Universidade do Minho
Escola de Economia e Gestão

Liliana Raquel dos Santos Fernandes

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STATEMENT OF INTEGRITY

I hereby declare having conducted this academic work with integrity. I confirm that I have not used plagiarism or any form of undue use of information or falsification of results along the process leading to its elaboration.

I further declare that I have fully acknowledged the Code of Ethical Conduct of the University of Minho.

Mulheres na 'Nova Turquia' (2007-2022): experiências de cidadania (política) e o regime (de género)

Resumo

Os regimes políticos formam-se numa base de relações desiguais de poder que regulam as experiências de cidadania. A partir dessa afirmação, centramo-nos nas relações de género e analisamos as estruturas e instituições que formam o regime político na Turquia, ou, por outras palavras, o seu regime de género. Esta é uma investigação pós-positivista de inspiração feminista, cuja principal questão de investigação é "que interpretação, com base numa perspetiva de género, fazem as mulheres turcas do regime político?". Os objetivos são interpretar se e como o Estado, sob a governação de Tayyip Erdoğan, promove um novo tipo ideal apoiado numa estrutura nacional-religiosa; perceber a relação entre as mulheres (cidadãs) e o regime político (Estado); e compreender as condições que envolvem a política, a economia, a violência e a sociedade civil. Os primeiros dois capítulos expõem o quadro teórico-conceptual, aos quais se segue a temática de investigação. Depois, produzimos um estudo grounded theory, seguido de um segundo capítulo analítico sobre os domínios institucionais que formam o regime de género turco. Argumentamos que há uma correlação entre a oposição à igualdade de género e a natureza do regime político. Depois, alegamos que o regime político, que aqui referimos como a 'Nova Turquia', apoia ações religiosas e institucionaliza normas familialistas discriminatórias. Em terceiro lugar, afirmamos que esta abordagem tem implicações na política assistencial da Turquia, em harmonia com a política económica do partido governante. Queremos promover o debate sobre género e formulação de políticas na Turquia; contribuir para domínios teórico-metodológicos a partir da produção de conhecimento específico sobre género e política e de uma visão mais ampla da ciência política; e produzir uma nova linha de investigação sobre a política turca contemporânea: a era AKP alterou o paradigma republicano, redefiniu o papel das clivagens tradicionais e o AKP despontou como força autoritária anti-género e familialista apoiada numa estrutura nacional-religiosa bastante complexa para se restringir a dualismos convencionais. Discutimos esta 'Nova Turquia' e referimos uma estratégia para promover a igualdade de género no país formulada a partir do "modelo teórico sobre a situação e as perspetivas das mulheres sobre o regime de género na Turquia".

Palavras-chave: Cidadania, Mulheres, Regime de Género, Regime Político, Turquia

Women in the 'New Turkey' (2007-2022): experiences of (political) citizenship and the (gender) regime

Abstract

Political regimes are founded on unequal power relations that shape experiences of citizenship. Drawing upon this claim, we focus on gender relations and analyze the structures and institutions that make up the Turkish political regime, or, to put it in another way, its gender regime. This is a post-positivist feminist-inspired study whose main research question is "How do women interpret the political regime in Turkey from a gender perspective?". The aims are to interpret whether and how the state under Tayyip Erdoğan's rule proposes an ideal type based on a national-religious structure; to perceive the relationship between women (citizens) and the political regime (state); and to comprehend the conditions surrounding policy, economy, violence, and civil society. The first chapters introduce the theoretical-conceptual frameworks, which are followed by the topic of study. Then, we conducted a grounded theory study, which is followed by an analytical chapter examining each of the institutional domains of the gender regime. We argue that there is a correlation between opposing gender equality and the nature of the political regime. Afterwards, we contend that this political regime, referred to as 'New Turkey', sponsors religious actions and institutionalizes non-equal familialist norms. Thirdly, we assert that this has implications for care policies and is consistent with the ruling party's economic policy. We aim to produce a discussion of gender and policymaking in Turkey; to contribute to theoretical and methodological fields through the development of specific knowledge on gender and politics and the coverage of a broader insight into political science; and to produce new avenues of research on current Turkish politics: the AKP-era changed the republican paradigm, redefined the role of traditional divisions in Turkey, and the party arose as an anti-gender and familialist authoritarian force on the grounds of a national-religious structure too complex to be limited to conventional cleavages. We discuss this 'New Turkey' while proposing a strategy for promoting gender equality in Turkey based on the "theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey".

Keywords: Citizenship, Women, Gender regime, Political Regime, Turkey

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List of Abbreviations

ANAP	Motherland Party [Anavatan Partisi]
AKP	Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi]
AP	Justice Party [Adalet Partisi]
BBP	Great Union Party [Büyük Birlik Partisi]
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women
CEFMU	Child, Early, Forced Marriage and Unions
CEMR	Council of European Municipalities and Regions
CGP	Republican Reliance Party [Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi]
CHP	Republican People's Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi]
DEVA	Democracy and Progress Party [Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi]
DP	Democrat Party [Demokrat Parti]
DSP	Democratic Left Party [Demokratik Sol Parti]
DYP	True Path Party [Doğru Yol Partisi]
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEC	European Economic Community
EIGE	European Institute for Gender Equality
EU	European Union
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FP	Virtue Party [Fazilet Partisi]
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GONGO	Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization
GP	Future Party [Gelecek Partisi]
GREVIO	Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party [Halkların Demokratik Partisi]
HEDEP	People's Equality and Democracy Party [Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi]
HIF	Liberal Entente [Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası]
HPV	Human Papillomavirus
HÜDA-PAR	Free Cause Party [Hür Dava Partisi]
IKD	Progressive Women's Organization [İlerici Kadınlar Derneği]
ILO	International Labour Organization

IP	Good Party [IYI Parti]
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
ITF	Committee of Union and Progress [Ittihad ve Terakki Fırkası]
KADEM	Women and Democracy Association [Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği]
KCDP	We Will Stop Femicide [Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu]
KHF	Women's People Party [Kadınlar Halk Fırkası]
KP	Women's Party [Kadın Partisi]
LGBTI+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and others
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi]
MNP	National Order Party [Millî Nizam Partisi]
MP	Member of Parliament
MSP	National Salvation Party [Millî Selâmet Partisi]
NAIRU	Nonaccelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAP	Declaration and Platform for Action
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party [in Kurdish, Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê]
PIA	Perceived Income Adequacy
RP	Welfare Party [Refah Partisi]
SCF	Liberal Republican Party [Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası]
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SHP	Social-Democratic People's Party [Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi]
SP	Felicity Party [Saadet Partisi]
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
SRT	Social Reproduction Theory
STIs	Sexually transmitted infections
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey [Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi]

TCF	Progressive Republican Party [Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası]
TIP	Workers' Party of Turkey [Türkiye İşçi Partisi]
TIS	Turkish-Islamic Synthesis [Türk-İslam Sentezi]
TKB	Union of Turkish Women [Türk Kadınlar Birliği]
TKP	Communist Party of Turkey [Türkiye Komünist Partisi]
TÜİK	Turkish Institute of Statistic [Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu]
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
VP	Patriotic Party [Vatan Partisi]
WWHR	Women for Women's Human Rights
YRP	New Welfare Party [Yeniden Refah Partisi]
YSK	Supreme Election Council [Yüksek Seçim Kurulu]
YSP	Green Left Party [Yeşil Sol Parti]

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Gender equality is more than a goal in itself. It is a precondition for meeting the challenge of reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development, and building good governance.

- Kofi Annan, 1998

We must fight for gender equality. The status of women is the status of democracy.

- Kamala Harris, 2022

INTRODUCTION

Context, scope, and motivation

> Gender, like 'race', social class, sexual orientation, disability, and religion, are some of the categories influencing the development of people and their relations with other members of society (Gilas and Parcero, 2021: 9).

Gender analyzes how social norms and power structures impact the opportunities available to men and women. Overall, because of unequal gender power relations, more women than men are forced into poverty, undereducation, and exclusion from decision-making positions. Gendered experiences of citizenship imply different access to services, resources, rights, and opportunities (just fourteen countries around the globe offer full equal rights for women and men[1]). Using Walby's (2009; 2020) theorization of gender regimes, which we define as a collection of gender structures, relations, and institutions that make up the political regimes, we examine these mechanisms. We contend these cannot be understood without studying how gender shapes their functioning and dynamics.

In Walby's conceptualization, gender regimes are active in the institutional spheres of the economy, civil society, policy, and violence. The principal consequences of gender inequality in the economy are the feminization of precarious work (United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], 2020), the gender pay gap (women earn approximately 20% less than men), and the underrepresentation of women in the economy (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2019). The onset of COVID-19 increased inequality and led to forty-seven million women living in poverty, as those already subject to discrimination and inequality suffer the most from crises (United Nations [UN], 2021). 58 per cent of employed women work in the informal economy (UN Women, 2020), and women held only 4.5 per cent of Fortune 500 CEO positions in 2012 (Wynn and Correll, 2018). This increased in 2020 to 7.4 per cent (Statista, 2023) but fell to 4.8 per cent in 2022 (Hinchliffe, 2022).

Economic gender inequality adversely impacts other institutional domains. For instance, in the domain of civil society, which includes, according to Walby, education, sexuality, and intimacy (2020: 421), about two-thirds of the illiterate people in the world are women (UN, 2015: 59), and the lack of funding for women's education negatively influences gross domestic product (GDP) and poverty (Chaaban and Cunningham, 2011: 3). Also, the World Economic Forum expected a 10 per cent GDP

[1] These fourteen countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. See Buchholz, K. (2023). *Only 14 countries have full equal rights for women*. World Economic Forum. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/03/only-14-countries-have-full-equal-rights-for-women/.

growth in developing countries where girls and women reach secondary education (Elks, 2020), and according to Bloom, Kuhn, and Prettner, investing in girls' education pays off in terms of economic development (2018: 14). Feinstein et al. argued that education leads to advances in health (2006: 172), and Bhalotra, Clots, and Iyer asserted that the higher the political participation, the higher the literacy (2013: 5).

When it comes to sexuality and intimacy, child, early, and forced marriages and unions (CEFMU) persist, and 200 million women are affected by female genital mutilation (FGM). Globally, 20 per cent of girls get married before 18, and at this pace, up to 10 million girls will become brides by 2030 (UNICEF, 2021: 68). Also, a report by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) found that 43 per cent of women are unable to make decisions about their sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) 23 per cent are unable to refuse sex, 24 per cent cannot make decisions about their health, and 8 per cent are unable to decide about contraception (2022: 22). The human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, a crucial part of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5.6.2 on SRHR, is only guaranteed in 54 of the UN member states (UNFPA, 2022: 88). In the institutional domain of violence, women make up 82 per cent of victims, and 137 are murdered by relatives daily (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2018: 10). According to the World Bank (2022), 30 per cent of women face intimate partner violence (IPV), and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) informed that about one in two women in the EU have faced psychological violence[2]. South Asia, the Middle East, and African countries are the territories where there have been the most reports of so-called honour crimes, however, it happens elsewhere.

In polity, governments in the European Union (EU) are predominantly composed of men, and women hold 39 per cent of seats in the European Parliament and 32.5 per cent in the national parliaments (Eurostat, 2023). On a global scale, the proportion does not exceed 26.5 per cent. At the local level, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) noted that only 29 per cent of the councillors and 15 per cent of the mayors are women (Ceciarini, 2019: 2).

Leading international organizations and global institutions consider gender equality as a fundamental right, but as authoritarianism and de-democratization[3] spread (Bogaards, 2018; Tilly, 2017), opposition to gender equality gets bigger (Alonso and Lombardo, 2018). Poland's near-total ban on abortion, Hungary's anti-genderism, and Turkey's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention (Council

[2] EIGE. (2022). *Combating coercive control and psychological violence against women in the EU Member States*. European Institute for Gender Equality-Publications Office of the EU. Available at https://eige.europa.eu/news/almost-1-2-women-eu-have-experienced-psychological-violence.

[3] We use the conceptualization of de-democratization (as opposed to the other concepts that have been coined to represent the decline of democracy) for two reasons. Firstly, it directly opposes democratization; secondly, it differentiates democratic erosion, democratic breakdown, and repression Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 91). This is valuable because it distinguishes the various stages of the process. See Annex A for an explanation of the democratization and democratization processes.

of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence) are patterns of the backlash against gender equality in the de-democratization processes. Keeping with SDG five to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, we study the Turkish political regime, bearing in mind targets 5.1. to end discrimination against women; targets 5.2 and 5.3. to eliminate all forms and practices of violence against women; target 5.4 to value unpaid care and domestic work; target 5.5. to ensure participation in all levels of decision-making, and target 5.6 to ensure access to SRHR. Also, we consider targets 5.a, 5.b, and 5.c on economic rights and empowerment. Women's recognition and representation not only transform how political regimes impact gender equality but also deepen democracy. The democracies that want to succeed must fight to improve the rights of both men and women and to eliminate the gender hierarchies sustaining inequity. Gender equality is a step toward democracy and development and a must-have for a more representative, advanced, and equitable society.

Thesis topic

Gender and Politics is a field of political science that analyzes the relationship between gender and a political phenomenon. While some studies in this field focus on equality within political institutions (e.g., representation studies), other studies analyze women's political activity, institutions, policies, and laws that directly influence women (Celis et al., 2013: 12). This PhD thesis on the 'gendering de-democratization' of Turkey falls under this field.

Albeit scholars use similar concepts, such as authoritarianism (Yılmaz and Turner, 2019; Yilmaz, Shipoli and Demir, 2021); electoral authoritarian regime (Baghdady, 2020); hybrid political regime (Öniş, 2016); neoliberal authoritarianism (Borsuk et al., 2022); weak authoritarian political regime (Akkoyunlu and Oktem, 2016); electoral autocracy (Coşkun and Kölemen, 2020; Pappas, 2019); new authoritarianism (Somer, 2016); and illiberal democracy (Turkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2015), it is known in the existing literature that Turkey is a competitive authoritarian regime (Akkoyunlu, 2017; Aytaç and Elçi, 2019; Çalışkan, 2018; Sarfati, 2017).

Although electoral authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes share similarities, electoral authoritarian regimes do not distinguish between those that support multi-party elections and those that reject "liberal-democratic principles of freedom" (Çalışkan, (2018: 9). Mudde and Kaltwasser positioned competitive authoritarianism between "full authoritarianism" and "electoral democracy"

(2017: 87), and Levitsky and Way said that they control the media, give the opposition a low chance of winning elections, and do not respect the judiciary (2002: 53). Levitsky and Way (2010) asserted that democratic institutions exist, but incumbents' abuse of the state places them at an advantage regarding the opponents (Table 1).

Table 1. Criteria for Competitive Authoritarianism

Unfair Elections	At least one major candidate is barred for political reasons Centrally coordinated or tolerated electoral abuse is asserted Impediments prevent the opposition from campaigning on equal footing Uneven electoral playing field
Violation of Liberties	Harassment of independent media for political reasons The political attack on the media The government restricts freedom of political association or speech Attack on opposition figures or other government critics
Uneven Playing Field	State institutions are politicized and deployed limiting the opposition Uneven media access Uneven access to resources

Source: Levitsky and Way (2010: 366–68). Own elaboration.

As the political sphere is tilted in favour of the rulers, the political regime is authoritarian, however competitive, given opposition can challenge them through democratic systems (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 5). Despite unfairness, competition exists. Instead, full authoritarianism (North Korea, Saudi Arabia...) has no channels for the opposition, and democratic institutions do not exist (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 7). Competitive authoritarian regimes are hybrid regimes moving from authoritarianism to democracy, or conversely, where "incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents" (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013: 107).

Çalışkan used Levitsky and Way's signs of competitive authoritarianism and established that Turkey met 9 out of eleven points from 2010 to 2016 – opposition candidates were not banned for political reasons, and electoral fraud was not emphasized at that time – and eleven out of eleven after 2016 (2018: 13). The detention of People's Democratic Party (HDP) former co-chairs, Figen Yüksekdağ

and Selahattin Demirtas, in 2016, and the 2022 sentence of Republican People's Party (CHP) Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu exemplify this shift. Also, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) said the 2017Constitutional Referendum "was held on an uneven playing field" and opposition did not have equal opportunities (2017: 1). There were doubts about the counting of votes (OSCE/ODIR, 2017: 22), which denotes a "tendency toward full authoritarianism" (Çalışkan, 2018: 5).

This is similar to what Pappas meant when used the term "electoral autocracy" to refer to autocracies that are undemocratic, corrupt, and suppress dissent by violence and intimidation (2019: 4). Conversely, a hybrid regime is a broad concept that links more than one type of political regime, making it difficult to explain if it is closer to democracy or authoritarianism. For instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (2022) considered both Paraguay and Turkey as hybrid regimes, but there is a considerable gap between them. Paraguay has higher civil liberties values than flawed democracies (e.g., Poland), and Turkey has lower levels than totalitarian political regimes (Haiti and Kyrgyzstan). Another concept established by the literature on political regimes is new authoritarianism. It refers to a set of politicians who weaken the Constitution to further their goals. Babones (2018) used it to refer to politicians, like Donald Trump, who maintained a liberal agenda but adopted authoritarian rules, while Versteeg et al. (2020) revealed Vladimir Putin, Alvaro Uribe, and Paul Kagame as models of new authoritarian leaders. Somer distinguished between the new authoritarian Justice and Development Party (AKP) and old authoritarian military governments in the case of Turkey (2016: 486). Akkoyunlu and Öktem (2016), contrarily, defined Turkey as a weak authoritarian political regime, ignoring the fact that Way (2012) used the concept to explain why democratization failed in former Soviet states that left full authoritarianism but did not engage electoral democracy.

Another similar term is authoritarian neoliberalism. Walby disagreed, contending that as all forms of neoliberalism degrade democracy, it is unnecessary to classify them as authoritarian (2020: 419). We refuse it as well, however, for another reason. According to our view, describing neoliberalism as authoritarian devalues the political system at the expense of the political economy.

Lastly, delegative, unconsolidated, and illiberal democracies ignore the non-democratic results. It is unreasonable to term Turkey an unconsolidated democracy as it is linked to electoral democracy and flawed democracy. Boese et al. (2022) even described Turkey as an autocratizing country, and the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index classified it as a hybrid regime. Even the IDEA's 2022 Global State of Democracy, which identified it as a democratic regime until 2018, defined Turkey as a hybrid regime. The Freedom House, which tagged Turkey as "partly free" from 1983 to

2017, since 2018, describes it as “not free”[4]. The World Justice Project noted that the rule of law has declined, the presidential system weakened democracy, and authoritarianism has been confirmed (2022: 3-5). Given these reasons, we contend that competitive authoritarianism is the most appropriate concept to define the political regime in Turkey.

In Turkey, the existing literature on the democratic breakdown is divided into two clusters. According to the first, it began in 2011, during the third term of the AKP (Bermek, 2019; Gülel, 2020; Mushaben, 2018; Sarfati, 2017). Some authors even shifted their analysis during this term. For example, during the second term (2007-2011), İhsan Dağı praised the AKP for “speaking not of Muslim duties but of human rights” (2008: 28); but, in the third term (2011-2015), Dağı (2013) called it a "post-modern authoritarian" regime imposing "morality, lifestyle, and values". Similarly, Özbudun identified the AKP as a "conservative democratic party” (2006: 547) aligned with centre-right political parties rather than Islamic groups; but, in the third term, recognized the “majoritarian drift” (Özbudun, 2014). Since independent media was prohibited from covering the opposition during the 2011 election campaign, Yilmaz and Bashirov also categorized 2011 as the start of the de-democratization (2018: 1917).

On the other hand, the second group asserts that it was during the second term that the democratic breakdown was initiated. Çalışkan said that de-democratization began in 2010 and that the contentious coup d’état attempt in 2016 and the 2017 Referendum signalled a “shift toward full authoritarianism" (2018: 8). Yavuz argued that the coalition with the Gülen Movement started a "soft Islamization" that located religious clerics at the head of public institutions (2019: 72), and Aytaç and Elçi (2019) said that 2007 initiated the democratic breakdown. We concur with such a claim and contend that the de-democratization began in April 2007 when Abdullah Gül (2007-14) was chosen to succeed Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000-07) as President. In response to the criticisms levelled at Abdullah Gül's Islamic background, early elections and a referendum were scheduled for July and October. The referendum registered irregularities, and the Supreme Election Council (YSK) identified 2.398 ballot boxes where the votes beat the electorate (Çalışkan, 2018: 25). It imposed a shortening of the legislative term from five to four years and a popular vote in presidential elections. Although it seemed to be a democratizing policy, it paved the way for using democracy to spread authoritarian goals and replace secularists in state institutions.

It was followed by a gradual failing of individual freedoms (e.g., the 2013 bills restricting alcohol consumption and tightening internet law) and the rule of law (e.g., the 2014 law increasing

[4]The organization's latest report is available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf.

political control over the judiciary). In 2007, the AKP seized control of ATV-Sabah, one of the largest media groups, which was purchased by Turkuvaz Media Group[5], and in 2008, the Gülen Movement[6] strengthened its control over the judiciary (Akkoyunlu and Oktem, 2016: 512). It resulted in the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon trials and the convictions of hundreds of politicians, lawyers, public and military officers, journalists, and academicians. In March 2008, former Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, brought charges against the AKP for violating the separation of religion and state. The Court recognized evidence supporting the charge; however, by one vote, it avoided closure (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019: 94). In 2010, a second referendum transformed the judiciary, reducing the power of secular judges and the chance of AKP government challenges. In 2012, the Education Reform brought religion to schools, and in 2013, the response to the Gezi Protests expounded the first authoritarian reaction on a large scale.

