where profitability and uselessness intertwine. This general bio- semiotics invites a special bio-logic that gives room for epigenetic landscapes, and thus to individual creativity and idiosyncrasy: the art of being in my body as on stage.Publication Open Access L’instabilité de l’être-avec: Configurations de l’intersubjectivité autour de Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Levinas2009 - Jesus, Paulo RenatoLe rapport à l’altérité en général et à autrui en particulier condense un noyau de possibilités multiples qui, selon l’hypothèse esquissée, s’exprime et s’interprète dans le mode de penser et de vivre le Désir d’avenir. Oscillant entre hétérophagie et hétérophilie, ce type fondamental d’érotisme tem- porel s’incarne dans des configurations phénoménologiques dont la typologie idéale fait covarier une décision métaphysique (repérable au sein du spectre qui va de l’idéalisme constructiviste au réalisme affectif) avec une attitude éthique (située entre le scepticisme individualiste et l’hétérodicée absolue). L’analyse des contrastes qui définissent les positions onto-éthiques de Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Levinas devient une méthode heuristique pour mettre en évidence la topologie de l’incommensurable et de l’optatif.