A self‑employed taxpayer experimental study on trust, power, and tax compliance in eleven countries

dc.contributor.authorBatrancea, Larissa
dc.contributor.authorNichita, Anca
dc.contributor.authorDe Agostini, Ruggero
dc.contributor.authorBatista Narcizo, Fabricio
dc.contributor.authorForte, Denis
dc.contributor.authorMamede, Samuel de Paiva Neves
dc.contributor.authorRoux‑Cesar, Ana Maria
dc.contributor.authorNedev, Bozhidar
dc.contributor.authorVitek, Leoš
dc.contributor.authorPántya, József
dc.contributor.authorSalamzadeh, Aidin
dc.contributor.authorNduka, Eleanya K.
dc.contributor.authorKudła, Janusz
dc.contributor.authorKopyt, Mateusz
dc.contributor.authorIsaga, Nsubili
dc.contributor.authorBenk, Serkan
dc.contributor.authorBudak, Tamer
dc.contributor.authorMaldonado, Isabel
dc.contributor.authorPacheco, Luís Miguel
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-25T11:26:43Z
dc.date.available2022-11-25T11:26:43Z
dc.date.issued2022-11-23
dc.description.abstractThe slippery slope framework explains tax compliance along two main dimensions, trust in authorities and power of authorities, which infuence taxpayers’ compliance attitudes. Through frequentist and Bayesian analyses, we investigated the framework’s assumptions on a sample of 2786 self-employed taxpayers from eleven post-communist and non-post-communist countries doing business in fve economic branches. After using scenarios that experimentally manipulated trust and power, our results confrmed the framework’s assumptions regarding the attitudes of the self-employed taxpayers; trust and power fostered intended tax compliance and diminished tax evasion, trust boosted voluntary tax compliance, whereas power increased enforced tax compliance. Additionally, self-employed taxpayers from post-communist countries reported higher intended tax compliance and lower tax evasion than those from non post-communist countries. Our results ofer tax authorities insights into how trust and power may contribute to obtaining and maintaining high tax compliance levels amid global economic challenges, downturns, and increasing tax compliance costs.pt_PT
dc.identifier.citationBatrancea, L., Nichita, A., De Agostini, R., Batista Narcizo, F., Forte, D., Mamede, S. P. N., Roux‑Cesar, A. M., Nedev, B., Vitek, L., Pántya, J., Salamzadeh, A., Nduka, E. K., Kudła, J., Kopyt, M., Pacheco, L. M., Maldonado, I., Isaga, N., Benk, S., & Budak, T. (2022). A self‑employed taxpayer experimental study on trust, power, and tax compliance in eleven countries. Financial Innovation, 8:96, 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-022-00404-y. Repositório Institucional UPT. http://hdl.handle.net/11328/4545pt_PT
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-022-00404-ypt_PT
dc.identifier.issn2199-4730 (Electronic)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11328/4545
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherSpringer Openpt_PT
dc.rightsopen accesspt_PT
dc.subjectSelf-employed taxpayerspt_PT
dc.subjectSlippery slope frameworkpt_PT
dc.subjectVoluntary tax compliancept_PT
dc.subjectEnforced tax compliance,pt_PT
dc.subjectTax evasionpt_PT
dc.titleA self‑employed taxpayer experimental study on trust, power, and tax compliance in eleven countriespt_PT
dc.typejournal articlept_PT
degois.publication.firstPage1pt_PT
degois.publication.issue96pt_PT
degois.publication.lastPage23pt_PT
degois.publication.titleFinancial Innovationpt_PT
degois.publication.volume8pt_PT
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
person.affiliation.nameREMIT – Research on Economics, Management and Information Technologies
person.familyNameMaldonado
person.familyNamePacheco
person.givenNameIsabel
person.givenNameLuís Miguel
person.identifier.ciencia-id1D1D-3612-D593
person.identifier.ciencia-idBF16-0EF2-107B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1292-6201
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-9066-6441
person.identifier.ridE-5193-2010
person.identifier.scopus-author-id55945343700
relation.isAuthorOfPublication1d5bf75b-f0ec-4431-aa1e-cfb8be344155
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationa25aba90-4787-45a8-b908-646f24b32dfc
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery1d5bf75b-f0ec-4431-aa1e-cfb8be344155

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