After losing the majority, in June 2015, the AKP resumed military operations in Southeast Anatolia and signed a deal with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). It was followed by repressive actions (e.g., Turkey was a safe place for the LGBTI+ community in the Middle East, but Pride marches were suppressed in 2015 and banned in 2016), and the OSCE/ODIHR questioned the electoral fairness (2015: 17). After regaining the majority in November 2015, the AKP tightened its control over the media and used security threats in 2016 to quell opposition (e.g., HDP deputies' withdrawal of immunity). This was made possible by the contentious coup attempt. As a result of the state of emergency (2016-18), the AKP conducted further purges, firing thousands of public servants. Many HDP-elected mayors were relieved of their duties by amendments to the Municipal Law, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) approved Anti-Terrorism Law No. 3713, whose definition of terrorism permits anyone to be easily labelled a terrorist. As Bechev stressed, the Turkish state is now a family (and crony) fiefdom, where those who disagree with the ruling party face accusations of terrorists (2022: 24). In 2018, the parliamentary system was replaced by an executive presidential one due to the 2017 Constitutional Referendum, enabling Erdoğan to become both head of state and head of government. Early elections, referendums, and agreements gave the President a legal monopoly on the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Authoritarian regimes, Pinto (2021) observed, are "dressing up as democracies". "Democracies still die, but by different means" as the "democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box"(Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 5). Turkey is such a case.

[5] A subsidiary of Çalık Holding, a company with close ties to Erdoğan that became known by corruption allegations in the 2023 earthquakes. Former Çalık CEO (2007-13) Berat Albayrak is Erdoğan's son-in-law and former Minister of Treasury and Finance (2018-20).

[6] From 2008 to 2013, Fethullah Gülen's Islamic movement was a part of the political establishment, but the partnership ended when the movement launched an investigation into AKP officials and their families (the 2013 corruption scandal). In 2016, the Gülen Movement was labelled as a terrorist organization responsible for the coup attempt.

Gender analysis reveals a correlation between the political regime and gender equality in Turkey (Table 2), the less democratic the political regime, the more asymmetrical gender relations. We term this 'gendered de-democratization'. This supports previous findings that non-democratic political regimes do not promote gender equality because they adopt a traditional view of gender roles and use gender policies to establish and maintain power (Tripp, 2013). In Turkey, this founds a hybrid gender regime by merging private/domestic and public institutional domains, deviating from the private-public continuum the framework has expected. As democratic breakdown growths, Turkey regresses along the continuum, raising private/domestic forms of exclusion (restrictions on abortion, position on divorce, etc.), proving that only democratic regimes follow the continuum. The democratic breakdown brings forms of exclusion that antecede commitments established by the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action (PAP), and the Istanbul Convention, endangering women's rights, international agreements, and democracy. As Turkey abandoned the prospects of membership, a 'New Turkey' (Fernandes and Carvalhais, 2018) emerged, and the political regime moved from a fragile electoral democracy to competitive authoritarianism.

Table 2. Turkey's political and gender regimes correlation

	The Political Regime		The Gender Regime		
Process of de-democratization from an electoral democracy to a competitive authoritarian regime	2nd Term (2007-11)	Early elections Constitutional Referendum AKP-Gülen agreement Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials Constitutional Referendum	National Action Plan on Gender Equality Committee on Equal Opportunity for Women and Men The Istanbul Convention	State Pro-feminism (2007-11)	Process of gendered de-democratization from a public gender regime to a hybrid gender regime
	3rd Term (2011-15)	Reactions to the Gezi Protests Corruption Scandal Presidential elections	Ministry of Family and Social Policy Law No. 6284 to Protect Family and Prevent Violence... Abortion ban attempt Committee on Family and Social Policies	Pro-family Conservatism (2011-15)	
	4th Term (2015-18)	AKP-MHP agreement Early elections Contentious coup d'état attempt Constitutional Referendum	Shutdown of women's rights organizations The Divorce Commission Amendments to the Civil Registration Services Law Action Plan on Women's Empowerment Action Plan on Combating Early and Forced Marriages	Anti-gender Familialism[7] (2015-2021)	
	5th Term (2018-)	The People's Alliance[8] Early elections	Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention	State Anti-feminism (2021-)	

[7] Familialism considers reproduction a normative order where the family embodies the nation (Gwiazda, 2021; Ilonszki and Vajda, 2019). In other words, it is a nationalist politicization of the family.

[8] The People's Alliance was developed in 2018 by the AKP and the MHP to compete in the 2018 General Elections. The national-conservative Great Union Party (BBP), the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP), and the left-wing Eurosceptic Patriotic Party (VP) supported the alliance and Erdoğan's re-election. In 2023, the ruling party announced the alliance embraced by the AKP, the MHP, the BBP, and the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP). Erdoğan refused to take the VP into the alliance but accepted the support of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Sunni Kurdish Islamist Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR). The latter elected four deputies under the AKP's list for the 2023 elections.

We classified the Turkish gender regime into four phases and gave the first one the name 'State Feminism' (2007-11). Previously, the AKP cooperated with women's rights organizations (e.g., the 2003 Labour Code and the 2004 Penal Code), and despite pushing a religious-based agenda, it established the 2008 National Action Plan on Gender Equality and the 2009 Committee on Equality for Women and Men and signed significant international treaties, such as the Istanbul Convention. The AKP began to lift the veil ban in 2008, which increased the public's recognition of pious women. The lifting, which would be finished in 2013, may not be seen apart from the AKP's religious-based agenda, but it supported women's freedom of expression and bodily autonomy (at least for Islamic women since the "politics of dressing" was not extended to Kurdish clothing, sleeveless shirts, or mini-skirts). Yet, Erdoğan made the first statement opposing gender equality at this stage while still serving as Prime Minister[9].

This was followed by what we term 'Pro-family Conservatism' (2011-2015), the stage in which the General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women was retitled by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (2011), and the AKP attempted to outlaw abortion (2012). The Istanbul Convention was incorporated into domestic law by Law No. 6284, which was approved in 2012, and one year later, the Committee on Equality for Women and Men was replaced by the Committee on Family and Social Policies. In 2013, the ruling party turned the Gezi Protests into a platform for polarization and exposed feminists as "the other" who threatened the ideal type of native women. As Özkazanç (2020) said, more than pro-natalist policies, the AKP endorsed family-based principles opposing gender equality. The lifting of the ban reintegrated religious women into the public sphere, but as social unrest grew, it became clear that the AKP used women for its own purposes, widening the gap between social groups and supporting its social base (Yarar, 2023: 1). Some participants, including veiled women, recognized such political exploitation.

In the parliamentary elections held in June 2015, the AKP won 40.8% of the vote, losing both the majority and the chance to change the political and constitutional systems. Future Party (GP) leader and former AKP, Ahmet Davutoğlu, was unable to form a cabinet, and President Tayyip Erdoğan, who was elected in 2014, declined to invite the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to do so, calling for early elections. There was a substantial uptick in violence and attacks on press freedom (e.g., attacks against the newspaper Hürriyet), attacks on HDP offices, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) peace process broke down. Domestically, the Syrian conflict was used as an excuse to suppress Kurds' rights and aid the incumbents in retaining power (limiting HDP representation, rallying support on nationalistic

[9] See Belge, B. (2010). "Women Protest Erdoğan in Women's Meeting". Bianet. Available at: https://m.bianet.org/bianet/gender/125938-women-protest-pm-erdogan-in-women-s-meeting.

voters, etc.). The ruling party ordered the closure of women's rights organizations and news outlets in Southeast Anatolia, like the Jin News Agency, which was staffed entirely by women targeted by "war on terrorism". We term this period, which came along a clearer nationalist[10] and Islamist outline of AKP's conservatism, 'Anti-gender Familialism' (2015-21).

We refer to the fourth stage, which followed the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, as 'State Antifeminism' (2021-). At that stage, the ruling party gave up on what Özkazanç (2020) called Janus's face: on the one hand, a legal framework for gender equality; on the other, the state-sponsored religious acts and a discourse inciting violence. The 2022 attempt to "protect the family" and the "Muslim society" by introducing an amendment targeting the LGBTI+ community – and the 2023 campaign's anti-gender speeches promoting the family as an alternative to womanhood – well illustrated it. Also, the anti-feminist stance claiming feminism weakens the traditional family misrepresents it by seeing women as mothers and wives, limiting citizenship and access to political and economic opportunities. Not unexpectedly, despite commitments to international agreements, Turkey ranks 65th in the Gender Inequality Index (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2022) and 129th in Global Gender Gap Report, the lowest-ranked state in the Eurasia and Central Asia region (World Economic Forum, 2023: 11). It is the lowest-ranked state of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and EU candidates. Although different topics are measured (maternal mortality favours Turkey if compared with states with low levels of human development), Turkey performs poorly when compared to its counterparts.

Women are extremely underrepresented when we look at the institutional domain of the polity. In terms of local politics, between 2014 and 2019, women made up no more than 10.72 per cent of councillors and 2.86 per cent of mayors (Sumbas, 2020: 573), and in 2023, the rate of women in regional assemblies was 8.4 per cent[11]. In national politics, there was 17.4 per cent of women served as Members of Parliament (MP) during the 27th legislative term (2018-23) and 20 per cent in the 28th term (2023-). The under-representation in the TBMM is not higher thanks to the Green Left Party (YSP)[12], considering that 48.4 per cent of its candidates elected in 2023 are women, which contrasts with the 8 per cent of the MHP and the nil percentage of the YRP[13]. Merely Mahinur Özdemir Göktaş,

[10] Nationalism is one of Turkey's main political features and assumes different forms, such as ethnic nationalism (MHP), cultural nationalism (AKP), Kurdish nationalism (HDP), and civic nationalism (CHP). The way the nationalist vote was contested in the 2023 elections is a clear-cut of this dimension and furthers the idea that Turkish nationalism cuts across many ideologies, even among those that support Turkey's engagement with the West. In Chapter 3, we go over this topic.

[11] EIGE. (2023). *Gender Statistic*. Available at https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_pol_parl__wmid_regall_ass/map.

[12] To avoid the risk of a possible closure before the 2023 elections, the HDP ran under the banner of the YSP. In its 4th Extraordinary Congress, held on 27 August 2023, the HDP transferred its activities to the YSP against the risk of closure. Then, the YSP held its 4th Grand Congress on 15 October 2023 and changed its name to the People's Equality and Democracy Party (HEDEP) for the same reasons.

[13] The YRP elected five MPs, making it a short sample. However, it is the only party with parliamentary seats that did not elect women, even if compared to parties that elected fewer MPs. For example, the Workers' Party of Turkey (TIP) elected a woman, despite only being elected 4 MPs.

the Minister of Family and Social Policy, is a woman, therefore, the total of women in ministerial positions is 5.9 per cent, which is much lower than the global average of 22.8 per cent (UN Women, 2023).

In the institutional domain of the economy, women's participation in the market is 34.9 per cent, the unemployment rate is 13.1 per cent (Turkish Institute of Statistics [TÜİK], 2022), and the employment rate is 32.8 per cent, the lowest among OECD states (OECD, 2023b). Women earn one-third (31%) less than men[14], and in education (as we explained in Chapter 2, we consider education in the institutional domain of economy), women denote 66 per cent of illiteracy, have lower levels of education (Caner et al., 2015: 1232), and near 45 per cent of women in Southeast Anatolia are illiterate (Taşkent, 2012).

In the institutional domain of violence, 40 per cent of women have faced physical/sexual violence (UN Women, 2019: 5), and femicide kills more than a woman a day – six out of ten had requested protection before being murdered (Caha et al., 2021: 106). According to the women's organization We Will Stop Femicide (KCDP), femicide increased to 403 in 2022 from 67 in 2008[15], and Çavdar and Yaşar contended that the AKPs governments have done little to prevent it (2019: 168). The AKP is more than negligent, and the state is to blame for gender-based violence because, in the absence of actions against perpetrators, it condones violence. The ruling party's most recent alliances with parties that support limited participation of women in the public sphere are expected to exacerbate the situation, as evidence suggests that this approach undermines autonomy and increases women's vulnerability to abusive relationships and IPV.

Finally, in civil society, in the fields of sexuality and intimacy, the AKP opposes women-friendly policies, and CEFMU still happens in many provinces. The National Immunization Program did not cover the HPV vaccine (Özdemir et al., 2022: 51), and although it was announced in 2022 that this would change, it was also announced that it would be limited by age groups and marital status (excluding single women). Additionally, public policies are deficient in contraception, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), abortion, and family planning[16] (Yılmaz, 2020: 65). This frequently restricts low-income women, as abortion is accessible in private hospitals, and the HPV vaccine is marketed and available to those who can afford it. Moreover, SRHR have been in jeopardy since 2012. In addition to

[14] See BIA News Desk. (2020). "Gender Pay Gap in Turkey". Bianet. Available at https://bianet.org/english/labor/231160-gender-pay-gap-in-turkey-women-earn-a-third-less-than-men.
[15] KCDP. (2022). *Digital memorial for women's violence death*. KCDP. Available at http://anitsayac.com/?year=2022.
[16] "They are talking about population planning and birth control. No Muslim family can have such an approach". Erdoğan, R. T. 30 May 2016. Live television speech. Ankara.

the attempt to outlaw abortion, the 2012 “cesarean law” and the 2016 and 2020 “marry your rapist” bills are examples of such an approach.

The analysis of the gender dynamics of the political regimes is a timely endeavour due to the link between gender equality and the structure of political regimes. This suggests women's potential for change, as well as their role in renewing social contracts. As a result of this dynamic, it is critical to study gender as a structural and institutional practice, emphasizing the role of gender equality in sustainable development and shining a light on women's issues in politics. Furthermore, studying women's potential for change on the one hand and gender as an institutional practice on the other allows us to comprehend the cleavage between the state's claim of cultural authenticity and women's revindication for gender equality. Turkey is a relevant case study as even though its legal framework has recognized women’s rights, it has more and more the lowest signs of gender equality among NATO and OECD countries. It is critical to consider differences between legislation and implementation not only for interpreting its regime and making recommendations but also for informing on the shortcomings of theoretical frameworks and strictly legislative-based indexes. Gender plays a central role in Turkish politics, and a sign of its de-democratization is its opposition to gender equality.

Review of the literature

The scholarship on gender and politics in Turkey is divided into three main periods. The first period studies gender politics in the so-called second-wave feminism that occurred in Turkey in the 1980s rather than the 1960s (Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu, 2017: 155; Diner and Toktaş; 2010: 41). Tekeli was the first to examine this topic, studying women’s political behaviour and the barriers to their political participation. Tekeli interviewed 69 MPs and concluded that 60.4 per cent recognized marriage, motherhood, and gender social norms as having a negative impact on women's political participation (1982: 320). Respondents noted that the Parliament did not take women's rights into account, and Tekeli stressed that women were marginalized since politics was conducted according to male standards (1991: 121). This is an “absence syndrome” (Tekeli, 1991: 117). Güneş-Ayata explained Tekeli's arguments and set she was the first to study topics like awareness, equality, and gender, and to claim that legal rights *per se* do not guarantee women's rights (2001: 159). Actually, Tekeli was the first to identify gender inequality as a structural issue, but she focused too much on middle-class and educated women. This could have been the basis for her link with liberal feminism

(Knaus, 2007), however, she argued, "It wasn't capitalism that did it [the gender inequality], it was men and the male domination" (Tekeli, 2009: 115), recognizing patriarchy. Tekeli focused on a liberal feminist object of study but went beyond the analysis of the legislative framework to consider variables, like marriage and motherhood, that liberal feminism traditionally ignored. Afterwards, Tekeli studied political disinterest and concluded it was caused by a capitalistic gender division of labour; however, as Grünell and Voeten said, Tekeli explored alternative explanations and deserted the Marxist perspective (1997: 224). That is why Tekeli's viewpoint, we claim, brings her closer to radical feminism.

Subsequently, authors like Yeşim Arat contributed to Turkish second-wave feminism. Arat stated that male dominance prevented women from accessing political power and wrote a thesis titled "The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey" on women's struggles in the TBMM and underrepresentation. The aims were to understand how women move from "the private to the public world in Turkey and see the extent to which patriarchal explanation could shed light on the issue" (Arat, 1989: 117). Although the research was conducted before the theorization of gender regimes, the private-public continuum was already a subject of concern. Arat clarified that despite the "unequal power relation between men and women works against women to keep them away from politics" (1989: 122), the few women in the TBMM (the amount declined from 4.5% in 1935 to less than 1% in 1977) worked on raising consciousness, multipartyism, rights (ibid: 47-48) and women's role in politics (ibid: 123). Arat previously claimed that women had never been organized to fight for their rights and had not started awareness-raising groups after gaining the right to vote (1985: 355). As a result, rather than celebrating accomplishments, Law No. 2827 (or the abortion law) was a top-down family planning policy endorsed by men (Arat, 1985: 355) without any feminist purposes. Tekeli and Arat brought common topics to those raised by their Western counterparts twenty years earlier, such as gender-based violence, sexuality, and representation. However, they do not consider the political regime, and at a time when Turkey faced its third coup d'état (1980) and political violence was extremely high, it would be valuable to understand the effect of political violence on gender-based violence.

Following a period when the study of gender and politics focused on identity politics and the veil (Kadıoğlu, 1998; Göle, 1997; Saktanber and Çorbacioğlu, 2008), the regime became the axis of the study of gender and politics. Arat was the first to analyze the nexus between the regime, conservatism, and gender equality in AKP's first terms, claiming that religious-oriented cadres were migrating into civil society and the educational system, limiting women's participation in the public sphere (2010: 881). Çakır (2014) used Arat's views to debate women MPs and political citizenship. After studying underrepresentation and the lack of participation, Çakır concluded that traditional roles

imposed new barriers to political participation (2014: 227). However, whereas Arat and Çakır evaluate the AKP's religious-oriented stance to explain outcomes on political citizenship, Acar and Altunok (2013) emphasized its costs for intimate citizenship. Acar and Altunok (2013) relied on Plummer's (2001) conception and is the only study considering intimacy as a feature of citizenship.

Based on populism and neoliberalism, Kandiyoti argued that gender is a discourse that "pits an authentically national us against an anti-national them" (2016: 103), which is an echo of the political regime's populism and nationalism. Kandiyoti argued the AKP's neoliberal ambition of reducing the state's responsibility was followed by a discourse shift to strengthen the family (2016: 106), which is supported by Altunok's view of neo-conservatism as an approach of reasoning that supports moral hierarchies and controls how people behave (2016: 133). Gender-based violence, according to Kandiyoti, is an effect of "masculinist restoration" rather than "entrenched patriarchy" (2016: 109), and sexism increases the likelihood of gender-based violence, which is caused by the threat that powerful women represent to masculinity. Similarly, Özgüler and Yarar (2017) analyzed neoliberalism, conservatism, and sexism. The AKP is responsible for legislation governing women's bodies and sexuality, Özgüler and Yarar claimed, which is related to Koyuncu and Özman's (2019) gender stigmatization. The literature acknowledged the nature of the regime and its effects on the private sphere, and while the first stage was primarily focused on the public, the second stage was concerned with the ways in which the religiously-centred stance affected women's intimacy.

The third period began once the concept of gender regime was introduced. The discursive use of women's bodies and sexualities, according to Cindoğlu and Unal, was the principal strategy used to maintain the conservative gender regime (2016: 39), which is notable for the government's anti-abortion initiative and the limitations placed on c-sections (ibid: 42). Cindoğlu and Unal claimed that after the AKP's authoritarian turn in 2011, it was clear that its religious-conservative ideology produced oppressive sexual norms, resulting in a highly gender-regulated regime (2016: 47). Also, Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün coined the concept "religio-conservative gender climate" to define, like Özkazanç's (2020) Janus face, the gap between the legal framework and gender. Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün contended that, although recognizing international agreements, the ruling party had an opposed stance to the legal framework (2017: 616). Such an approach was taken under a "religio-conservative gender climate", which meant that a patriarchal gender order was being restored at the intersection of nationalism, Islamism, and neoliberalism (2017: 616).

In a comparative study of Turkey and Russia, contrary to Kandiyoti (2016), Doğangün defined patriarchy as an aspect of authoritarianism (2019: 2) and outlined the relations between gender

inequality and the AKP's authoritarian-nationalist policies. Doğangün said the promotion of gender roles deepened gender hierarchies (2019: 101), the regime's effects on the private sphere were the main factor of gender inequality, and nationalism was a major part of the gender regime. Doğangün (2019) and Kandiyoti (2016) offered proper guides for rendering sexism in institutions and must be seen as complementary rather than opposed. Çavdar and Yaşar studied employment, health, and education, and like Doğangün (2019), said that gender policies have been improved by neoliberal religious patriarchy that idealizes women as mothers and wives (Çavdar and Yaşar, 2019: 58). According to Çavdar and Yaşar, the AKP encouraged women to be politically active to mobilize voters and spread traditional norms, not to assume decision-making positions (2019: 68).

Other studies stressed the role of neoliberalism within the gender regime. For example, Borsuk et al. said that there was an alliance between neoliberalism and authoritarianism (2022: 19), citing Turkey as a sample "of democratic backsliding in line with rising poverty and inequalities that have been amplified as a result of sweeping neoliberal reforms" (2022: 12). More recently, Kocabıçak (2020) studied the gender regime and focused on raising an alternative framework on its varieties. Conducting historical-sociological research, Kocabıçak studied the development of a neoliberal public gender regime with private/domestic structures, compared gaps in education and employment, and revised childcare provision until 2015. However, by limiting the study until 2015, Kocabıçak did not consider the stages of 'Anti-gender Familialism' and 'State Anti-feminism', even though she provided major information on the regime in the early Republic. Due to the temporal barrier, Kocabıçak was unable to study the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, ignoring the reactionary nature of the regime and the most recent private/domestic form of women's exclusion. But Kocabıçak acknowledged that, even in more progressive electoral circles, most of the women's work was done at home (2020: 824), and the AKP encouraged the rise in the number of children and supported women to be full-time caregivers (ibid: 825).

Finally, Telseren (2020) identified five phases of gender and politics during the AKP's rule. Telseren stated policies were compatible with gender equality in the first two terms (2020: 365); however, in the third term, the party became more authoritarian, populist, and nationalist. The fourth stage showed a chauvinistic view of women, and the last period (post-2018) focused on the role of the family at the expense of gender equality (Telseren, 2020: 379). We understand the plan to divide 'Anti-gender Familialism' into two steps because of the end of the state of emergency and the shift to a presidential system, but we must not forget that the Divorce Commission (2016), which proposed a 10-year ceiling for alimony restricting divorced women's autonomy with children under their care, had

already been set. The AKP proposed the 'marry your rapist' bill (2016), which would overturn a man's conviction for child abuse if he married the victim, and the TBMM passed a bill allowing Sunni servants to perform marriages (2017). This shows how, despite the discursive focus on family, the period from 2018 to 2020 was not a new stage but rather the maintenance of the AKP's familialist project.

Concerning the political regime, there is a balance between the second and third phases of the literature on the state's religious-oriented stance. However, while the second-phase studies identified populist and neoliberal stances, the third-phase studies identified the political regime as authoritarian, and its democratic breakdown was recognized for the first time. These studies laid the grounds for the study of gender and politics in Turkey but have two limitations that we want to address. Firstly, conclusions about the political regime are not drawn from research on the gender regime. It enables us to highlight the relational dimension between the nature of the political regime and gender equality and the major role that gender plays in politics. Second, nationalism has been disregarded (except for Kandiyoti [2016] and Doğangün [2019]). Thus, it is hard to understand the attempts to renegotiate a social contract based on an ideal type that is wholly at odds with the one envisioned by the Republic's founders. The result is the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, which, if ignored, will make it challenging to understand policies that impact how men and women in Turkey experience citizenship.

Selecting and understanding the theoretical framework

Many studies have focused on this functionalist perspective of Turkey's social structures. Gender, according to structural functionalism, is a rational category of division of labour that divides social roles based on biological biases. Men provide for the family's financial needs, while women handle domestic duties, given "the dependence of the human infant", the "disabilities of pregnancy", and "breastfeeding" (Parsons, 1991: 109). Thus, men are the single-income providers, and women do not participate in the market (Ganong and Coleman, 2004: 178). However, this functionalist model has some limitations.

Firstly, it disregards social and political developments that run counter to Parsons' main argument. Bryan S. Turner's preface to *The Social System* notes that Parsons was devoted to pre-industrial agrarian societies and favoured conservatism, authority, and sacredness. His thesis was developed based on this biased perspective. Secondly, the idea that the subject acts according to social

norms ignores the agency's role and autonomy (Holmwood, 2005: 93), and thirdly, restricts women to unpaid employment and only considers benefits for society while disregarding effects on women (ibid: 98). Moreover, structural functionalism is based on an anti-feminist interpretation of gender as biological, with men and women fulfilling pre-existing roles. Parson used reproduction and breastfeeding to justify gender discrimination, while structural functionalism weakened equality by robbing women of autonomy and driving them into abusive relationships.

In an effort to clearly explain the gender implications of this functionalist perspective, we wrote this PhD thesis based on the theory of critical feminism, which is better developed in Chapter 1 and whose option has three reasons we want to address. Firstly, the theory of critical feminism provides an all-inclusive analysis of gendered experiences, not limiting gender equality to an identity issue (e.g., the veil or the secularism-Islamism cleavage[17]) or disregarding attributes like ethnicity (e.g., do Kurdish women feel less represented by the state?) and income (are low-income women subjected to additional forms of exclusion?). It also does not prevent one from seeing recognition or non-recognition based on religion, aiding in understanding higher levels of representation among pious, veiled women.

Secondly, the theory of critical feminism is not restricted to the legal framework, which is crucial to enlarging the analysis's focus since laws are not always put into practice. For instance, compulsory education in Turkey lasts twelve years, but 7 per cent of girls (aged 8 to 12) were not attending school (Caner et al., 2015: 1231). Even though the law allows equal rights, economic constraints and social norms prevent girls from attending school. Equality is not enough to ensure women's access to rights. It does not ensure real equality and conceals inequality as having access to resources and opportunities and being legally entitled to them can give the impression that one exercised or received one's rights (Meer and Sever, 2004: 19). For example, let's look at abortion. Despite being legal, it is getting harder and harder to have access to it; only 3.4 per cent of state hospitals in Turkey provide abortion services without restrictions until the end of the 10th week of pregnancy (O'Neil, Altuntaş, and Keskin, 2020: 1). Very few women have access to abortion, but the fact that it is legal creates a false perception that women can access it. Thirdly, it follows gender equality as a multifaceted issue. The experiences of an uneducated, elderly, poor, south-eastern Kurdish woman are not the same as those of an Istanbul-based, middle-class, well-educated, young

[17] Political Islam gained prominence in the late 20th century, polarizing the debate between secularism and Islamism and increasing identity politics. At that time, the veil took on a special meaning, leading to the distinction between *başörtüsü*, the traditional veil, and what the opposition calls *türban*, the representative veil of Political Islam. For a more detailed analysis, see Aksoy, M. (2005). *Başörtüsü-Türban: Batılılaşma-Modernleşme, Laiklik ve Örtünme* [Headscarf-Turban: Westernization-Modernization, Secularism and Veiling]. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.

Turkish woman[18]. There are several regimes of inequality[19], other than those based on gender, that impact women's experiences of citizenship.

Critical feminism, which has its roots in Critical Theory itself, criticizes Habermas' notion of the public sphere by asserting that there are few opportunities for women's participation due to the public/private division (e.g., gendered nature of domestic work leaves women as the only ones responsible for the care). The public/private division, according to critical feminism, assigned men the role of agents of citizenship, relegating women to the private sphere and excluding them from the public. Additionally, as the existentialist acceptance of freedom suggests, women have the right to make their own decisions but are limited by biased structures and laws. Beauvoir's existentialism deeply persuaded critical feminism in this perspective: women are ontologically free, but whether the agency experiences freedom depends on the structure (does the state endorse equal rights for women?) and attributes like income, ethnicity, age, religion, and others. As a result, intersectionality is crucial to this framework as well.

That is why postmodernism must be kept in mind, despite conflicting opinions (Benhabib advocated for feminism of low postmodern impact at the risk of penalizing emancipation while Judith Butler aims for postmodern feminism). In this vein, we advance the hybrid critical feminism proposed by Nancy Fraser's theory of gender justice[20], which comprises redistribution, recognition, and representation. For example, distribution cares about the lack of policies to support women's decent work (the economy), while recognition stresses gender-based violence (violence). As Fraser explained, authoritarianism institutionalizes and normalizes masculinity (1998: 100), so even if the ratio of women in poverty is reduced and the gender pay gap is closed, gender inequality still exists (1996: 27). Also, representation contests the boundaries that refuse interaction (electoral systems that do not guarantee parity). Fraser questioned theories of justice by reiterating a concept of justice as "participatory parity" (1996: 27) that permits "all to participate as peers in social life" (2013: 193). According to Fraser, institutions did not represent women because they ignored the impact that gender has on society. Actually, representation is crucial to feminist-inspired political science as it rejects the androcentric view of male citizenship as universal that serves to justify the exclusion of women from the exercise of power (Gilas and Parcero, 2021: 16). Having said that, considering the right to representation at decision-

[18] While we contrast Kurdish and Turkish women often throughout this study, we do so solely on the basis of ethnic belonging.

[19] When referring to attributes (ethnicity, class, etc.) causing gender inequality, we use the terms "axes of injustice" (Fraser, 2008), "regimes of inequality" (Walby, 2009), and "axes of domination" (Butler, 1990) interchangeably. Regarding class, we define it here based on the participants' perceived income adequacy (PIA), following a Weberian view of class as a flexible economic position. Also, class is related to lifestyle, with factors such as education, background and affiliation all coming into play. Thus, being well-educated or living in a rural region, for example, also impacts the participants' experiences.

[20] Do not confuse Fraser's gender justice – synonymous with gender equality – with its conservative Turkish counterpart – synonymous with gender complementarity, the religious viewpoint that holds that men and women have different but complementary roles and responsibilities.

making positions, we reexamined Nancy Fraser's perspective on representation and distribution. Even though we are based on this framework, the data collected prove the meaning of economic autonomy and responsiveness, so we reinterpreted Fraser's theory and developed a middle-range theory integrating both.

Firstly, achieving equal distribution involves an honest commitment to full employment –an SDG on its own, given goal 8 to promote full and productive employment – including women's participation in the labour market, gender-equal pay, no long-term unemployment, precarious work, and co-dependent relationships. Sure, women's full employment does not imply gender equality in and of itself, but it paves the way to close gender economic gaps. There are data relating domestic violence to unemployment (Anderberg et al., 2016; Tarshis, 2022), and while participating in the market does not prevent gender-based violence, it makes it easier to leave abusive relationships. As Walby said, "Women with fewer economic resources are more vulnerable to domestic violence" (2009: 209). Similarly, participants who admitted to suffering from IPV and being unemployed told us that economic co-dependence forced them into abusive relationships. Furthermore, participants who, despite not having experienced IPV, work in victim support organizations stated that a lack of economic autonomy is a risk factor and that the victims' exclusion from the market forced them into abusive relationships.

Fraser criticized full employment but did not consider changes in paid work and saw women in the family as being limited by someone else productive work. Thence, we take a different stance regarding Social Reproduction Theory (SRT). Autonomy is refused by the hint that women should be rewarded for relieving men from care so they (men) can pursue paid employment. Our approach is more like Benhabib's critical feminism. Privatization of women's experiences does not term "recognition of equal female autonomy" (Benhabib, 1992: 155), and there is no emancipation without "enhancing the agency, autonomy, and women's selfhood" (1992: 214). The idea that women are more likely than men to be primary caregivers, assuming the duty of care, supports gender stereotypes. Many women depend on the state to protect their well-being, but in the contest for gender equality, this must be a means rather than the end. When this is ideologically motivated, preventing women from working productively, it creates inequalities. Given its religious-conservative agenda, instead of investing in structures that relieve women of these responsibilities, the Turkish ruling party encourages women to leave the market, declines economic autonomy, and extents co-dependency. Women should participate in the market as a condition of redistribution.

Second, we claim that responsive women in decision-making positions promote women's representation. We are aware of the gap between successful women and those at the bottom, but we

argue women's leadership improves policymaking responsiveness, transforms gender relations, lessens inequality, and builds a more representative polity. Pitkin's (1967) symbolic representation redeveloped gender social norms and gave participation legitimacy. The point is that, as debated in Chapter 1, for women in decision-making positions to effectively represent other women, they must be responsive. Presence in politics (Phillips, 1995) is set by representativeness (descriptive representation) but what gives a sense of belonging is responsiveness (substantive representation). This is the issue of representation; not only the presence in decision-making positions but their role in representing and speaking up for other women. Of course, this should not be seen as a rejection of Fraser's opinion on the distinction between privileged and underprivileged women. Contrary, we value the term as a structure for locating inequalities, but supposing that women in decision-making positions are different from those on the bottom should not prevent one from seeing the former as a way to promote gender equality.

Research questions, objectives, and arguments

The synthesis of three fields of study led to the development of this thesis. Firstly, this thesis is a political science study of Turkey's political regime, a significant case study in light of the change of the political system, the de-democratization, and the predominance of political actors. Furthermore, as the state is a gender-structured body, gender analysis is an effective technique for understanding the political regime. As a result, it is a study on gender and politics. Second, as gender is the main category of analysis in this research, gender studies are at the forefront of it. We agree with Costa and Sawer that the incapability of political science to address issues of global politics is due to the field's lack of gender recognition (2019: 268). According to that view, the foundational concepts of political science (e.g., citizenship) were developed using an androcentric (and not truly universal) approach that rejected women's representation and their right to actively engage in politics.

Third, given feminism is a scientific technique that studies women's experiences, we want to understand how experiences of citizenship impact the prospects of the political regime. We claim that there is a relationship between citizens (women) and the state (political regime), which is why the political regime is gender-oriented (gender regime) and has a gendered view of its citizens (the gendered nature of citizenship). We propose 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship', even though we concur with Isin and Nielsen's (2008) view that citizenship is a set of social, political, and cultural "acts

of citizenship" (rather than just a legal status) and with Ahn's perspective that it is "everything we do and experience" (2018: 176). We suggest integrating a gender perspective into different dimensions of citizenship: political citizenship (Bagchi, 2000; Janosky and Gran, 2002), economic citizenship (Kessler-Harris, 2003; Moghadam, 2013), and intimate citizenship Plummer, 2001). The dimensions are related to each domain – the greater the democratization of polity, the greater the political citizenship – and there is an indirect cross-cutting correlation between dimensions of citizenship and the domains – economy influences intimacy, as lower incomes increase exposure to domestic violence. Similar to Corbin and Strauss (2008 [1990]), when we refer to experiences, we are not talking about "inner experiences". Rather, we refer to an all-inclusive concept to describe how someone participates in a process – how women (agency) experience the de-democratization (process) of the political regime in Turkey (structure).

Considering that we based this analysis on Kessler-Harris's view of economic citizenship as a "right to work at the occupation of one's choice; earn wage adequate"; "to a nondiscriminatory job market; to the education and training that facilitates access to it; to the social benefits necessary to sustain and support labour force participation"(2003: 159), an explanation must be addressed. From our perspective, and in line with Walby (2009; 2020), the economy is comprised not only of the market but also of tasks produced by domestic labour and welfare activities carried out by the state. That is why economic citizenship covers a set of social rights (Moghadam, 2013), including education. Education is a socio-economic ladder, and as previously said, it impacts GDP and state economic development. As a result, as opposed to Walby's suggestion, we study education in the context of the economy. On intimate citizenship, although some studies use the concept of sexual citizenship to express it (Lister, 2002; Richardson, 2000), we employ the former as it does not only pay attention to SRHR (contraception, abortion, bodily autonomy, the HPV vaccine, family planning, etc.) but also to a variety of issues related to the private and the intimacy, (e.g., divorce, parenting, and marriage). This is what Plummer terms "intimate troubles" (Plummer, 2003). When it comes to political citizenship, we agree with Lister: citizenship is a performative act of "acting as a citizen" rather than merely the organic experience of "being a citizen" (Lister, 1998: 229). That is why we consider participation as respondents to be a (political) act of citizenship and emphasize this aspect in the thesis subtitle.

Chapter 3 presents the gendered situation of the political regime, expounding the title "Women in the New Turkey (2007-2022)", while Chapters 4 and 5 use field research to understand women's prospects, explaining the subtitle "Experiences on (political) citizenship and the (gender) regime". We examine the gender regime while also trying to understand how patterns or tensions in

citizenship lead to similarities or contradictions in women's perspectives on the regime. The timeline runs from 2007 – the beginning of the gendered de-democratization ('State Pro-feminism') – to 2022 – the current stage ('State Anti-feminism') and the end of the interviews. Asking questions about the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention (2021) is significant as it calls into question the widely held belief in Turkey that gender is a sociocultural problem of implementation rather than a political-legislative issue. While it's true that this has been the case for a while, the withdrawal confirms what subjects like the Divorce Commission had been hinting at previously (the 'Anti-gender Familialism'). Since the withdrawal condones acts of violence, elevating sexuality to a normative order and inspiring complementarity opposing gender equality, it is urgent to study it as a political issue. Moreover, it is a structural issue that denies women the right to recognition. But what makes this gender regime exclusive? How can 'gendering de-democratization' be explained? What does that mean in terms of gender and politics? To answer those questions, we address the following main research question and additional secondary questions, linking them on a multi-level micro-meso-macro basis (political regime/gender regime/women's experiences of citizenship):

- How do women interpret the political regime in Turkey from a gender perspective?

    - How does the political regime locate itself regarding gender equality?
    - What restricts women's experiences of citizenship in Turkey?

Our main goals are to uncover the meanings women assign to their experiences during the AKP rule and to provide new perspectives on how politics influences women's experiences of citizenship. These goals are not unintended and may indicate change within the state, society and the political regime. Indeed, the gender national-religious structure makes it possible to draw several inferences on a proposal for a national identity based on a religious (Sunni Muslim) conception of the (Turkish) nation. Specifically, the objectives of the thesis are:

- To interpret whether and how the state under Tayyip Erdoğan's rule proposes a new ideal type based on a national-religious structure.
- To perceive the relationship between women (citizens) and the political regime (state)
- To comprehend the conditions surrounding the domains of policy, the economy, violence, and civil society.

We argue that there is a correlation between opposing gender equality and the nature of the political regime. In particular, we assert that by encouraging an idealized view of women, a gender-biased structure that excludes women from the public sphere has shaped the de-democratization process and polarized Turkish society. Secondly, we claim that the political regime, referred to as 'New Turkey', sponsors religious acts and institutionalizes non-equal familialist social rules. We contend that the AKP's discourse is becoming more religiously conservative in its treatment of women and that the idea that the family (and not the individual) is the foundation of national unity normalizes gender-based violence.

Thirdly, we argue that this approach has implications for care policies and is consistent with the ruling party's economic policy. When the state's investments are reduced, and in case of the nonexistence of a public policy that promotes gender equality, women assume responsibilities that, otherwise, the state would provide, mainly when combined with a religious-conservative and familialist view of women. As a result, women prefer unstable, low-paying part-time jobs and tend to quit their jobs. Childcare facilities easily clarify this point. Only 10.5 per cent of children aged 3 attend childcare facilities in Turkey, and enrollment of children aged 4 is 34 per cent, significantly lower than in France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Ireland, with an attendance of 100 per cent (OECD, 2023a). Private providers charge costly fees, and public ones, albeit less expensive, charge costly prices to low-income families. Consequently, women leave the market and stay at home to take care of their children.

Research design, epistemology, and methodology: a short introduction

Political science still has a gender bias. Because its definitions and contributions were based on a male vision, political science has emphasized a male citizen-voter while ignoring those who did not participate in the exercise of power (women) and how they relate with the state (Gilas and Parcero, 2021: 9-10). To constrain these biases, it is needed to rebuild androcentric discourses, recognize women as political actors, and include a gender perspective like the research question expounds, which goes beyond using gender as an analytical variable and critically studies reality through a broad understanding of politics and power[21]. Therefore, we implement a feminist-inspired approach to political science, which employs gendered analytical tools and explores gendered life. We move away from traditional political thinking by

[21] See Lorenza Perini's explanation of gender perspective as having nothing to do with "women's viewpoint". Perini, L. (2016). "Teaching in a Gender Perspective". *Italian Political Science*. Vol. 11 (2): 19-23. This topic is also covered in Chapter 4.

emphasizing gender as a concept of social and political content and opposing normative views that legitimize gender experiences based on gender-unequal patterns.

We embrace an interpretivist (methodology) post-positivist critical feminist (epistemology) perspective, which places itself as a challenge to the traditional positivist epistemology. Rather than focusing on methodological contingencies, we conducted semi-structured interviews and prioritized women's experiences and voices, developing a qualitative feminist-grounded theory model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey. This interpretivist methodology explains the already mentioned research questions, which aim to comprehend the complexity of the gender regime in Turkey. The grounded theory method redeveloped the questions during the research process while developing codes/categories inductively and generating theory from data. In Chapter 4, we address the methodological and epistemological issues and assert that a feminist-grounded theory is gainful in producing in-depth research on gender and politics.

We must consider two different stages in the fieldwork. Firstly, we realized the pilot study and met with an activist and two academics working on gender politics. The meetings resulted in useful references, like refraining from assuming pious Sunni Muslim women have an incontestably traditional view of the role of women (pre-existing concepts should not be used, as determined by grounded theory); going back to the data after the initial interviews to decide if any questions had to be changed, and assessing the need to introduce new questions (according to grounded theory, abstract categories are created inductively during the research process). Such collaborations aided in avoiding preestablished assumptions, adjusting questions on the religious veil, and asking about the Istanbul Convention. At this time, policy documental analysis was carried out, including analysis of foreign agreements (e.g., 2006-2010 Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men; 2011-2020 European Pact for Gender Equality; the Istanbul Convention...), as well as national laws (e.g., Article 10 of the Constitution of Turkey; Article 68 of the Civil Code; Articles 3, 122, 216 and 277 of the Penal Code; Article 5 of the Labor Law; Law No. 2827 of the 1983 Population Planning Law; Law 6284 to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women...). We concluded that not only is the law occasionally established on a normative gender basis, but it is also disregarded (mostly international agreements). This stage was fundamental as it aided us in looking beyond the data and developing a thorough understanding of the interviews.

Following the pilot study, we settled on the participants' profiles based on the selection criteria and pre-defined analytical categories (Table 3). Because of the intersectional framework, we study categories, such as perceived income adequacy (PIA) or ethnicity, that affect participants' experiences

of citizenship. Even though the policy documental analysis was suitable for examining legal and political subjects, semi-structured interviews served a dual purpose: to understand how different agencies interact differently with the political regime (e.g., is it common for a young lesbian woman to feel underrepresented in light of the government's stance on LGBTI+ issues? Are Kurdish women the ones who changed their views of the structure the most during the de-democratization process? Is a middle-aged veiled woman likely to identify ways of representation ignored by secular women?) and to produce knowledge on the topic: different experiences develop different prospects. Nevertheless, as *gendered de-democratization* advances, the gap declines, and women find points of convergence, experiencing new acts of citizenship.

Table 3: Participants' Profiles

SELECTION CRITERIA To identify as a woman (cisgender or transgender) To be of legal age (18 or older) To have Turkish citizenship To join a pre-established profile	ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES	PROFILE		
	Age Perceived income adequacy Ethnicity Province Education Party identification	Mass Interview	Women voters (P.1)	Women who exercise political rights without engaging in politics. They take part in elections (not the least because voting is mandatory in Turkey) but rarely engage in political discourse, demonstrations, or other informal forms of political participation.
		Elite interview	Women activists (P.2)	Women who are active in the women's rights movement. They can engage in street politics or other non-formal forms of political participation (e.g., online activism), without having to be a part of foundations, organizations, or institutions.
			Women politicians (P.3)	Women who hold/seek elected positions in politics. They can hold/seek political office in national or local politics, in any political party, or as independent candidates.
			Women academics (P.4)	Women working on gendering political science or other Social Sciences, such as Sociology or Economics (professors, researchers, lecturers...).

The fieldwork occurred between October 2020 and July 2022, and 53 semi-structured interviews – plus the pilot study – were conducted: 25 online interviews and 28 in-person interviews. Despite mass interviews (P.1) with 13 ordinary women chosen at random with the aim of understanding what women in the street – average women, distinct from experts – think about the gender regime, we conducted elite interviews (P.2; P.3; P.4) with 15 activists, 11 politicians, and 14 academicians, who represent 13 women's rights organizations, 9 political parties, and 9 universities (Table 4). All the interviews were transcribed and coded (open, axial, and selective coding) using NVIVO software, which enabled the establishment of an overall sense of the topic. Codes were sorted into higher-level concepts, compared for patterns/similarities, and contrasted for singularities/contradictions.

Eight categories emerged due to conceptualizing the data. Table 5 presents the codebook for qualitative analysis created on the grounds of these categories. The data collection and analysis are explained in Chapter 4, but very briefly, categories are themes and "higher-level concepts under which analysts group lower-level concepts" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 159). Figure 1 shows one of our memos (reactions to participant narratives) explaining these interpretative conceptual labels: lower-level concepts, such as "religious", "Islamic_Muslim", and "veiled", are related to the higher-level concept of "Locating the Self". Lower-level concepts are explanatory terms, while higher-level concepts can be applied to other participants. Similarly, as shown in Table 5, lower-level concepts of "feminist", "social democrat", and "nationalist", are properties (some characteristics that define or describe concepts) of different participants, but both indicate the same category. The same for "Sexuality and Intimacy"; many participants identified it through different lower-level concepts like "abortion" and the "HPV vaccine".

The interviews were based on a 10-question interview guide (Appendix B) and included sensitizing, practical, and guiding questions (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In the first section, the questions were designed to determine the participants' political stance, background, and prospects on gender issues in Turkey. Participants were asked about their political thoughts, whether they had ever experienced gender discrimination, and opinions on problems that women face most regularly. It explores socioeconomic and demographic categories and uncovers how they influence participants' prospects in categories identified by the grounded theory study. For example, there is a tendency among Kurdish women (ethnicity) to take a left and pro-Kurdish stance (Locating the Self). The domains were the main topic of the interview's second stage. We conducted the interview based on key prompts like the HPV vaccine, pap smears, CEFMU, informal economy, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, and others. The purpose was to understand whether it is possible to establish a pattern in

each of the domains (is there a specific group of women who feel more represented? Which women have encountered more difficulties in accessing education?) and to confirm whether their experiences in each domain are consistent with the overall interpretation they have of the gender regime. In the third section, we asked participants about their political prospects over the previous 20 years and how they perceived the significance of women's issues in Turkish politics. Despite the different backgrounds, it was possible to see some patterns in the participants' interpretations of the political (and gender) regime. For instance, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention is very vivid in their minds, who also generally acknowledge the legislative progress in the first terms. Moreover, regardless of the party affiliation and the background, participants agreed on identifying an issue: violence against women. This is where the participants most often agree, which emphasizes how urgent it is to take action to tackle femicide in the country.



2 July 2021

Entry into the AKP and locating the self

The reason for the closure was the focus on the reactionary movement. The Supreme Court said that the Virtue Party, Fazilet Partisi, was a reactionary movement. Then they have prevented Merve Kavakçı, the headscarf MP [from taking her oath of office]. This was very important due to the headscarf prohibition, a situation that became stricter through the years, mostly after Merve Kavakçı's case. She couldn't be an MP and the problem became bigger. For headscarf women, the situation was very... very tough, very difficult for us. At the time, the AK Party, the Justice and Development Party, was about to be founded. So, they offered me to be a founding member and I said okay. When it was proposed, I accepted because we had said, after the Refah Party closure, that we would fight for the headscarf issue. It meant our educational, voting, and political rights.

The participant does not identify the RP as a reactionary movement, but rather as one that the secular government of the time considered as so. I am not sure if she did it intentionally or just as a way of contextualizing/explaining the political events in Turkey at the end of the 1990s. She looked back at the invitation she received from the AKP and the reasons that led her to accept. She reiterates how the veil affected her decision to join the AKP by first discussing the ban placed by the DSP in 1999 on an MP attending a ceremony while wearing a headscarf. I'm not sure if she felt it was necessary to justify why she joined the party. Or perhaps the issue of the veil has such significant value for her that she cannot separate it from herself. Under the higher-level concept of "locating the self" come lower-level concepts, properties that help define who she is, such as "religious", "Islamic_Muslim", and "veiled". The statement "we would fight for the veil" support such concepts.

Figure 1. Screenshot 1 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

Table 4. Elite interviews

Political Parties	Women's Civil Society Organizations	Universities
	Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates	
	Awen for Us	
Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA)	Capital City Women's Platform	Ankara University
Future Party (GP)	Flying Broom	Bahçeşehir University
Good Party (IP)	Gender Equality Monitoring Project	Bilgi University
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)	Havle Women's Association	Boğaziçi University
Patriotic Party (VP)	Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation	Doğuş University
Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)	Purple Solidarity	Hacettepe University
Republican People's Party (CHP)	Women's Solidarity Foundation	Middle East Technical University
Women's Party (KP)	We Will Stop Femicide Platform	Sabancı University
Workers' Party of Turkey (TIP)	Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey	Sivas Cumhuriyet University
	Women for Women's Human Rights (WWHR) – New Ways	
	Women's Platform for Equality	

Table 5. Codebook for qualitative analysis

Name	Description	Example
Gendering de-democratization	A gendered-oriented de-democratization that controls how institutions work and engage with society.	"The EU was content with Erdoğan because of the Syrians and did not even talk about democracy or gender equality".
Economy	Participation in the market, the welfare aspects of polity, and private relations produced by domestic work outside the market.	"Women provide services and goods, being a strong part of the economy".
(Non-)participation in the market	Women's market participation in a job of their choice and earning an adequate wage.	"Women are withdrawing from the market to work as invisible labourers within the domestic sphere".
(Under)representation in the market	Women's small representation in the market, resulting in exclusion, discrimination, and unconscious biases.	"The way they introduced flexibility and provided part-time jobs works on the consolation of familialist politics".
Economic (non-)autonomy	Women's capacity to generate income and financial resources based on access to paid work under equal conditions with men.	There are men saying women's economic independence is not good because when they have it, they easily divorce".
Feminization of precarious work	Occupational gender-related discrepancies and paid inequalities that women encounter in the market.	"Women's role is to support the economy by working in insecure jobs".
Gender (im)balance in management positions	Executive positions are significantly lower for women than those for men, who still dominate the top executive positions.	"The glass ceiling and leadership are something that is discussed among white collars".
Gender pay gap	A measure valuing the contribution in the workforce that shows the difference between the average earnings.	"There are structural barriers like glass ceilings, and there are no policies for equal pay for equal work".
Household	A group of people who live together. The gendered division of household is still accepted almost everywhere.	"Low workforce participation of women helps the government as it improves the status of housewives".
Welfare state	The provision of basic economic security and social well-being by the state to its citizens.	"If there are no care facilities for children, women have to withdraw from the market".
Education	Set of issues on education, including attendance at school and	"Parents who do not want their daughters to go to school can

Name	Description	Example
	completion of mandatory education.	interrupt education. Even if it's compulsory".
Educational Reform	The Turkish 2012 Educational Reform, which is known as the 4+4+4 system.	"They reorganized the system in a way that, after some years of schooling, parents can choose remote education".
Religious schools	Imam Hatip Middle and high schools ruled by religious leaders (imam) and preachers (hatip).	Most families (...) have no option other than to send their children to these religious schools.
Gender-based violence	Acts of violence rooted in unequal gender power relations.	"I was married for 12 years, and for 12 years I faced violence".
Femicide	An intentional killing with a gender-related motivation.	"Femicide is the main women's adversity in the country".
"Honour crimes"	Crimes committed to "defend" the reputation of a family.	"Honour and men don't let women live".
Intimate partner violence	Abuse or aggression that occurs in a relationship by both current and former spouses or partners.	Violence against women mostly takes place within the house; it is a real domestic problem.
Political_Gender regime	Gender structures, relations, and institutions that comprise forms of government.	"It is a very restrictive regime that seeks to control and limit women's sexual and reproductive rights".
Authoritarianism	A non-democratic way of governing that values control and a central power over personal freedom and plurality.	"Turkey, of course, is a leading example of an authoritarian right-wing populist regime".
Conservatism[22]	A political philosophy characterized by support for tradition, religion, and the family.	"The AKP's conservative gender politics position women in the labour market in relation to their motherhood status".
Familialism	A national politicization of the family where reproduction is a normative order, and the family embodies the nation.	"Turkey is familialist and women are kept at home. But it's a very political and ideological issue".

[22] In Turkey, in sociocultural terms, conservatism is characterized by support for tradition, religion (not to be confused with Political Islam), and the traditional family. The Democrat Party (DP), the Justice Party (AP), the ANAP, and the True Path Party (DYP) have all played significant roles in this spectrum. Newly formed parties, such as the GP and the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), should be considered on this spectrum too. The same is true for the Democrat Party, which in 2007 replaced the DYP and should not be confused with its homonym from the 1950s. The reformism-conservatism cleavage tends to weaken with the disintegration of the traditional right and the remoteness of the AKP from the political centre; the two currents tend to band together and act against the ruling party's escalating radicalism.

Name	Description	Example
Nationalism	Identification with one's own nation and devotion to it that can lead to hostility between insiders and outsiders.	“We could see some elements of it, but lately, we see a full-grown right-wing nationalist, nativist authoritarianism”.
Neoliberalism	Market-oriented policies that advocate economic policies such as deregulation, reduced public services, and privatization.	“Part of the reason is because of the neoliberal policies dominating the education policies”.
Populism	A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be separated into two groups and politics as the expression of a general will.	“Turkey is a purely populist country and there is absolutely no rule of law”.
Islamism	Synonymous with Political Islam. It is the belief that Islam should influence polity.	“We see a right-wing nationalism-populism with a significant Islamist component”.
Toxic masculinity	An attitude or set of social guidelines stereotypically associated with manliness to assert men's power and superiority.	“Masculinity at the bottom of the patriarchal society and the authoritarianism at the top of the regime inspired each other”.
Cronyism	The practice of favouring relatives and friends, especially in political appointments, regardless of their qualifications.	“Only AKP's allies and their friends represent the true people. We are not the people, and our will is not the will”.
Locating the Self	Principles that women support and how they define themselves.	“I'm a feminist. I identify myself as a feminist”.
Social democrat	Someone advocating for social justice, mixed economy, the welfare state, state intervention, etc.	“I consider myself a feminist, maybe a social democrat, and anti-AK Party”.
Nationalist	Someone identifying with their own nation and who believes it should be congruent with the state.	I’m a nationalist and I support developmental state”.
Kurdish	Someone identifying with the ethnic-linguistic group of Kurds.	“I'm a feminist and a Kurdish woman”.
Feminist	Someone who reinforces standards for women’s autonomy and grants progressive governance based on social change.	“I read some feminist rights text threads, started to call myself a feminist, and was organized in a feminist movement circle”.
Lesbian	A woman who is attracted to another woman.	“I'm a lesbian and a political woman”.
Secular	Someone supporting the separation of religion from the state,	“I'm a middle-class, secular woman coming from a Kemalist

Name	Description	Example
	including non-religious or unrelated to religion women.	family".
Religious	Someone who is related to religion and expresses their devotion, including pious women.	"Because of the headscarf prohibition in Turkey, I could not attend the university".
Islamic_Muslim	Someone who adheres to Islam. It is different from Islamist, which represents those who adheres to Islamism (Political Islam).	"The hijab ban is also about women's issues, so this is not only for my female but for my Muslim identity".
Veiled	A woman covered by a veil covering her body, face, and/or hair.	"I've been wearing hijab since I was 12".
Polity	A political unity organized for governance.	"Turkey is an authoritarian, conservative, nationalist state"
(Non-)Responsiveness	How representatives promote the interests of those represented.	"I don't feel my voice is there".
(Under)Representativeness	How representatives resemble those being represented.	"I don't think that the political parties have attempted to increase women's representation; only the Kurdish party".
Androcentric Polity	The propensity to centre politics around men and men's needs, priorities, and values.	"Politics in Turkey appears to be a job for rich old, heterosexual men".
Gendering of local politics	Barriers to women's participation in local politics.	"We must be strong, in a good financial situation, and much more active in communication with the local community".
Sexuality and Intimacy	Sexual rights, reproductive health, and intimate issues.	We have problems with reproduction, care, sexuality, etc.
Bodily (non-)autonomy	It has to do with power, agency, dignity, and choice (UNFPA).	"It is my life, my decision, my choice".
Contraception	The deliberate prevention of conception using various devices, chemicals, drugs, or surgical procedures.	"It was possible for lower-class women access to contraceptives through family doctors, but it' s becoming more difficult".
Divorce	Legal dissolution of a marriage.	"The biggest reason why women are killed is to divorce".
Alimony	A sum awarded to a former spouse following a divorce.	"There is a male association against alimony".

Name	Description	Example
Marriage	A legal union between partners in a personal relationship.	“You must be legally married before having a religious ceremony, but there were political attempts to change it”.
Child marriage	Any marriage (or union) involving a child under the age of 18.	In poor regions, girls (...) are forced to get married”.
Women's health	Health issues that affect women differently than men or are unique to women.	“Health issues are not so bad, but the employment rates of women and participation in politics are alarmingly low”.
Abortion	To end a pregnancy by taking medicines or having surgery.	“We have the legal right to abortion, but not in practice”.
C-sections	A surgical delivery of a baby through an incision made in the abdomen and uterus.	“In Turkey, we have pro-natal policies and see the attack on abortion and c-sections by the president”.
HPV vaccine	It protects against human papillomavirus and prevents cancer-causing infections.	There have been cultural impediments because the need for HPV vaccination means that you are sexually active
Pap smears	One of the cervical cancer screening tests, which tests for the presence of cancerous cells on the cervix.	I'm not sure to what extent women have access to pap smears, but I don't think there has been sufficient monitoring”.

We did not limit the interviews to any province to produce the most representative sample possible. The geographic space was divided into provinces where the most voted political party in the 2019 Local Elections was the AKP and the main opposition party, the CHP. We also considered the major urban provinces and five geographical regions: the Marmara Region (Istanbul), the Aegean Region (Izmir), the Central Anatolia Region (Ankara), the Mediterranean Region (Kahramanmaraş), and the Southeast Anatolia Region (Gaziantep). The aim was to cover many profiles and backgrounds. For example, a Turkish policymaker from Ankara has different experiences than an ethnic Kurdish worker from Gaziantep, which implies their prospects regarding the regime may contrast.

The dynamics of the interviews varied. Conversations with activists were very open-ended and focused on subjects that most affected lower-income women. Instead, politicians had a more professional tone. They used plural tenses and emphasized the party's view rather than their own understanding. Academics showed a more approachable and informative tone and women voters were the most heterogeneous group. In any case, despite the difference, some patterns were seen, and most participants agreed that the major gender issues are femicide and gender-based violence. They were afraid of low levels of women's employment, CEFMU, and some education problems in Southeast Anatolia. The major features related to the political regime were conservatism, populism, authoritarianism, Islamism, neoliberalism, nationalism, and cronyism, and the gender regime was defined as toxic, patriarchal and familialist. Opposition to gender equality and the lack of access to abortion and the HPV vaccine are among the most mentioned "intimate troubles".

Outline

This thesis on gender and politics in Turkey is divided into five chapters. The thesis topic, the review of the existing literature, and a short introduction to the theoretical framework are first presented in the Introduction. In addition to introducing the research design and the methodology, this section discusses the research questions and the main objectives.

After the introduction, Chapter 1 provides the required theoretical framework for a deeper comprehension of the research problem. The origins of feminism, its contribution to the study of political phenomena, and how it impacted political science concepts are all thoroughly explained in Chapter 1. We discuss a set of feminist perspectives - laying the theoretical framework for radical feminism, liberal feminism, and Marxist feminism before moving on to hybrid thoughts, like socialist

and postcolonial feminisms - which have different and even conflicted contributions to politics. We believe it is crucial to discuss feminism before developing the theoretical framework to understand how it impacts the study of politics, policies that different currents support, and the issues they are concerned about. In this thesis, we discuss the interplay of critical feminism influences and offer suggestions for rethinking representation and (re)distribution in light of full employment, autonomy, and decision-making. This chapter works as a bridge to Chapter 2, which introduces the conceptual framework of gender regimes and citizenship. We study varieties of gender regimes (private gender regime, neoliberal gender regime, etc.), laying the conceptual basis for the following chapters. Also, we suggest 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship', which is divided into politics (political citizenship), economy (economic citizenship), and intimacy (intimate citizenship). There is a correlation between the institutional domains of the gender regime and the dimensions of citizenship, whose attributes are participation, representativeness, responsiveness, and economic and bodily autonomy.

Before the analytical part, Chapter 3 places politics into perspective and informs about the political regime, the political system, the electoral system, and democratization/de-democratization processes in Turkey. It gives a brief historical background and takes at its centre the First Republic's structures (1923–60), the resurgence of Political Islam in the 1990s, and the emergence of 'New Turkey' in the 2000s. We argue each one of these periods coexisted with different gender regimes: 'State Feminism' (1924–50) and 'Conservative Gender Regime' (1950–60) in the First Republic; 'Gendered Political Islam' in the 1990s; and 'Gendered de-democratization' after 2007. Chapter 3 explains the dynamics between women and the state since the 1920s. Variations in the regime, society, and the state at large are reproduced, even because the AKP's rise would be impossible without the cleavages rooted in modernization during the 20th century (Bechev, 2022: 27).

In Chapter 4, the focus shifts to the Methodology (descriptions of data collection, sampling, etc.). We explain the epistemological and methodological approach of the research and the role of feminist-grounded theory in this thesis. This chapter is organized into three sections. The study's epistemology is described in the first section, and its relationship to grounded theory is the subject of the second. This is where the concept of feminist grounded theory comes from. Lastly, the third part shows our feminist-grounded theory study. We begin by identifying participants, the procedure, and the data collection and analysis processes. We move on to the results, identifying the causal conditions, the phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, strategies, and the consequences. We return to the results in Chapter 5 and describe the institutional domains of the gender regime in Turkey individually. We sought to contextualize the private/domestic forms of exclusion that participants had identified to

interpret how 'gendering de-democratization' affects various domains differently. We consider regimes of inequality other than gender, so the chapter proves how income, ethnicity, and religion impact gendered experiences of citizenship in Turkey. We define how their prospects are shaped according to experiences, however, despite heterogeneity, they expose many common concerns. We present a set of recommendations for advancing gender equality in Turkey based on their prospects and the middle-range theory developed.

Finally, the Conclusion overviews the main findings and principal arguments. The chapter presents the contributions of this study, followed by a section on the missing links and avenues for further research. We think that academia should provide solutions to the issues that we face as researchers and citizens, in addition to acting as a forum for the exchange of scientific knowledge. This engagement is part of a feminist approach and shows how much feminism provides to political science, "although it is not always apparent that mainstream political science is listening" (Randall, 2010: 109). We conclude by remembering political science can and should be gender inclusive.

CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Framework

Feminism opposes women's subordination and gender hierarchy. It criticizes theories emphasizing that not all identities, including gender identities, control decision-making positions (Plascencia, 2021: 27), whose absence manifests itself in numerous forms of women's exclusion. Changes in gender relations mean variations in the representation of power, which involve women's recognition and a more equitable distribution (Fraser 1995b; 1996; 1997; 2003; 2005). Feminism interprets, critiques, and creates claims regarding gender power relations. Due to the confluence of epistemic, normative, and political concerns, feminism is simultaneously a research paradigm and an ideology. As such, it is both a theoretical and methodological approach (Dhamoon, 2013: 89). In this chapter, we will approach it from a theoretical point of view.

Given its diversity, we refer to it as "feminisms", starting the chapter with an explanation of its origins before highlighting the contributions of liberalism from Wollstonecraft and Stuart Mill and Marxism from Engels and Marx. The rise of radical feminism as a thought on its own is then explained, along with hybrid analyses like socialist feminism – the synthesis of radical and Marxist feminisms – or postcolonial feminism – an effort to convey socialist feminism and ethnic concerns. We discuss various points on patriarchy, equality, difference[23], and what makes up "the political" in this chapter. In order to address the main research question, "How do women interpret the political regime in Turkey from a gender perspective?", we explain how "feminisms" influences politics and political concepts and propose critical feminism based on Fraser's ideas. The public/private divide limits women's opportunities to participate, and this framework acknowledges this. It contends that not all experiences are equal because of systems of inequality other than gender. This framework underlines the legal framework while considering the diversity of women.

In the final section of this chapter, in the context of our feminist-grounded theory study evidence, we reviewed redistribution and representation, highlighting the role of full employment,

[23] The "equality vs. difference" dilemma is central to the feminist debate. This influences not only feminist strands (Chapter 1) but also the feminist conceptualizations of citizenship (Chapter 2). In terms of the former, equality feminism advocates for women's inclusion in the public sphere, while difference feminism recognizes the difference and structures respecting women's characteristics. Liberal, Marxist, and socialist feminism stresses equality in the public sphere (Heywood, 2017), as well as a group within radical feminism, which includes Shulamith Firestone, supports equality in the private sphere (e.g., family, care, reproductive rights...) and accuses the difference of discriminating against women. However, the difference is viewed favourably by other strands, such as Young's unifying socialist feminist theory, radical feminism in general, and postmodern, postcolonial, black, or psychoanalytic feminisms. Nevertheless, each strand takes a stance toward difference. For example, Beasley (2005) identified radical "singular difference", Freudian "sexual difference" and "multiple difference", whereas Evans (1995) referred to radical "first difference", socialist "group difference", and "postmodern/poststructuralist difference". Hughes (2002) added "sexual difference" and "postcolonial difference" to Evans' view. Beasley's "multiple difference" incorporates Hughes' "postmodern/poststructuralist difference" and "postcolonial difference". In this thesis, we use "singular difference", "sexual difference", "postmodern/poststructuralist difference", "group difference", and "postcolonial difference".

autonomy, and responsiveness. This serves as the foundation for a strategy for promoting gender equality in Turkey, which aims to empower women, guarantee their rights, respect their autonomy, and give them equal opportunities.

1.1. Feminism(s): a range of theoretical stances on gendered political analysis

The origins of feminism are ambiguous. Da considered that the first feminist evidence, at that time, a proto-feminist manifesto, arose in the Ancient Age (2015: 678), while Heywood and Drake related its origins to the 19th century, a time of an astonishing political resistance (2004: 114). Contrarily, Friedman, Metelerkamp, and Posel linked it to the political movement of the 20th century (1987: 3); however, most of the existing literature set down the beginnings of feminism in the 18th century (Beasley, 1999: 120; Flax, 2005: 183). This was the case with Olympe de Gouges, who supported the incorporation of "women and people of colour in the founding charter of the French Republic" (Vanpée, 1999: 53), and Mary Wollstonecraft, who questioned women's exclusion from the ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity (Perini, 2016: 19). With a focus on the decline in the economic status of European middle-class women (Tong and Botts, 2018: 13), Mary Wollstonecraft opposed revolutionary advancements that ignored the fact that women were a part of humanity (Lundberg and Farnham, 1988: 274). While acknowledging Wollstonecraft's contributions to feminist theory, Celis et al. (2013) rejected feminism as a Western invention. Celis et al. asserted that discussions on women's rights were already taking place in China at the time and pro-emancipation movements were active in India in the 19th century (2013: 4). Not so different, in a synthesis of earlier research, Heywood observed that while Wollstonecraft was the first to theorize modern feminism, the Ancient Civilization was the first to express it (2017: 321).

Offen went back to the 17th century and François Poullain de la Barre's disapproval of women's mental abilities biases, an opinion covered by Cobo's study, which considered feminism as the result of the struggle for women's rights that began "when François Poullain de la Barre, in 1673, published *De L'Égalité des Deux Sexes* (Cobo, 2014: 13). Likewise, Seidel detected the role of Poullain de la Barre and remembered that, in the 17th century, Pierre Bayle designated him one of "the three most important feminist writers of the age" (Seidel, 1974: 499). Poullain de la Barre promoted a strand known as cartesian feminism, which focused on women's intellectual capacities while criticizing moderate feminism for not advancing a reform outside the aristocratic circles (Seidel, 1974: 500).

Similarly, Bryson (2003) paid attention to 17th century feminism and remembered, in addition to Poullain de la Barre, the egalitarian claims of Marie de Gournay and Anna Maria van Schurman, whom Poullain de la Barre himself had criticized for wanting to advance women's education.

On this subject, in *L' Égalité des Hommes et des Femmes* (1622), Marie de Gournay attempted to establish a theory for equality between men and women (Irwin, 1977: 48–49) through a study whose main goal was to prove that the Bible was not an anti-feminist book. Astell highlighted religion as a proto-feminist issue, and in *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of Their True and Greatest Interest* (1694), furthered the establishment of a university where women could study reason and religion (Broad, 2016: 16). In *Some Reflections on Marriage* (1700), Astell reviewed gender relations in authoritarian marriages, but despite a belief that education makes women happier and more useful, Astell focused the analysis on upper-class women (Sutherland, 2016: 153), echoing Poullain de la Barre's criticisms. Lastly, Schrupp (2017) and Baumgardner (2012) went to the 15th century and mentioned Christine de Pizan (1405) as the first representative of feminism.

From the first half of the 20th century, Virginia Woolf and Simone de Beauvoir stand out as two notable figures. In *Orlando* (1928), the former began focusing on gender issues, and then, in A Room of One's Own (1929), examined science as an exclusive culture, writing that we "could not go to the map and say Columbus discovered America and Columbus was a woman, or take an apple and remark Newton discovered the law of gravitation and Newton was a woman, or look into the sky and say aeroplanes are flying overhead and aeroplanes were invented by women" (Woolf, 1977 [1929]: 92). Woolf argued that biological concepts cannot be understood in the context of society because patriarchy, not biology, enforces the exclusion of women (Whitworth, 2005: 177).

One of the few topics Simone de Beauvoir and Virginia Woolf agreed on was the idea that rather than biology, the main obstacle to women's liberation was constructed femininity (Beauvoir, 2015a [1949]: 79). Beauvoir's existentialist ontology of freedom suggests that women have the right to make their own decisions, but others can impose limits on their freedom. Women are "the Other" of an "Absolute" male and are "not regarded as an autonomous being" since "man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him" (Beauvoir, 2015a: 15-16). Moreover, communities do not define themselves without putting the other in front of them, so outlining someone as “the other” is only possible with another “other”; Jews are “the other” of anti-Semites while black people “the other” of racists (Beauvoir, 2015a: 17). However, Beauvoir continued, unlike other "others", women did not accept reciprocity (anti-Semites are "the other" of Jews), did not do the equivalent of a Slave Revolution, despite the similarities between black people and women (a sense of moral and biological inferiority is

imposed on both), nor challenge male dominance (2015a: 18). Women are not outnumbered, and women's exclusion does not correspond to any historical development, like Colonialism (Beauvoir, 2015a: 19). Women have "no past, no history, no religion" and their actions have never gone beyond symbolic agitation, explaining why bourgeois women supported bourgeois and white men rather than working-class and black women (Beauvoir, 2015a: 20). Even before sisterhood was conceptualized, Beauvoir criticized the absence of a sense of friendship and support among women[24].

Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser conceptualized feminism as a resistance of "exploited, dominated, and oppressed", principally "poor and working-class women, racialized and migrant women, queer, trans, and disabled women" (2019: 13–14), which is in line with Marcuse's view of feminism as a revolt against decaying capitalism (1974: 288). In a different line, non-neo-Marxist strands describe feminism as a view against male dominance while excluding class concerns. For instance, liberal feminism, which presents a different stance due to the lack of a critical perspective (Clark, 2007: 348), emphasizes feminism as an understanding of equality and freedom (Boryczka, 2011: 578) seeking to spread women's rationality and citizenship in capitalist societies (Beasley, 2005: 19). Since Scott (1986) and West and Zimmerman (1987) conceptualized gender, feminism has made a distinction between sex and gender, holding sexual differences are biologically based while gender differences are socially/politically constructed. "Gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power" and is expended to term "social relations between the sexes" (Scott, 1986: 1056). It is "a social category imposed on a sexed body" (Scott, 1986: 1069) that permitted the removal (at least the decline) of normative views of femininity (Offen, 2003: 21) and the linking of social issues earlier secured by physiological and biological features (Offen, 2005: 72; Scott, 1986: 1053). The conception of gender power relations, which serves as a synonym for patriarchy, was developed because of this conceptualization.

In the 1970s, Salper (1972) and Schneir (1972) divided feminism into "old feminism" and "new feminism". The former is linked to the time between the late 18th century and World War I (Schneir, 1994 [1972]: 2), while the latter came from the neo-Marxist movements in the 1970s (ibid: 6) and emphasized education and paid work (Schulz, 2017: 1). "Old feminism" privileged marriage and rationality and was concerned with suffrage, but not exclusively. Nonetheless, it was too white middle-class centred (Schneir, 1994: 12). A decade later, Eisenstein (1984) recognized tripartite feminism, which recognized radical feminism, liberal feminism, and Marxist feminism.

[24] Given that suffragist women fought for the right to vote for all women, including working-class women, at the end of the 19th century, revealing, albeit limited, a source of solidarity, we consider this view to be overstated and even unfair.

Radical feminism argues that political struggles are inseparable from gender (Randall, 2010: 115), aims for an independent political movement, and accuses the state of exercising and accepting violence. Radical feminism aids in understanding the state's role in maintaining gender inequality, not least because the patriarchy captures the idea that the multiple forms of oppression of women are interconnected, support one another, and are systematically reproduced by the state rather than being imposed on women arbitrarily (Freidenberg and Gilas, 2021: 222–23). It holds second-wave feminism's slogan "the personal is political" (Firestone, 1970: 38), and strengthens that politics fills all aspects of life, including the family (Heywood, 2017: 325). That is why it suggests an overthrow of all family structures, denies the distinction between public and private spheres (Boryczka, 2011: 580), and regards patriarchy as the gravest form of injustice. As none of the other forms, such as class exploitation and racial hatred, institutionalize male dominance as patriarchy nor reflect power structures in daily life, they are minor forms of injustice. Consequently, the state cannot liberate women as it is impossible to distinguish between the power of the state and the power of men.

That feminist strand claims that the state is patriarchal in and of itself. According to this approach, patriarchy is a social constant where the male half controls the other half (Millett, 2000 [1969]: 25). Despite its emphasis on violence, sexuality, and intimacy, it ignores the economy and promotes a sisterhood that ignores topics like class and ethnicity. It is a woman-centred feminism that supports essentialist "singular difference", seeing women's attitudes as different (sometimes even better) from men's ones. This is made even clearer in radical lesbian feminism. Accordingly, heterosexuality is the leading cause of oppression (Rich, 1980: 643) and an institution constructed by the political regime to define the social structure (Gilas and Romero, 2021: 233). This structure defines gender relations by the recognition of heterosexual male dominance, which institutionalizes and normalizes sexual differences and the gender binary. The (heterosexual) political regime results from a social contract imposed on women by men (Gilas and Romero, 2021: 234), so heterosexual relations involve a relationship between an oppressive sex class (men) and oppressed women. Rich manifested against forcing people into heterosexuality (1980: 632), and Witting argued that society oppresses women, lesbians[25], and gay men (1980: 108). Likewise, Daly defended an essence of womanhood, capable of existing without the limits of power relations (1990 [1978]: xxvi), and an "anti-androcrat, a-mazingly anti-male, furiously and finally female" stance (1990: 29).

Underrepresentation in politics, business, and law is the only aspect that liberal feminism stands as patriarchal, in contrast to radical feminism (Heywood, 2017: 328). Liberal feminism even

[25] As a supporter of the idea that being a lesbian means going beyond sexual categories, Wittig believes lesbian women are distinct from heterosexual women. Accordingly, the only people who identify as women are lesbians, and heterosexual women have no idea what is to be a woman.

warns against the dangers of politicizing the private sphere. There are two typologies of liberal feminism. On the one hand, classical liberal feminism advocates for limited state intervention in women's rights and enforces equality of opportunities (i.e., meritocratic access). Egalitarian liberal feminism, on the other hand, advocates equal outcomes while encouraging government action to combat scarcity and economic gender inequality (the legal action to correct basic inequality). The first contributions of classical liberal feminism date back to the 18th century and were determined to include women in the traditional public sphere and to extend men's rights to women (Pateman, 2005: 14). This contests a rethinking of citizenship that values and includes women's differences and defends equality, even if only procedural equality (Evans, 1995: 13; Flax, 2005: 182).

Classical liberal feminism supports a neutral state and treats the difference as a synonym for exclusion, the antithesis of equality, seemingly conflating equality and sameness. Wollstonecraft was the first to theorize classical liberal feminism and opposing other feminists she disapproved suffrage as, she said, was "favorable to despotism" (1988 [1792]: 147). Wollstonecraft expressed concern over the confinement to domesticity, compared privileged women to caged birds devoid of choice and freedom (1988: 56), and thought that if men were confined to the same environment, they would exhibit similar behaviours (ibid: 23). Wollstonecraft argued women have equal cognitive abilities to men (1988: 25), opposed the androcentric view of men as the pattern of humanity (ibid: 7), and supported education and the end of women as "slaves of power" (ibid: 164). Wollstonecraft criticized Rousseau[26] for portraying rationality as exclusive to men, but without regard for gender roles (Hughes, 2002: 46), despite believing that men and women deserve the same opportunities (Beasley, 2005: 38). She demanded economic autonomy but also established citizenship through motherhood, upholding both equality and difference. Such dichotomy is known as "Wollstonecraft's Dilemma" (Pateman, 2005: 17). Despite supporting equality, Wollstonecraft held education made women better mothers (1988: 189), so they should be integrated into an equal social order where they are different (Hughes, 2002: 46).

Within the context of classical liberal feminism, Stuart Mill and Taylor also deliberated rationality, autonomy, and equality. The main point of contention with Wollstonecraft is the support for the right to vote (Heywood, 2017: 338). Stuart Mill and Taylor opposed male authority and the denial of women's freedom (2009 [1869]: 159), and, while denying the difference contrasting with Wollstonecraft, supposed women should make their own decisions (ibid: 117). When questioned on male dominance and women's rationality, Stuart Mill and Taylor went beyond Wollstonecraft's ideas,

[26] For Rousseau, boys should learn courage and justice while girls learn patience, docility, and humour. Émile, the ideal student, pursued humanities and sciences to become a self-reliant citizen, while Sophie focused on domestic skills to become a devoted wife and mother. See Rousseau, J.J. (1979). *Emile: Or, On Education*. New York: Basic Books.

which admitted women might not be able to have an equal degree of knowledge. However, even being the symbol of suffragism, Stuart Mill and Taylor assume that all women share similar identities.

The well-known representative of liberal feminism, Betty Friedan, emerged in the 1960s. Identifying a "problem that has no name" and that reduces women to no "greater destiny than to glory in their own femininity" (Friedan, 1979 [1863]: 11) of housekeeper, mother, and wife, Friedan claimed that "we can no longer ignore that voice within women that says: I want something more than my husband and my children and my home" (1979: 27). Friedan contended that, despite the conquest of some rights, women were limited to domesticity and barred from the public sphere (1979: 4). It created a false awareness of women's rights and a "feminine mystique" that devalued women. Friedan, like Wollstonecraft, Stuart Mill and Taylor, only mentioned white, hetero, middle-class, married, educated women while ignoring the experiences of working-class white women and black women. Friedan was unaware of privilege and assumed that all women were economically supported by men and intended to enter the market for reasons other than the economy (Tong and Botts, 2018: 35). Like liberalism, Friedan believed that women and men have different natures and trusted in a female natural ability for family and domesticity, not having been spared from the evaluation that the "feminine mystique" was the "mystique of motherhood" (Heywood, 2017: 341).

However, in *The Second Stage* (1998), Friedan recognized the criticisms and differences between women (1998: 75), questioning imposed standards in the workplace and at home (ibid: 20–21). Nevertheless, Friedan believed that women could achieve equality if their actions were valued (1998: 233–34). So, the second stage, or second-wave feminism, forced the participation of women in the market to escape a mystique that saw women "in the sexual relation to man as wife, mother, housewife, serving physical needs of the husband, children, home, never a person herself" (Fraser, 1998: xxv). Advocating for feminity and inspiring women to work (Friedan, 1998: 41), Friedan differed from other egalitarian liberal feminists who believed that women have to be like men to have equal rights. Still, despite the economic concerns, Friedan stressed well-educated and economically stable white women (Tong and Botts, 2018: 35). Friedan, similar to Stuart Mill and Taylor, supported participation and representation in the public sphere, but tried to endorse social justice in order to overcome gender discrimination.

This approach resulted in Friedan's shift from classical to egalitarian liberal feminism, a strand shared with Martha C. Nussbaum. Nussbaum accepted that classical liberal feminism does not guarantee equality for all women (Beasley, 2005: 30) and supported state-funded care for the most vulnerable (Nussbaum, 2000a: 62). Nussbaum said that all women should be cosmopolitan, global

citizens, and express universal opinions (2000b: 36), but this view was criticized, commonly by postcolonial feminism, with Gayatri C. Spivak accusing Nussbaum of assuming she speaks for all women “as if she were on a civilizing mission instructing those in the developing world in what they want” (Beasley, 2005: 41). Similar to Nussbaum (although criticized by the latter for not taking into account the compatibility between Islam and gender equality), Okin assumed egalitarian liberal feminism and argued that public policy and family law are the key tools to reverse the structures preventing gender equality (1999a: 130). Okin said the state must give up its neutrality – therefore contradicting liberal thought itself – which prevents it from intervening in the regulation of specific aspects of the family and achieving equality in the private and public spheres (1999b: 22). Contrary to the minimal state, the state should impose restrictions on multicultural groups to prevent their customs from impinging on women's rights (Okin, 1999a; 1999b).

Liberal feminism is not without criticism. Androcentrism, lack of gender-related varieties, sameness, and visions of human nature are the most common criticisms. One of the criticisms is that it is an androcentric thought too focused on transmitting the rights of white middle-class men to white middle-class women (Tong and Botts, 2018: 35–36). Wollstonecraft said she rejected the androcentric view of humanity but supported that men's rights should be passed down to women. So, Flax blamed it for producing unsatisfactory views of subjectivity and justice (2005: 184).

The second criticism is related to classical liberal feminism, which is accused of favouring individualist policies for white, middle-class, heterosexual women, as their financial and educational status “equips them to take advantage” (Heywood, 2017: 340). Davis contended that many African American women would gladly swap Friedan's “problem that has no name” for their own problems (1971: 7) and hooks contended that Friedan's work was only pertinent to marry, educated, middle-class, white housewives (2015: 1). The “problem that has no name” was exclusive to a small elite, ignoring "the existence of all non-white women and poor white women" (2015: 2), and is a "political vocabulary that masked the extent to which they shaped the movement so that it addressed and promoted their class interests" (hooks, ibid: 6). Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser believed liberal feminism is a tool for self-promotion rather than the liberation of women as it conflated "feminism with the ascent of individual women" (2019: 12). According to this view, classical liberal feminism disregards the state's responsibilities to prevent violence and promote employment by overlaying individual interests in the common good.

Third, liberal feminism subjects women to inferiority and deviance contrasts by assuming that equality equates to sameness and enforcing masculinity as a normative stance (Evans, 1995: 4).

According to Flax (2005), the definition of liberal feminism is itself constrained because it rejects gender relations, denies differences, and supports essential similarity. "If women must cease being feminine to be citizens, speaking of women's political emancipation would be an oxymoron" (Flax, 2005: 183). Elshtain believed that the principal claim of liberal feminism that all women should be like (the same, not equal) to men is its main flaw (1982: 442). Fourth, on the premise that men and women are fundamentally different, liberal feminism accepts that a woman's primary sphere of influence is her home and ignores her right to self-determination. In Jaggar's approach, due to the defence of a natural gendered division of labour, rationality and freedom are not gender-neutral, and liberal feminism emphasizes mental activities over bodily ones, supporting a normative gender duality (1983: 28). In this regard, liberal feminism convoys anti-feminist views of gender (not only sexual) differences as biological differences.

Marxism is the second ideological tradition that had an impact on feminism. It holds that society is founded by forces and relations that back the mode of production through commodities and value (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 163), in contrast to liberalism's view that thoughts and values are what propel progress. Marxism opposes exchange relations (liberalism) because of the divergence between what is paid (income) and the value produced and argues that society is formed through social ties that explore sidelined people (Tong and Botts, 2018: 75). According to Marxism, it is incorrect to assume that exchange relations are naturally good if income is derived from the labour of the workforce (Marx, 1976: 41). Men and women, similar to owners and workers, are divided by social relations categories, which place them in a gender/class hierarchy that unequally spreads resources (money, power, status, etc.). Tong and Botts (2018) used prostitution as an example to contrast liberalism and Marxism. The former observes prostitution as an option among other jobs, while the latter says that the woman's choice to sell her sexual abilities is a forced act rather than a voluntary one (Tong and Botts, 2018: 76).

Marxist feminism[27] is interested in women as participants in the class struggle they wage as workers and holds that economic factors, not culture, are the key factors of gender inequality (Hepburn, 2003: 100; Heywood, 2017: 342). According to Engels, there was a matriarchal period in which women were in charge and produced the majority of the goods, but "the domestication of animals and the breeding of herds had developed a hitherto unsuspected source of wealth and created entirely new social relations" (Engels, 2010 [1884]: 29). In this order, subservience is in the family (Heywood, 2017: 342), the husband is the bourgeoisie, the wife the proletariat (Engels, 2010: 30), and class oppression precedes sexual oppression. Engels assumed that emancipation resulted from production

[27] The concept of "materialist feminism" is preferred by scholars like Michele Barrett and Christiane Delphy, contending that Marxism cannot address women's exploitation unless Marxism itself is changed.

(Beauvoir, 2015a: 102), but ignored other women's concerns or the fact that, if not seen from an androcentric attitude, the limits of one's ability are not a real disadvantage (ibid: 105). Beauvoir asserted that Engels reduced gender to a class issue, saying that "the socialist community will abolish the family, quite an abstract solution" that does not mean the liberation of women (2015a: 106).

This feminist strand places a lot of emphasis on domestic work, arguing that as women relieve men of this duty, they can work effectively (Heywood, 2017: 343). In contrast to claims for a revolution saying that the end of capitalism leads to emancipation, Marxist feminism is concerned with the liberal public sphere but shares radical views on women's roles within the family (Beasley, 1999: 61). Some approaches even reject patriarchy, arguing that capitalism, not patriarchy, is to blame for gender inequality (Heywood, 2017: 328). Reed, for instance, said that oppressed women and men should band together to oppose capitalism (1970: 17), considering that not all women are oppressed and bourgeois women oppress proletarian men (ibid: 40). Reed assumed that the end of capitalism would allow women and men to prosper in a socialist order and was confident in equal gender relations in a post-capitalist society (1970: 41).

Out of the debate between radical and Marxist feminisms and combining two systems of inequality, capitalism and patriarchy, arose socialist feminism. This typology is a neo-Marxist theory that relates gender to class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and 'race' (Holmstrom, 2003: 38). Hartmann assumed that "attempts to integrate Marxism and feminism are unsatisfactory" as the former subordinated feminism to the fight against capitalism (1981: 2). "We need a healthier marriage, or we need a divorce" (Hartmann, 1981: 2). Such a marriage was socialist feminism. Eisenstein's conceptualization of the "feminization of poverty" (2009), highlighting women's cheap labour, as well as the "capitalist patriarchy" (1979), referring to hierarchical gender relations and the economic side of patriarchy, are theoretically based on socialist feminism. It was the theoretical basis for Mitchell and Hartmann's dual systems, as well as Iris M. Young's single system.

According to dual system methods, capitalism and patriarchy are distinct systems whose interactions expound the oppression of women. "Patriarchy interacts with the system of the mode of production", Young explicated, "to produce the concrete phenomena of women's oppression in society" (1997: 491). In line with Juliet Mitchell's dual system, patriarchy interacted with a specific mode of production as an "ideological and psychological structure independent of specific social, economic, and historical relations" (1997: 95). Mitchell kept that it was urgent to replace capitalist emotionality (2015 [1971): 38) and to end with oppression applied by the family and by the idea of femininity (ibid: 14). As the bourgeoisie was the ruling class, Mitchell affirmed, there was no way for working-class women to

impose their approaches (2015: 33). The second dual system, which is more related to Marxist feminism, saw patriarchy as a set of social relations of production distinct from those originated "in men's control over women's labour and in women's exclusion from access to necessary productive resources" (Young, 1997: 100). It studies gender from a Marxist viewpoint of capitalism (Young, 1981: 46), and alleged that low wages of proletarian men forced women to enter the labour force (Hartmann, 1981: 26). It is inextricably linked to equality feminism because it demands that women be included in male standards.

The third Marxist strand is a difference feminism that deviates even further from Marxism. It backs "group difference" and takes radical and Marxist feminisms into consideration. As women are oppressed by capitalism and patriarchy, Jaggar disagreed that people have to participate in economic relations to feel alienated (1983: 114–15). Sexuality and maternity can be an alienating experience, mostly when sexual rights are decided by men (Jaggar, 1983: 309-11). Dual system methods were not exempt from criticism introduced by Young (1981; 1997) because if one looks at class as agender, there will be no explanation for exclusion. That is why Young criticized Mitchell. In referring to patriarchy as a system with features of capitalism, universalizing subordination, and seeing gender as part of the economic system, Mitchell stressed cultural, racial, and class biases (Young, 1981: 47), constructing a "common consciousness among women" and without explaining men's privilege (1997: 99).

Young questioned the favouring of a system that observes patriarchy as a single system, even if patriarchy and production cannot be divided. If men dominate "by excluding women from access to some essential productive resources" (Hartmann, 1981: 15), which means that social relations are not limited to the family but to the market, it is difficult to understand how to separate patriarchal gender relations from capitalist ones (Young, 1981: 29). As patriarchy and capitalism "manifest in identical social and economic structures, they belong to one system, not two" (Young, 1981: 47). Young's criticism implied that "capitalism has actually entered into and rationalized sexual and affective relations for its own ends" (1997: 101). If capitalism and patriarchy are a unified system, there is no need for a theory (Marxism) to explain capitalism and another (feminism) to explain the patriarchy (Young, 1981: 57). Young disseminated a "theory of capitalist patriarchy as a unified system entailing specific forms of gender structuring" in economic relations (1997: 102), arguing that feminism must be a "total social theory" that recognizes the link between class and gender (ibid: 104). Young associated gender experiences with those shared by all women and rejected the view of a "single difference" and the idea of women are a homogeneous group.

Within these perspectives, criticism of Marxist and socialist feminism emerged. Marxists criticized socialist feminism's non-materialist viewpoint, while socialists accused the Marxists of not doing enough to study exclusion. For example, Jackson claimed that the return to materialism was essential for dealing with gender inequalities (1999: 33), and, on the contrary, Jagger said that the end of class exploitation does not mean the end of women's exclusion (1983: 316). Also, socialist feminism accuses Marxism of overlooking conditions in the workplace, equal pay, and precarious work. Fraser and Nicholson criticize Marxist views of being populist, conservative, and essentialist, as it explains a social phenomenon as a biological one and creates a universal reason for exclusion (1989: 93–94). Liberal and Marxist feminisms are more similar than let on in this regard, despite divergences on economic issues.

Postcolonial and black feminisms, which combine socialism with racial/ethnic concerns, are other forms of hybrid feminism. Postcolonial feminism raises questions about how elites silence women (Spivak, 2006: 217) and suggests other feminisms are unsuitable for thinking about gender in a postcolonial era (Olesen, 2018: 266). This theoretical framework highlights several territories and gender practices (Spivak, 1978: 241), criticizes colonialist modes of representation, underlines “postcolonial difference”, and echoes the relationship between difference and hierarchy (Hughes, 2002: 79). In order to help "the other", it promotes strategic essentialism (Andermahr, Lovell, and Wolkowitz, 2000: 61), and as a means of self-representation, minority groups organize around a common gendered identity. For its part, black feminism opposes “singular difference” and stresses the "gender, racial, and economic disadvantages that women of colour face" (Heywood, 2017: 352). Hooks argued that considering sexism, racism, and classism, black women are the only ones who are not oppressors: black men are victims of racism, but sexism allows them to act like women's oppressors; white women are victims of sexism, but racism allows them to act like black people's oppressors (2015: 16). However, in the contest between black men and white women, black men seem to take the better, and Kantola pointed out that black feminism's solidarity is often with black men rather than white women (2006: 8).

Lastly, after advances in social sciences and the development of new approaches in the 1980s and 1990s, new perspectives emerged from psychoanalysis and postmodernism (Giddens, 2006: 469). Chodorow's Freudian feminism studied mother-child relations within the framework of psychoanalysis and contended that various identities are shaped by family structure (Chodorow, 1994: 5). From another perspective, French or post-Lacanian feminism, a linguistic framework that combines Beauvoir, Marx, and Freud's psychoanalytic theory of personality, "countered empirical attempts at

recovering female voices, arguing that the governing structural law of language did not allow for the expression of femininity as radical difference'' (Danielsen et al., 2016: 7). That is why, despite Freud's influence, it rejects Freudian gender hierarchy (Agger, 1993: 59). French feminism is presented in Irigaray's work, which provided a theory of feminity focussed on “sexual difference” against a Freudian acceptance that femininity relies on male domination. Nonetheless, Cornell and Thurschwell questioned Irigaray's gender binary, saying that, in that way, the woman was ''the one with nothing to say'' (1987: 161). Indeed, if women are only a sign of difference, they are excluded from their subjecthood/womanhood. That's why Butler presented French feminism as part of high modernism, not as a sort of postmodernism (1995: 37). However, “sexual difference” feminism tried to avoid blame for dematerialising women. Connell, for example, said that “sexual difference” is racialized, nationalized, and linguistically limited (1987: 53), and Cornell, giving a new meaning to “sexual difference”, brought back Rich’s concept of “compulsory heterosexuality” to explain that “sexual” is a symbolic way to say who we are as sexed beings, “a way of being that claims one's own sex outside of the imposed norms of heterosexuality'' (1997: 41).

Finally, we draw attention to postmodern feminism, which is based on the ideas of Lacan, Beauvoir, Lyotard, and Foucault. Contrary to most of the last feminist theories, it does not support a common identity nor try to provide women the rights of men (Andermahr, Lovell, and Wolkowitz, 2000: 61), and is based on Derrida's *différance* (difference and deferral). Postmodern feminism argues that there are numerous signifiers for women (as opposed to a single definition) and that gender is not fixed, as postcolonial feminism claims (Beasley, 2005: 100). Postmodern feminism claims that the social context affects “biological” sorts of gender (Heywood, 2017: 352) and rejects essentialism, heterosexism, classism, binarism, and racism (Butler, 1990: 13; Clark, 2007: 349). From a postmodern feminist approach, thinking that there is a universal basis follows the idea that subordination takes only one form (bearing a resemblance to socialist feminism). Butler said that class, ‘race’, ethnicity, and other axes of domination had been decontextualized from the specificity of women (1990: 4). This radicalized, according to Beasley, the “use of social constructionism” (2005: 101). From this view, everything is socially constructed, including women; there are no pre-existent descriptions, and women’s bodies are cultural and performative creations. That is why postmodern feminism rejects “singular difference” and “group difference” and its goal is to upend the identity's fixity (Beasley, 2005: 102).

Unsurprisingly, one can find a discussion between Judith Butler and Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum accused Butler of not caring about the poorest and said it is defiant to accept ''Butler's ideas

because it is difficult to figure out what they are" (Nussbaum, 1999). Nussbaum argued that Butler's points of view, which are supported by "so many contradictory concepts", are not intended for "a non-academic audience" and do not attempt to explain the beliefs of "blacks, Jews, women, and gays and lesbians" (Nussbaum, 1999). Goldstein responded, contending that Nussbaum was unaware of the ideas behind Butler's point (2005: 67). Beasley said Butler challenged identity norms emphasizing there was no "real" self, and Nussbaum wrongly thought Butler spoke outside of power structures (2005: 102). In postmodern feminism, gender is performative and results from the discourse; its task is not to compel gender identity but to rewrite its own rules (Beasley, 2005: 102).

There are many types of political analysis because each theoretical framework interprets key political science ideas differently. For example, liberal feminism accepts that state institutions are male-dominated, so it promotes legislation to advance equality, supports women in decision-making positions, and emphasizes equality before the law. In contrast to radical feminism, which focuses on society, liberal feminism views the state through the lens of political institutions. On the other hand, Marxist feminism labels many ways in which the state reinforces gender subordination while maintaining that it is fundamentally capitalist and that its maintenance presupposes women's subordination (e.g., legislation promoting exclusion from the market and exercising control over women's bodies). Views on prostitution, the politicization of the private sphere, the contribution of women to the economy, and other topics make clear how these perspectives influence gender-responsive policymaking. Only Marxist feminism, for instance, seems to support policies to reduce women's working hours as it places a lot of emphasis on care work. According to other views, this would sustain gender norms and make achieving gender equality more difficult.

Despite this, feminist theories do not always contradict one another, and when joined, some strands emerge as broad approaches that allow for a comprehensive examination of gender and politics. This is where critical feminism finds itself. The addition of radical concerns with the private sphere, liberal issues of political representation and participation, and socialist interests for economic and bodily autonomy set our framework for the study of gender in political regimes. The diversity of political regimes to the detriment of particular policies also necessitates the examination of the state as a distinct group of institutions, assuming an all-inclusive framework that enables us to examine the regime from all perspectives. We do not consider the state as inherently patriarchal (contrary to radical feminism), but rather that state institutions are culturally associated with men, institutionalizing male power. It is the duty of the state to change this stance by being more inclusive and joining the struggle for gender equality, the ending of gendered institutions, and the acceptance of women's agency in

exercising their citizenship. The solution lies in equitable distribution, greater recognition, and equal representation, as discussed in greater detail in the following section.

1.2. Critical feminism as a three-dimensional theory of gender equality

Despite the influences that critical feminism has faced over the years, Marcuse's concept of new sensibility was the basis for its claims. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, two other members of the first generation of Critical Theory, were interested in issues of social justice, sexual behaviour, and inequality (Bronner, 2011: 358), but it was Marcuse who gave more attention to feminism and encouraged the emergence of a new subfield within Critical Theory. Women's liberation is "a vital stage in the transition to a better society", and "women must become free to determine their own life, not as wife, not as mother, not as mistress, not as girlfriend, but as individual human being" (Marcuse, 1974: 288). "Repressive needs and values" were a "form of male-dominated culture", said Marcuse (1974: 285).

The feminist critique of modernization[28] and the idea that economic development should benefit all women were inspired by this approach (Coles, Gray, and Momsen, 2015: 2). Boserup, for example, brought up the topic of development in Africa, pointing out that women did not benefit from the rise in income and men were the only wage providers (2007 [1970]: 29). According to this view, the subsistence economy, which women typically assume, produced false indicators of development and was to blame for the gap between developing and industrialized states (Boserup, 2007: 151). Other studies of the colonization of non-Western culture followed Boserup's work. For example, according to Mies (1982), colonial labour exploitation is the source of Western patriarchy. This is supported by the theory of world systems, which argues the centre organizes the political structure through its interests and increases polarization within the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974: 352).

However, a new scope for gender in Critical Theory was founded with Jürgen Habermas' second generation. Even though Habermas did not study gender (Connell, 1987: 7; Fraser, 2013: 26) and critical feminism opposes his view of the public sphere, he influenced critical feminism. Political participation occurs in the public sphere, according to Habermas. This sphere is a forum to debate public matters and where organizations representing people "negotiate and compromise among

[28] Various perspectives (e.g., the dependency theory) criticized modernization for attempting to universalize Western history while failing to bring economic growth to the most vulnerable segments of society. For a feminist critique of modernization, see Scott, V. (2011). "Tradition and Gender in Modernization Theory". In: S. Harding (eds.). *Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader*. Durham: Duke University Press.

themselves" (Habermas, 1991: xii). Fraser questioned whether women were included in Habermas' public sphere controlled by bourgeois white men, which would explain sexism, gender norms, and the distinction between public and private spheres (1990: 60). Fraser and Nicholson thought that the public sphere might help people understand gender better, but they disagreed with the essentialist notion of a single shared private sphere for all women. Also, the public/private division makes women the only ones in charge of the kids, leading to fewer chances for participation and keeping gendering domestic work (Fraser and Nicholson, 1989: 94). That is why the public sphere, as stated by Habermas, is a place for exclusion where women are barred from participating (Fraser, 1990: 64).

Contrarily, Fraser supported an equal and participatory public sphere, which restricted discussion to the reflection of the common good (1990: 62-63). There should be no pre-established limits in the public sphere, and what is a matter of common interest should be established in public (Fraser, 1997: 86). If this is not the case, gender-based violence will not be discussed, explaining why domestic violence is not a public crime in some countries. Fraser went even further, saying Habermas' suggestion to keep private matters out of the public sphere was exclusive and granted the power to elites to impose public interest (Canaday, 2003: 64). To balance out participation and show the subaltern groups' emancipatory potential, members of subordinated groups (subaltern counter-publics) share counter-discourses. However, "participatory parity", which means "standing on an equal footing" (Fraser, 1998: 109), is the only basis on which emancipation is possible. In this line, women's participation is mandatory not only for gender equality but also for democracy.

Fraser was less confident in Habermas' work for feminism than Benhabib was. Benhabib took a supportive stance and discovered in Habermas the basis for gender mainstreaming but was against universal (and androcentric) laws and how exclusively they were based (1992: 152). Young, on the other hand, took the opposite stance and asserted that Habermas' theories were founded on exclusion (1987: 58), which caused women's differences to be suppressed and "their exclusion from the public sphere" (Benhabib and Cornell, 1987: 9). That is why Young understood it was the state's duty to ensure mechanisms of representation. Otherwise, political decisions would tend to reflect the interests of dominant groups (Young, 2011: 184). Still, Fraser, Benhabib, and Young agreed the traditional public/private division produces gender misunderstandings and is a harmful social code for women (Benhabib and Cornell, 1987: 9).

Beauvoir's Existentialism is another influence of critical feminist theory. It offers a solution to historical gender inequality (women as "the other" of men) and empowers women to rise above their position as the "second sex". The existentialist acceptance of freedom indicates that women in

subordinate positions retain an existential freedom. Women are free to make their own decisions, like the prisoner in *Ethics of Ambiguity* (1948) who has a choice in how to live behind bars. To be free, Beauvoir explained, “is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given towards an open future” (1948: 39). However, social structures, like pro-life and anti-abortion laws, limit the opportunities available to them (Beauvoir, 2015b: 583). In that regard, collective action, participation, education, gainful employment, divorce, and the freedom to have children remove some of the obstacles faced by women. It is mandatory to change their economic situation and to support collective action against “superiority complexes” of women as “the other” (Beauvoir, 2015b: 583-85).

Foucault's ontology of the present (who and how we are according to historical reality) effectively summarizes Beauvoir's thoughts (Vintges, 1999: 135). Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre, saying even though women are ontologically free, their social standing affects whether or not they can experience freedom (Vintges, 2001: 174). Besides, if "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman" (Beauvoir, 2015b: 13), gender can only be an existentialist project. This means identity emerges from axes of domination, and being a woman is not inherited. Instead, women change and evolve into the roles that men have defined and decided are appropriate for women. As Vintges enlightened, according to Beauvoir, it is impossible to refer to a woman as an essential feminine subject as gender is not a matter of human nature or a biological trait (1999: 137). Beauvoir had criticized individualism and economic subjects before Fraser, contending the success of privileged women could not justify the exclusion of the majority (Vintges, 2019: 6).

Intersectionality is the third component of critical feminism, and it is inextricably related to that non-essentialist view of women. Coined by Crenshaw to attend to “the multidimensionality of black women’s experience” (1989: 139), it allows an understanding of the intersection of gender with ‘race’, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, age, and other issues. For example, Davis supported the parallel between gender, racism, and oppression (2000: 147), stating that black women saw reproductive rights as a need that stemmed from living conditions, not because of their gender, but because they were poor and racialized women (Davis, 1983: 204). This is what Palmer (1983) calls the “racial feminization of poverty”. In this regard, Cisne, Castro, and Oliveira concluded that abortion criminalization primarily affects poor, black, young women from peripheral areas (2018: 452). The same is true for women's wages. Worldwide, women earn about 20% less than men, but black and Hispanic women make 35% and 40% less than men (Patten, 2016). Feminism became more comprehensive because of intersectionality, which includes new topics other than women of colour and extends beyond black feminism as it "does not necessarily and inherently privilege any social category"

(Carbado et al., 2013: 812). Intersectionality claims an interactive link between different categories and how they influence the development of political institutions, political actors, and their connections (Hancock, 2007: 67). Critical feminism, unlike liberal feminism, does not recognize gender as a single category, speaks about all women, and acknowledges the inequalities faced by nonmainstream women because of intersectionality.

Postmodernism is the final critical feminist feature, and diverse views exist regarding its applicability to feminism. For example, Butler stressed postmodernism and looked at critical codes as normative values, while Benhabib backed the connection between postmodern particularity and modern universality (Benhabib, 1992: 51). Benhabib is sceptical of postmodernism. Fraser said, "Benhabib claims that postmodernist and poststructuralist views of subjectivity are incompatible with feminist politics (...) while Butler claims that views like Benhabib's imply an authoritarian foundationalism antithetical to the feminist project" (1995a: 59). Benhabib agreed that language shapes subjectivity, but was concerned that postmodernism would undermine feminist specificity, ignore autonomy, and expose emancipation (1995a: 20-21). We are not just extensions of histories, and postmodernism limits us to a non-reflective performance, Benhabib said (1995a: 21). Outlining worries about subjectivity, individuality and a possibility that performativity does not reveal the value of gender (Benhabib, 1995b: 108), Benhabib accused the "Death of the Subject" (a postmodernist rejection of women as a category itself) of stifling emancipatory goals. Some postmodernist views, according to Benhabib, are not compatible with feminism and threaten its viability as a theoretical illustration of emancipation. “Postmodernism undermines the feminist commitment to women’s agency and self of selfhood” (Benhabib, 1995a: 29).

Contrarily, Butler said the position put forth by the subject is constitutive and disregarded that self-reflexivity is absent in cultural contexts (1995: 46). Saying that the subject is constructed does not indicate predetermination, nor does the "Death of the Subject" suggest the end of the agency, Butler claimed (1995: 46). "Any effort to give universal or specific meaning to the category of women" develops factions, so identity “can never hold as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement" (Butler, 1995: 50). It is credible to broaden the definition of what it means to be a woman and, “in this sense, to condition and enable an enhanced sense of agency” (Butler, 1995: 50). This is accomplished by recasting the signified as the referent and protecting “women” as a likely place for resignifications. "Categories are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary”(Butler, 1995: 50). Deconstructing women is respecting other meanings that enable the emancipation of all women as women are neither dismissed nor seen as a unitary category.

As an alternative, there is a hybrid viewpoint that merges Judith Butler's postmodernism with the critical thinking of Seyla Benhabib. Fraser and Nicholson, for example, established a strand that allowed exchanging unitary notions for (postmodern) constructed conceptions of social identity without rejecting pragmatism and (critical) social macrostructures (1989: 101). Although Benhabib and Butler's positions polarized the debate, according to Nancy Fraser, they are not wholly opposed (1995b: 166), so we do not have to choose between Critical Theory and poststructuralism; instead, we might rebuild each strategy to make it compatible with the other (1995a: 60).

Fraser agreed that Butler revealed a reduced autonomy stance and a dangerous anti-essentialism (Fraser, 1995a: 66). Fraser contended that Butler's statements that homophobia was embedded in production relations and heteronormative sexual regulation were an element of the economic structure, neither enlightening "the social division of labour nor the mode of exploitation of labour power" (Fraser, 2013: 181). Fraser shared Benhabib's duty with emancipation-centered feminism (1995b: 160), which upholds a critique of Marxism. The issue with Marxism, according to Fraser, is that it placed too much stress on class while disregarding women and other subaltern groups (Ferrarese, 2015: 9). This was in addition to the fact that liberation was absent from the debates fought in its name. Feminism, according to Fraser, must assert claims on behalf of women, which does not entail lumping them all into one identity category. Fraser was critical of French feminism and argued one must strike a balance and reject the French feminist stance that women cannot be defined (1995a: 70). While generalization cannot be avoided, it is essential to examine these claims without adopting a fundamentalist perspective of women (Fraser, 1995a: 70).

Fraser began to sketch out a dual theory of gender justice in terms of (re)distribution and recognition, locating gender on the political economy background and including reproduction and care. Gender inequality, according to this stance, is the result of *misdistribution* and *misrecognition* (and non-recognition) of difference (Fraser, 1996: 18). In other words, Fraser supported a hybrid approach where distribution and recognition are not limited to one or the other, in contrast to I. M. Young's support of a social justice paradigm as an alternative for claims for egalitarian redistribution via recognition.

From the point of view of redistribution, gender is an economic factor that distinguishes productive male well-paid employment from reproductive female low-paid jobs. The SRT stands out as a crucial idea in this context because it highlights the meaning of reproductive work in upholding and growing institutions while scrutinizing how women carry out responsibilities as caretakers and unpaid workers. If workers produce goods, who produces them? If they are responsible for creating all of society's wealth, who creates them, and "what processes enable the worker to produce the wealth?"

(Bhattacharya, 2017: 1). In a debate on the topic, Fraser identified it as a social process making "continuous capital accumulation possible" by turning labour into a commodity (2017: 22). Fraser said unpaid social reproduction is needed for paid work, accumulation, and functioning of the economy, and the economic system depends on these activities (2017: 23). Moreover, it is required for cultural and political institutions. However, modern society is undermining it, resulting in a crisis of care (Fraser, 2017: 22), and the only way to resolve it (without sacrificing emancipation and subordinating reproduction to production) is through the restructuring of the social order (ibid: 36). Care work has a great status in Fraser's views, giving the "grounds for rejecting the temptation to try and incorporate women as wage-earners" (Ferrarese, 2015: 2). Fraser emphasized domestic work, arguing that women liberate men from this responsibility and allow them to work and earn a living, much like Marxist feminists. Another significant issue studied by Fraser is the Unconditional Basic Income. This would have little impact on the market and emphasize a "market in flexible, noncontinuous, largely female labour", reinforcing rather than changing "the deep structures of gender maldistribution" (Fraser, 2003: 79). However, if combined with "public childcare, it could alter the balance of power within heterosexual households, helping to spark changes in the gender division of labour" (Fraser, 2003: 79).

On the other hand, from a recognition perspective, gender is a status distinction (Fraser, 1998: 101). It raises concerns about cultural hierarchies preventing women from participating on an equal footing, given that cultural differences permit other forms of *misdistribution* (Fraser, 1996: 30). As a result of own intersectionality, being a black poor lesbian woman promotes other axes of injustice (instead of a white middle-class heterosexual man). No one belongs to only a group, and someone oppressed by an axis of injustice may rule over another (for example, bourgeois women or black men in Bell hooks' thinking). Fraser ignored both redistribution and recognition as absolute concepts. Cultural standards infuse all aspects of the economy and impact not just women's status but also women's economic standing (Fraser, 1998: 103). Together, redistribution and recognition can lessen gender inequalities. For instance, the effects of poor economic conditions on the status of single mothers (Fraser, 1994) or the economic features of divorce (Fraser, 1998).

Later, Fraser expanded on the initial two-dimensional view by including a third principle, representation, which is the political dimension of the theory of gender justice (Fraser et al., 2004: 380). "Centred on issues of procedure and on determining who counts as a member of the political community, the political dimension of justice is concerned chiefly with representation", Fraser said (2013: 195). Representation increases interest in political debate, reduces distrust in institutions, and enhances recognition (Gilas, 2021: 152). Not only does it give women a voice in traditionally political

communities, but it also represents a new direction in feminist politics that aims to address gender inequality in non-established contexts (Fraser, 2005: 305). Representation problematizes power structures and some decision-making processes (Fraser, 2008: 6), so injustice occurs when politics refuse gender interaction, either because electoral systems do not guarantee parity (e.g., the absence of gender quotas) or communities exclude the political participation of women (e.g., the Sharia Law). When women's statements are shunted in the political arena, the result is a *misrepresentation*, which, Fraser explained, has two levels. The first is known as *ordinary political misrepresentation*, and it represents a decision that denies the included women the opportunity to participate (Fraser, 2008: 19). Good illustrations include limited women in commissions of inquiry and predominantly male governments in systems with gender quotas. The second one, *misframing*, prevents women from participating at all (Fraser, 2008: 19). The rapport of *misframing* brings up another point; the purpose "to democratize the process of frame-setting" (Fraser, 2008: 22). Fraser outlined the criteria for determining who is excluded and questioned how democratization happens. The aim was to bring to light a structural feature. "If the current conjuncture struggles for justice", it cannot succeed unless we advocate for democracy. So, there is "no redistribution or recognition without representation", Fraser maintained (2008: 27).

However, the evidence shows the meaning of economic autonomy and responsiveness in promoting gender equality. Due to this, we examine the theory of gender justice and settle on a middle-range theory, which will be expanded upon in the analytical chapters. We contend that many forms of representation can be added in which women in decision-making positions provide some sense of representation. In the next section, we propose a theory for gender equality grounded on these three dimensions that Fraser presented. However, we defend the spread of full employment for more equitable distribution and the inclusion of women in decision-making positions for equal representation. We emphasize the value of substantive representation while keeping in mind that responsive women support the representation of other women, even if they integrate other axes of identity.

1.2.1. Reviewing Fraser's gender justice: a new approach to redistribution and representation

To address the economic, cultural, and political concerns of gender inequality, Fraser suggested the theory of gender justice, identifying gender as a social category alongside ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, 'race', nationality, and class. However, while Nancy Fraser's theorization is a valuable tool

and provides a unique theoretical framework, we propose to review the conceptualizations of redistribution and representation. We integrate critical feminism and the phenomenon of gendered de-democratization in Turkey, reinforcing the importance of including women as income providers and decision-makers.

Our first claim is that, in order to achieve more equitable distribution, women must have economic autonomy, which can be promoted by full employment. There are many ways to define full employment, and there are some differences in opinion regarding how to get there. As Felipe noted, the idea has been used in some circles to refer to the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) or the level of unemployment associated with price stability, or even when a significant number of unemployed workers are looking for work (2012: 17). Full employment can be described as the situation in which everyone who is looking for work is able to do so at a position that pays the prevailing wage and corresponds to their professional skills (Beveridge, 2014; Murray and Forstater, 2013). From that view, full employment "refers to zero involuntary unemployment" (Felipe, 2012: 18). This is not to say there is no unemployment – it corresponds to unemployment rates of about 3% – as there is always frictional or short-term unemployment because some workers freely leave the labour force (e.g., stay-at-home parents) or seek better opportunities. According to our approach, it must be understood in terms of the latter and includes reducing underemployment (non-permanent jobs, informal employment, precarious work, etc.), gender blindness, and gender exploitation (e.g., pay gap). Full employment is the best perspective to ensure women's economic citizenship in terms of Kessler-Harris (2003), non-unemployment (unemployment is often related to social and political unrest), and substandard living conditions where people merely make money enough to survive (predominantly in subsistence economies mostly performed by women). As we get closer to full employment, we are more expected to find decent work and become economically (and bodily) autonomous.

Several studies have found a connection between unemployment and other institutional domains, such as domestic violence. For example, Anderberg et al. documented a gender profile of unemployment and concluded that the decrease in women's unemployment (or the increase in men's unemployment) reduces domestic violence (2016: 1948). Because of the gender economic logic of power, gender-based violence decreases as the gender pay gap decreases, and women's unemployment is associated with a higher risk of violence (Anderberg et al., 2016: 974). Evidence from both England and Wales, Anderberg et al. observed, exposes a 3.7 per cent increase in men's unemployment caused a drop in domestic violence by up to 12 per cent, and a 3 per cent increase in women's unemployment caused an increase in domestic violence by up to 10 per cent (2016: 1949).

Employment offers economic autonomy and is a path to stability; both are necessary for a life free from violence.

Data from the fieldwork in Turkey show that economic autonomy makes it simpler to leave abusive relationships. Diana, a postdoctoral researcher from Istanbul, said she experienced IPV in her first marriage[29]. She was an employed and well-educated woman, showing that while employment eases domestic violence, it does not eliminate it. Diana accepted that there are many factors that affect gender-based violence, and while her financial situation did not shield her from violence, it gave her the resources to leave the relationship. Sultan Ünal, a clinical assistant from Kahramanmaraş, who, at the time, was non-educated and unemployed, concurred. Throughout a 12-year marriage, Sultan experienced IPV. She claimed that she was more likely to experience violence because she lacked economic autonomy and the ability to flee:

> I was a housewife without economic independence. I had no salary. It was desperate but without economic independence, I couldn't take care of myself[30].

Fraser contended that the promotion of women's employment and the focus on the redistribution of paid work "in an institution that has historically disadvantaged them" (1997: 52) weakens true equality. Fraser accepted that making divorce easier inspires a more equitable distribution within marriages and that giving women breadwinner jobs would aid in closing the gender pay gap (1997: 53). However, Fraser said that this model – which she calls the "universal breadwinner model" – is not egalitarian because has a social flaw that splits breadwinners from others (homemakers?) and does not reduce pay inequality among breadwinners when attributes, like education, ethnicity, 'race', age, or class are studied (1997: 53). Contrarily, a "caregiver parity model", which supports informal care work, permits women who oversee caregiving to support their families. That is why Fraser argued that domestic work, childrearing, and childbearing should all be raised to the status of paid work, and the role of the caregivers should be equal to one of the providers/breadwinners (1997: 56). Both are considered in Fraser's "universal caregiver model", but she emphasizes the second one, as shown by her defence of the SRT.

According to the SRT, which is profoundly influenced by Marxism, capitalism oppresses women, promoting a strict system of economic subsistence that excludes them from the market. While we can all agree that capitalism has the potential to be oppressive, subsistence only ensures the most

[29] Diana (fictitious name). Participant 5. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 20 January 2021.
[30] Sultan Unal. Participant 32. Interview. Ankara. 28 June 2022.

basic standards of living and downplays the key gender-related economic issues (the feminization of precarious work, the feminization of the informal sector, the gender pay gap, etc.). Fraser ignored paid work changes (e.g., remote work, tertiarization...) and considered women in traditional families (what about single-parent or same-sex families?) as being designed by someone else's productive work. Recognizing and valuing domestic/informal care work does not have to include financing, but rather gender-redistributive policies (e.g., childcare facilities) and promotion of shared family duty. Instead of a hierarchical structure where providers benefit from recipients, families should have a horizontal structure of shared rights and obligations.

Fraser's model ignored the gender pay gap among family members, and as she argued, it "did neither equalize income nor reduce women's marginalization" (1997: 61). Fraser recognized a joint framework to benefit from the greatest of each theoretical framework. However, she created many cleavages by refusing to assume women as wage earners while refusing to compromise women's emancipation. To reject the public/private division based on the idea that women oversee raising children and informal care work, as Fraser and Nicholson (1989) implied, arguing in favour of public compensation as a way of paying for caregiving duties, seems counterproductive. Fraser's views seem contradictory because she simultaneously advocates for an unconditional basic income that would help reverse the gender pay gap and support economic autonomy while defending a system (for non-wage-earning women) that allows (male) workers to gather wealth. Fraser appears to be following Lister's (1990) lead, which Walby warned against as these are two distinct strategies for advancing gender equality, "On the one hand she argues that the solution is for women to stop being exploited at home and enter the labour market, on the other that women's position as carer should be supported" (Walby, 1994: 387).

The issue is that this system does not guarantee economic autonomy; rather, it merely ensures an economic existence that is inconsistent with the experiences of many women (loans, high rents, high prices in big cities...). Moreover, the idea that women should be paid for relieving men of caregiving duties denies women the autonomy to take on this duty on their own, and their exclusion from the market contributes to the division of breadwinner/homemaker that the own Fraser intended to fight. Unintentionally, Fraser's model ignored gender as a social category and rejected other family options (e.g., stay-at-home dads) and public policies (e.g., parental instead of maternity leaves) that deny this division. By considering the state a capitalist state that perpetuates subordination, Fraser ignores the possibility of reversing patriarchal (and capitalist) structures of state institutions. Moreover, by supporting emancipation through reproduction, women would be the "other" of men. And if there is

no production, there will be no need for reproduction, as if the essence of women were reduced to the existence of men.

Based on evidence from Turkey, the OECD state with the lowest women's employment rate, keeping women out of the market limits them to a reproductive function, revoking women's self-determination in motherhood. Also, Turkey follows a functionalist-structural approach to society and the AKP has been assuming a familialist approach to the role of women. Inês, a Professor of Social Policy from Istanbul[31], maintained that the AKP's cash assistance program for women without social security is a risky and ineffective policy that views caregiving as a woman's responsibility and promotes gender stereotypes and inequality. Moreover, it inspires the application of an anti-feminist conservative agenda endorsing the role of women as mothers and wives rather than as active citizens.

The second statement is that responsive women in decision-making positions promote women's representation. As Siim argued, women's inclusion within the political elite gave women a new presence in politics (2000: 2). Understanding this idea means not seeing representation as a static phenomenon but as a set of four diverse dimensions – formalistic representation, symbolic representation, descriptive representation, and substantive representation – that puts individuals in spaces of representation (Philips 1995; Pitkin 1967). Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser (2019) said that being in leadership positions was a privilege that only allowed 1% of women to succeed, while the remaining 99% were forced to deal with the effects of the social, economic, and political crises. We agree that having women in leadership positions does not guarantee representation in advance (Phillips, 1995: 4) – Giorgia Meloni's election and Ivanka Trump's selection to represent the United States (US) at the G20 women's summits are some of the examples – and the presence of women in leadership positions does not inevitably translate into a deeper commitment to gender equality (Gilas, 2021: 150). We concur on the discrepancy between privileged and underprivileged women – which is questioned when policymakers like Kamala Harris, Sanna Marin, and Jacinda Ardern are considered – but even if women in these positions differ from those at the bottom, they can be responsive and promote gender equality. As Walby explained, "On average, elected women are more likely to support policies that directly or indirectly support gender equality" and women's rights like abortion and criminalizing rape in marriage and unions (2009: 182). Norris concluded that the expansion of women politicians improved the support for gender equality (1996: 89), and as Wängnerud (2009) said, there is a link between descriptive representation (how representatives resemble those being represented) and substantive representation (how representatives promote the interests of those represented). So,

[31] Inês (fictitious name). Participant 16. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 5 May 2021.

the chance of responsiveness (substantive representation) increases with representativeness (descriptive representation).

Walby stated that "the relative lack of presence of women in parliament has been shown to reduce their prospect of influencing governmental decision-making"; however, while it is needed "for the representation of women's interests it is still not sufficient" (2009: 183). This means that, as Philips' (1995) theory of the politics of presence suggested, women politicians tend to be "best equipped to represent the interests of women" (Wängnerud, 2009: 52). Nevertheless, they should assume what Young (2000) mentioned as a "feminist awareness" based "on the formulation and implementation of programs" "aiming to change society in women-friendly direction" (Wängnerud, 2009: 65).

Data from the field shows most of the participants do not feel policymakers (including female politicians) represent them. However, the main reason seems to be they don't take women's issues – domestic violence and SRRH – and their main concerns – rights, education, and poverty, according to Bektas and Issever-Ekinci (2019) – into account. It shows that symbolic representation (how representatives stand for those being represented) is low, even when there is a descriptive representation:

> We have only a political party that has a woman leader. It is a new party, but we look at the president of this party, named Meral Akşener, and she is like another member of the patriarchy. She is acting like a man. Her discourses, bodily performance, voice...[32].

> [Meral Akşener] is a woman in a man's world. She doesn't put herself as a woman, does not emphasize women's issues (...), and acts without a feminist conscious. She is trying to portray a decent image, like an honour protective, and is very connected to customs[33].

> "I don't feel represented because women's murders and other women's problems are not addressed. There is a Minister on this issue [Zehra Zümrüt Selçuk] and at least she must address the women's murders and other women's issues. All the government must address this, but if they do not do it, at least the Minister must do it. It's her responsibility, directly[34].

> We have two women Ministers [former Ministers Derya Yanık and Ruhsar Pekcan] but even so, women MPs cannot talk about women's rights for more than 5 minutes. We are not well represented[35].

[32] Ana (fictitious name). Participant 1. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 16 October 2020.
[33] Diana (fictitious name). Participant 5. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 20 January 2021.
[34] Fatma Bostan Ünsal. Participant 7. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 27 January 2021.
[35] Kibar Daşçı Özdemir. Participant 33. Online Interview. Ankara-Kahramanmaraş. 28 June 2022.

Participants, however, showed a higher level of representation when gender issues were brought up. This means that symbolic representation increases in proportion to substantive representation:

> Canan Kaftancıoğlu, the CHP's head of Istanbul, for example, is an incredible woman[36].
> We have a feminist MP in the parliament, Filiz Kerestecioğlu, from the HDP, the Kurdish political party. We see her in some meetings and the 8th of March night walk[37].
>
> There are members of parliament who represent my rights and interests. I just heard a speech from March 8th on a parliamentary debate and a female MP from the CHP [Sera Kadıgil, former CHP, currently in the TIP] ... I really felt empowered when I listened to it, it was like «this woman represents me»[38].
>
> The Gaziantep Mayor [Fatma Şahin] is a woman, who supports all forms of education for women and children, especially for mothers. She always supports education. She set up some libraries and arranged some courses and seminars as well[39].

This presumes that the concepts of representativeness and responsiveness, which are connected to descriptive and substantive representation, are contemplated. Data suggests representativeness inhibits policymaking and aids in the institutionalization of women in politics, but responsiveness is what gives them a sense of being represented. Because of this, it is important to observe women in decision-making positions not as opponents but as a source and a platform for the representation of women. This is applied to voters from different political backgrounds, not just those who support feminist (the HDP) or progressive positions (the CHP). This representation and feeling of belonging are recognized in Simone's words praising women's concerns (even if they suppose a familialist approach to gender) of the AKP's Gaziantep Mayor as well. If consider women's concerns, women policymakers are the tool for representing women from the bottom, which is shared by most of the participants, regardless of their education, ethnicity, province, age, or PIA. Moreover, it seems to be a practice that extends to all political fields.

Data presented in analytical chapters suggests responsiveness promotes representation while full employment can help to increase economic autonomy. These factors lessen economic gender inequality and gender-based violence while raising access to health services and education. As a result, both are included in the middle-range theory proposed in the analytical chapters and summarized in the final section of Chapter 5.

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[36] Diana (fictitious name). Participant 5. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 20 January 2021.
[37] Francisca (fictitious name). Participant 11. Online Interview. Braga-Güzelyurt. 12 February 2021.
[38] Gia (fictitious name). Participant 12. Online Interview. Braga-Istanbul. 17 February 2021.
[39] Simone (fictitious name). Participant 29. Online Interview. Ankara-Gaziantep. 23 June 2022.

1.3. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates how feminist viewpoints have emerged over the past few centuries. All these approaches support gender equality, even though advocating for different paths to get there. They, consequently, support various policies and have a different impact on how women experience their citizenship. Because they do not consider other frameworks (nor categories), approaches like liberal feminism and Marxist feminism are restricted to political and economic issues, respectively, and their analyses are limited by the non-consideration of other analytical structures.

How does radical feminism interpret women's low participation in the market and advocate solutions to end this underrepresentation? How does liberal feminism evaluate access to abortion in Turkey? What is Marxist feminism's perspective regarding Turkey's ratification of international agreements protecting women's rights? Even Marxist feminism, which makes a straight critique of the state, ignores forms of exclusion other than capitalism and is trapped in a negativist analysis that shows gender equality as a kind of utopia. Consequently, critical feminism is the most useful for studying the gender regime due to its faculty to address political, economic, and intimate issues. Fraser's theory of gender justice is one we support, but we contend that initiatives to promote full employment are favourable to equitable redistribution. Also, responsive women promote women's representation. This chapter introduces a middle-range theory that considers Nancy Fraser's theory of gender justice and strategies for promoting redistribution and representation based on the data collected. We argue that full employment promotes economic autonomy and supports gender-redistributive policies to increase women's participation in the market. As explained in the analytical chapters, childcare facilities and secular education are ways of promoting this. Then we underline the role of responsiveness to the representation of women.

Starting from the next chapter, we use this theoretical framework. Chapter 2 will present the conceptual framework of gender regimes and citizenship to lay the foundation for the remaining chapters studying gender and politics in Turkey. We propose ‘gendered-mainstreaming citizenship’ to better understand women’s experiences along the domains of the gender regime while debating the exclusion of women from the public sphere and advancing political, economic, and intimate forms of citizenship.

CHAPTER 2

Conceptual Framework

Gender and patriarchal norms depict two natural states. According to Cobo, while one is male and establishes the public sphere, the other is female and sets up a private one (1995: 132). Power relations were founded on this essentialist view of human nature that divided people into genders and excluded women from the public sphere (Cobo, 1995: 24), explaining why institutions operate normative procedures that produce a gender structure (gender regimes) and subordinate women's citizenship (take legal systems' resistance to recognizing femicide outside of the private sphere as an example).

Drawing on the concepts of gender regime and citizenship, the chapter begins by defining gender regimes and labelling their varieties (domesticity, neoliberalism, and social democracy) and institutional domains (polity, economy, civil society, and violence). We debate private/domestic and public varieties of regimes and highlight the significance of studying (gender-based) violence as an institutional domain on its own. Subsequently, considering the gendered nature of citizenship, we conceptualize 'gender mainstreaming citizenship'. The term is based on everyday practices, acts, and experiences, particularly those that occur within the institutions and structures of the gender regimes. We explain our reasoning and how this leads to an inclusive understanding of citizenship and examine the role of women within these structures based on this argument. On this topic, we study political, economic, and intimate forms of citizenship across the institutional domains without ignoring their correlation (the higher the presence of women in politics [polity/political citizenship], the more likely the development or approval of policies on SRHR [civil society/intimate citizenship]). Representation (representativeness/responsiveness), participation, the right to work, gender-based violence, education, and body politics (on intimacy and sexuality) are among the concepts studied.

For a deeper understanding of the underpinnings of gender inequality, we explore gender regime conceptualization in this chapter, arguing women's citizenship is the driving force for gender equality. Deconstructing the dimensions of gender inequality and promoting a presence-democracy (political citizenship) are necessary to achieve this goal. Furthermore, tackling gender inequality is based on women's transition to the market (economic citizenship) and a plurality of recognitions and rights (intimate citizenship) in the private sphere. Thus, gender regimes will advance toward a broad democracy as 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship' develops.

2.1. Gender relations intersections: the upswing of gender regimes

Various theories of how unequal gender power relations are formed have been put forth. Women's reproduction (Firestone, 1970), women's confinement to domesticity (Rosaldo, 1974), and sexual violence against women (Brownmiller, 1976) are some of the causes appointed to such inequality. Firestone advocated for reproductive control, including giving women back control over their bodies and the ability to decide whether or not to have children (1970: 11). According to Firestone, gender equality can only be attained by eliminating the factors that genetically make women less powerful (1970: 152). On the other hand, Rosaldo wrote domesticity is related to gender inequality and the private/public division allowed for the difference of women's (domestic) and men's (public) roles (1974: 23). There is a wide range of "sex roles", and we are the inheritors of a sociological tradition that regards women as irrelevant and accepts women's subordination to men (Rosaldo, 1974: 17). Brownmiller, in turn, blamed the problem on rape. Rape, Brownmiller said, is a criminal act that stems from men's intimidation of women, who remain in a state of fear (Brownmiller, 1976: 17). Additionally, usual rapist sentences like "she was asking for it" are used to shift the responsibility from the perpetrator to the victims (Brownmiller, 1976: 312).

Others studied marginalized groups in the modernization theory, arguing that economic development eroded gender inequality. These opinions, which we covered in Chapter 1, highlighted marginalized groups, explaining why modernization did not benefit all women (see Boserup, 2007; Mies, 1982). Nonetheless, these perspectives promoted an essentialist view of gender inequality, making it difficult to address complex subjects (Walby, 2009: 256), including the complexity of the political regime on its own. Reducing gender inequality to a single factor would be reductionist as it is an unequal structure influenced by numerous interrelated issues. As we revealed in Fraser's claim introduced in Chapter 1, even if the gender pay gap was overcome, women would still be subject to underrepresentation, gender stereotypes, or gender-based violence.

Lewis (1992), drawing on a broader viewpoint, centred her analysis on gender equality from the welfare state and the family. Theorizing welfare regimes, Lewis argued that the traditional welfare typologies have been historically based on the male-breadwinner family model (1992: 159), swapping from strong male breadwinner states (Ireland, Britain...) to weak male breadwinner ones (Sweden), passing through modified male breadwinner states (France). While Ireland and Britain have distinguished between public and private duties, women's labour force participation in France has historically been higher (Lewis, 1992: 159). But the most gender-egalitarian state was Sweden. In the

late 1960s and early 1970s, Sweden struggled to integrate all women into the workforce and “make the two-breadwinner family the norm” (Lewis, 1992: 169). The main modifications to encourage women's market participation were separate taxation, expanded childcare facilities, and parental leaves (Lewis, 1992: 169).

Despite its contributions, Walby argued this model suggests that the welfare state is the only one that provides gender equality, which is called into question by data showing that, in some countries, women have high employment rates without a welfare state (2009: 258). An example is the US. However, other factors may help to explain this, like the fact that the state is one of the few countries where men and women are equally likely to report having the funding needed to start their own businesses (OECD, 2016). Equal access to financial services, like checking and savings accounts, experience in decision-making positions, and education are factors that may be involved.

Consequently, Connell's (1995; 2002; 2005; 2009) and Walby's (1997; 2009; 2020) concept of gender regime was developed as an “alternative to the reduction of gender to family or culture” (Walby, 2020: 416) and proposes an inclusive outlook that goes beyond the welfare state. Walby defined a gender regime as "a system of gender relations which is analytically separate from other regimes of inequality” (2009: 259), while Connell defined it as an institution's patterning of gender relations (2005: 6) and a system of “interrelated gendered structures" (1995: 5). These structures are the household, paid work, male violence, sexuality, cultural institutions, and the state (Connell, 1995: 6). Connell said that there was a continuum between private/domestic and public gender regimes. Unlike the former, which is founded on the exploitation of sexuality, exclusion from the public sphere, and the role of the household as the key structure of women's labour, the latter is based on subordination (as opposed to the exclusion) within the structures of paid employment, sexuality, and violence (Connell, 1995: 5). Although still important, the household is no longer the most powerful structure of gender regimes, in contrast to private/domestic ones where fathers and husbands are primarily the beneficiaries (Connell, 1995: 6).

According to Shire and Nemoto, while private/domestic regimes promote gender-based violence and prevent women from participating in the public sphere, public gender regimes invite women to participate in education, employment, and politics (2020: 434). Within private gender regimes, women's labour is organized in the household (care or domestic work), women are barely in political institutions and not allowed to hold decision-making positions, and sexuality is limited to their marriage. On the other hand, in public gender regimes, labour is regulated as paid work, women participate and engage in decision-making positions, and sexuality is not limited to women’s marriage

(Walby, 2009: 260-61). In compliance with Lombardo and Alonso, public gender regimes control women to positions of minor power while admitting women's presence in the public sphere (2020: 451). Walby distinguished between neoliberal and social democratic public gender regimes (2020: 416), asserting the likelihood of a social democratic outcome increases with the depth of gendered democracy (2020: 419). Lombardo and Alonso's explanation of how austerity in the wake of the 2008 crisis aided the emergence of public neoliberal gender regimes supported such a claim (2020: 450).

Walby explained each one of the domains, both in private/domestic and public gender regimes. First, in the institutional domain of the economy, domestic work is a private form of labour, contrary to public-paid work. Social democratic gender regime, on the other hand, considers issues like gender-equal pay and working time regulation (Walby, 2020: 420), whereas neoliberal regimes only moderately control the economy and is known by a feminization of precarious work (Lombardo and Alonso, 2020: 457). Employment policies and welfare are the main areas where neoliberal and social democratic regimes diverge. Walby referred to the Nordic states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland) as examples of social democratic gender regimes and the US as an instance of a neoliberal regime (2009: 263). There are states in the middle, with neoliberal levels of welfare and social democratic levels of equality regulations in employment (the United Kingdom).

Secondly, in the domain of polity, Walby suggested ten points grouped into three sorts to show the depth of democracy. No unelected position, no colonies, no non-democratic governance, de facto and de jure universal suffrage, and free, fair, and competitive elections in a free civil society (Walby, 2009: 179) are the underpinnings of suffrage-democracy. A deeper form is the presence-democracy, which includes, in addition to the previously stated points, a low cost for electioneering, proportional representation, quotas for underrepresented groups, and the balanced presence of women in parliament (Walby, 2009: 179-82). In addition to the already mentioned subjects, broad democracy, the deepest form of democracy, is concerned with the governance of institutions like welfare services (Walby, 2009: 180). Walby refers to neoliberal regimes as suffrage-democracies, and social democratic gender regimes are related to broad democracy and presence-democracy (2020: 420). "The depth of democracy", Walby informed, "is linked to the extent to which a country is neoliberal or social democratic" (2009: 184). Conversely, we are confronting a private/domestic regime when not even indicators of suffrage democracy are appreciated (Walby, 2020: 420).

The third institutional domain contemplated is civil society, which comprises sexuality, intimacy, and education. According to Walby, a private/domestic form of civil society is limited to domesticity, contrary to a public one, which can be commercialized (e.g., sex trade), as is the case with

neoliberal civil society, and even mutualist, without involving “monetary exchange”, as a social democratic civil society (2020: 420-22). The fourth domain is violence. In private/domestic gender regimes, violence is perpetuated by domestic perpetrators unregulated by the state (Walby, 2020: 421). Neoliberal gender regimes, in contrast, place great emphasis on criminalizing violence, while social democratic regimes also emphasize victim support (Walby, 2020: 422). Walby saw violence as an institutional domain in and of itself because it is a part of social institutions and is constituted by them as opposed to being merely a device of power as already established (2009: 193). This enables one to comprehend, for example, the link between gender-based violence and the economy that we theorized about in Chapter 1. Beyond this context, instead of viewing violence as a domain on its own, Hearn et al. (2020) argued it should be analyzed as a single regime. However, it would lessen the link between violence and gender relations, “If everything harmful is violence, all forms of power blur into each”, Walby said (2020: 427).

Walby agreed with Connell and said there is a tendency toward the regime shifting from private/domestic to its public form, where women are more likely to be elected, participate in paid work, have access to legal abortion, and receive an education, for example (2009: 261). Looking at the modernization outcomes, this shift would be situated along a continuum between premodern and modern forms of gender regimes. However, Shire and Nemoto (2020) and Kocabıçak (2020) identified varieties of gender regimes that are simultaneously private/domestic and modern. Shire and Nemoto theorized on conservative gender regimes for straddling this variety, which "constitute the domestic as a public sphere and transform through social and family policies" (2020: 432). When considering the legal institution of the family (e.g., policies relating to fertility), the gendered division of labour, and the absence of laws addressing gender-based violence, the data designates a relationship between conservative regimes and domesticity; however, their welfare politics spread social protections to households (Shire and Nemoto, 2020: 441). Conservative regimes put the family in charge of providing social provision rather than the market (neoliberal gender regimes) or the state (social democratic gender regimes), but they support the family's emergence in the public rather than the private sphere (Shire and Nemoto, 2020: 441-43). Both private and public regimes are represented, but neither neoliberalism nor socio-democracy.

Nevertheless, while considering a combination of private/domestic and public gender regimes that were distributed unevenly across the domains, Walby contended that the addition of a conservative gender regime could be made without altering the theory, as the model proposed “allows for the transformation from domestic to public varieties of gender regimes to take place unevenly between the

institutional domains" (2020: 424). Moreover, Shire and Nemoto's (2020) analysis of Japan and Germany was contested by Walby (2020), who argued that the claim that Germany is a conservative regime merits further discussion. Walby asserted Germany is changing from a private/domestic regime (which would provide care within the household) to a public social democratic one (a neoliberal regime would emphasize private daycare facilities) because of gender equality in paid work or state support for childcare (2020: 424). According to Walby, theorizing on these empirical arrangements as private/domestic forms that still predominate in civil society and the economy eliminates the need for additional variety (2020: 425). The concept of hybrid regimes, borrowed from the literature on political regimes, can be used to define these gender regimes (see Moghadam, 2020; Walby, 2009). It can be applied to the Spanish gender regime, which Lombardo and Alonso (2020) defined as a Mediterranean-type regime that mixes conservative (familialism), social democratic (universal access to education), and neoliberal (liberal benefits) factors.

Kocabıçak then examined the evolution of domestic patriarchy in both its premodern and modern forms. Kocabıçak agreed that there are private/domestic and public gender regimes but differentiated between different aspects of the former. Conforming to Kocabıçak, rural women's exclusion from ownership produced premodern private/domestic regimes, whereas the exclusion from paid employment and wage dependency in urban households led to modern private/domestic gender regimes (2020: 813). While the markets and the state reduce the time spent on care work, this does not remove the gender-based division of labour in the family, and the exploitation within the household persisted throughout the change from a private/domestic to a public gender regime (Kocabıçak, 2020: 817). Instead, under public gender regimes, a new type of discrimination arose, and the state controls women's paid/unpaid work (Kocabıçak, 2020: 817). The patriarchal nature of the state – rather than the capitalist nature (neoliberal and social democratic regimes) –shapes women's experiences; however, the change from women's unpaid work in the home to the "double burden of paid and unpaid labour" signals the change from a private/domestic to a public gender regime (Kocabıçak, 2020: 817-18).

Like Shire and Nemoto (2020), Kocabıçak emphasized the significance of the family and stressed that, despite the move from private/domestic to public regimes, there are gender regimes where the family continues to be the site of patriarchal labour exploitation (Kocabıçak, 2020: 813). Based on this framework, Kocabıçak recognized the beginning of a public neoliberal gender regime alongside a modern private/domestic regime in Turkey (2020: 825). Walby underlined Kocabıçak's claim that there are different patterns of gender social relations in private/domestic gender regimes and

agreed on the importance of property in structuring society. But ownership, Walby contended, is not out of her model (2020: 426). A noteworthy aspect of the study is that it was completed in 2015, omitting the gender regime's latter stages we mentioned in the Introduction (the 'Anti-gender Familialism' and the 'State Anti-feminism'). These steps indicate a more complex private/domestic role than the one Kocabıçak seems to identify. Still, Kocabıçak's theory is crucial for understanding domesticity's limitations and the family's role in gender relations.

In addition to authors who disseminate family practices across the mentioned domains (Walby, 2009; 2020) or who, while not theorizing the family as an institutional domain, place more emphasis on the concept (Kocabıçak, 2020; Shire and Nemoto, 2020), some views even theorized the family as an institutional domain on its own. Contrary to Walby's theorization, whose practices usually related to the family are analyzed and spread across the institutional domains of the gender regime – the economy (care-work); polity (governance of reproduction); civil society (sexuality), and violence (gender-based violence) – Moghadam (2020) conceptualizes it as an institutional domain.

According to Moghadam, in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the family serves as both the main institution for regulating gender relations as well as the primary setting for social reproduction (2020: 478). One of its main consequences is patriarchal family laws, which restrict autonomy, mobility, and labour force participation in states like the monarchies of the Persian Gulf (Moghadam, 2020: 473). However, as Moghadam limited violence to the family realm, she rejected it as a domain on its own. Moghadam's analysis is also distinguished by the theorization of different varieties within public gender regimes, as Walby's gender regime varieties, she claimed, are based on "experience in Europe and North America" (2020: 467). Considering the region's economic, social, and political structures, Moghadam defined public gender regimes as neopatriarchal (where reports of private/domestic regimes, such as patriarchal family laws, low economic participation, and inadequate law on gender-based violence prevail) and conservative corporatist (portrayed by strong feminist movements, women in paid work, and reformed family law) rather than neoliberal and social democratic gender regimes (2020: 468-69). Moghadam mentioned Jordan, Iran, and Yemen as examples of the former, while Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey are examples of the latter.

Finally, it is worth noting the work of Lombardo and Alonso (2020), which, despite being concentrated on a very different political and geographical context, allowed for significant empirical parallels to be identified. Examples are the feminization of politics by the left and the response of feminist movements to efforts by conservative governments to limit women's access to abortion. Lombardo and Alonso related the labour reform in Spain to women's precarious work, explaining,

however, that despite neo-liberalization in the institutional domain of the economy, the civil society promoted "a more social democratic gender regime" (2020: 457-58). The evidence established a connection between the domains of the economy and violence (Lombardo and Alonso, 2020: 460), as well as the meaning of political ideology in Spain's institutional domains overall – except for the economy, where neoliberalism was advancing under the gender regime because of EU hegemony (ibid: 463). Such inference explains the relative detente between center-left and center-right parties at an economic level which is not, however, followed in other institutional domains, as well as the influence of external agents as one variable in the dynamics of gender regimes. Next, we delve into 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship' and explain how each domain of gender regimes is related to political, economic, and intimate dimensions of citizenship. The reasoning behind selecting these dimensions is briefly discussed, followed by an explanation of each constituent of the citizenship model.

2.2. Gender-mainstreaming citizenship: women, citizenship, and rights

Civil, political, and social rights are all part of full citizenship, as Marshall first suggested. According to this view, the civil element of citizenship is composed of the rights needed for individual freedom, such as liberty of the person, the right to own property (Marshall, 1950: 10), and the right to work. Marshall defined the latter right as "the right to follow the occupation of one's choice in the place of one's choice" (ibid: 15-16). Marshall defined the social component of citizenship as the right to economic security and welfare, to fully engage in social life, and to lead a life consistent with that of a civilized being. On the other hand, participation in politics was the political part of citizenship (Marshall, 1950: 11). However, Marshall ignored that, in many societies, women did not exist as individuals (Lister, 2002: 192). Worldwide, women did not have rights to custody (Meer and Sever, 2004: 17), to own property, work in the employment of their choice, to liberty of the person, and even the right to vote (Walby, 1994: 380-381).

Traditional definitions of citizenship were conceived as rights that empower one to engage in politics and decision-making positions in the public sphere (Meer and Sever, 2004: 9), ignoring different forms of membership and participation in terms of gender (ibid: 16). Marshall's model of citizenship was based on the interaction of the market and the state, ignoring the role of the private sphere, women, and civil society. As a result, it overlooked the history and reasoning (e.g., access to abortion and contraception) for women's rights (Siim, 2000: 14). Even Turner (1990), although giving special

attention to social relations, disregarded the inclusion of women (Walby, 1994: 383), revealing to be gender blind as it downplays the significance of the structural relationship between the public and private in understanding gender inequality (Siim, 2000: 19). Turner's criticism of Mann (1987) for ignoring the public/private division, as Walby claimed, would make the inclusion of women conceivable; however, Turner treated the family as a unitary, male-oriented entity, free from state intervention (1994: 383). Nevertheless, the perception of a "private space of the family" makes no sense because it denies social relations within the family (Walby, 1994: 383).

This lack of rights for women led to feminist criticism of the absence of gender in writings on citizenship (Lister, 1990; 1997; 2012; Pateman, 1988; 2005; Voet, 1998; Walby, 1994). As women have been relegated from the public sphere, traditional literature has not included them. Understanding such public/private division – the idea of women as responsible for raising children at home and men for decision-making and the market – is crucial to comprehend how women have been excluded from the public sphere. Citizenship saw men as its holders (Meer and Sever, 2004: 18), while women were expected as undeserving of participation and women's issues in the privacy were ignored (e.g., IPV and rape in marriage). Even today, despite current legal safeguards for women's rights, there are biases supporting women's exclusion from the public sphere (Meer and Sever, 2004: 19), and women do not enjoy full citizenship in almost all societies (even Spain, whose Constitution says all citizens are equal and may not in any way be discriminated against on the grounds of gender, follows throne male-preference primogeniture).

Due to the gendered nature of citizenship, feminism raised the issue of the exclusion of women and their mere inclusion in the family, creating alternative approaches based on women's participation in civil society, politics, and the market. These views argue that concepts of citizenship have been "hijacked to serve the interests of men" (Lister, 2012: 374) and represent the traditional equality/difference dilemma previously mentioned in Chapter 1: while gender-neutral citizenship is based on equality and meets women into male-dominated public life (Okin, 1989), differentiated citizenship maintains that if women fit into the male universalism, they will lose citizenship status (Pateman, 1988). On the one hand, gender-neutral citizenship, which is related to liberal feminism (Lister, 2012: 377), proposes to include women in the public sphere; on the other, differentiated citizenship, related to radical feminism overall and French feminism, defends a viewpoint where the private sphere is appreciated. Elshtain (1993) considered the family and motherhood the basis for women's political roles. Mothering is a force with great potential (Elshtain, 1993: 336), and the private sphere needs to be separated from the public one. However, the public space must uphold a group of

imperatives to protect human beings and permit women and men to participate "on an equal basis of participatory dignity and equality" (Elshtain, 1993: 351). Enthusiasts of differentiated citizenship, however, hold contrasting approaches. All of them are concerned with care, but while some believe "those who stay at home to provide care should receive payment", others worry that doing so would undermine women's claims of being able to participate in the market (Lister, 2012: 380).

There is a third feminist approach to citizenship. In contrast to differentiated citizenship, pluralist citizenship (Mouffe, 1992) rejects standard views of motherhood (Siim, 2000: 36), while avoiding reducing gender to a single position and acknowledging that not all women have the same experiences (Mouffe, 1992: 382). In such a manner, it is distinct from Young's "politics of group assertion", gender-neutral citizenship, and group difference. This view serves as the grounds of our 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship'. This includes a set of everyday practices and experiences (Isin and Nielsen, 2008) in which women are politically represented and participate actively in politics (political citizenship), join paid work reducing income distribution gap (economic citizenship), and are recognized on a personal level (intimate citizenship). We contend that for advance to a public form, in which women have equal access to political participation, education, paid work, and bodily autonomy, changes must be made in both public sphere and private sphere (including shifting the gendered division of labour). In this vein, we share Lister's (2012) claim for regrouping the spheres so that men and women can balance paid work and caring responsibilities. However, unlike Lister (2012), which prioritized caring, we highlight intimacy. 'Gender-mainstreaming citizenship', in line with differentiated citizenship, consider the private sphere; however, like the gender-neutral model, it also defends women's entry into the market.

This does not mean that we did not take the difference into account. For instance, both men and women have the right to work, but they may demand assistance to exercise this right that the other does not (extra safety when pregnant...). "A democratic conception of citizenship value and provide the resources for women's economic and political participation" but it is also based on the notion "that men cannot be accorded full citizenship if they do not fulfil responsibilities for caregiving work" (Cass, 1994: 114-15). Consequently, we strive for a three-dimensional model of citizenship in terms of political, economic, sexual, and intimate rights, in contrast to T. H. Marshall's civil, political, and social citizenship. Under the dimension of intimate citizenship, discussions of intimate and sexual rights can be found. Moreover, in contrast to Marshal's social citizenship, we propose an economic citizenship that recognizes women as providers, not only as recipients. Also, in the next session, we address representation and participation within the framework of political citizenship.

Although each dimension of citizenship is related to a specific institutional domain, there is also a cross-cutting relationship between them. In the sections that follow, we discuss the direct relation between polity and political citizenship, civil society/violence and intimate citizenship, and economy and economic citizenship. However, it is important to keep in mind that gender regimes are intricately intertwined systems that influence social relations and, as a result, the ways in which women experience citizenship. That is why economic non-autonomy affects experiences of intimate citizenship or, for example, androcentric polity harms economic citizenship.

2.2.1. Political citizenship: polity, presence-democracy, and the politics of presence

Cohen defined political citizenship as the right to vote and hold office (1996: 95). Within this view, participation in what Walby defined as suffrage democracy is a prerequisite for political citizenship. Later on, Janosky and Gran expanded the concept to comprise a set of personal (e.g., the right to vote, stand for office, protest, etc.), organizational (e.g., the right to form a political party, a social movement, a union, etc.), and membership rights like asylum rights and free access to government information (2002: 15-16). Accordingly, Bagchi's definition of political citizenship as involvement in electoral politics and the political scene (2000: 164) is consistent with Lister's view of citizenship as an action (act as a citizen) rather than merely an attribute (be a citizen).

Three considerations on political citizenship are possible using those approaches. Firstly, political citizenship is the right to engage in presence-democracy and broad democracy; if any of the topics previously suggested by Walby are not enshrined (e.g., a balanced presence of women in parliament), women's full political citizenship is not ensured. Second, in terms of personal rights, while women have gained the right to vote almost everywhere, in some states, social conventions prevent them from voting, subjecting them to pressure, harassment, and violence at the polls. *De facto* and *de jure* universal suffrage are required, and elections must be free, fair, and competitive. That is why considering democracy as the holding of elections and political citizenship as the right to vote is unsatisfactory.

Thirdly, Bagchi (2000) and Lister (1998) proposed a conception of political citizenship that covers new forms of political participation outside formal politics. Political participation faced large alterations, and the Internet – digitally networked participation (Theocharis, 2014) or online activism – is one of the most flagrant venues for political participation (Theocharis, de Moor and van Deth, 2019:

30). Another informal procedure of political participation is street politics, which, although its origins go far beyond online activism, proceedings like early the 2010s anti-austerity movements and Arab Spring have brought it back. Many political movements have been developed in the streets, allowing citizens to launch new urban political communities. We will address political citizenship as a condition for a presence-democracy, starting from designating the domain of polity, the one in charge of ruling the gender regimes and guaranteeing the presence of women in political institutions.

According to Walby (2009), a broader conception of polity covers not only states but also organized religions (Islam, Catholicism...), hegemonic powers (EU, US...), and global institutions (The World Bank, NATO...). Despite not having total control over a citizen's life, these organizations are essential to the regulation of some fields (Walby, 2009: 180). For example, organized religions have the power to influence intimate citizenship by regulating divorce, abortion, contraception, non-marital sexuality, and marriage. A case in point is the deal between Islam and Catholicism at the 1995 UN World Conference on Women, which positioned these organized religions in conflict with some hegemonic powers. Unlike the EU, which supported the right to choose, the religious coalition sought to limit sexual rights (Moghadam, 1996: 77). This is a good example of how politics affects other factors besides political citizenship and how gender, politics, and religion are interconnected. This interaction, incidentally, and taking up the case of the Vatican City, produces a perfect example of a private/domestic polity, considering that Walby classifies gender regimes with "no democratic participation" of women in this category (2020: 421).

In terms of public forms of polity, a meaningful conclusion on false paradigms in political science is drawn by Walby (2009) within the context of suffrage-democracy. The idea that there is a connection between economic development and democracy (Lipset, 1959; Diamond, 1992) is a half-truth because it is only visible when male suffrage is measured (Walby, 2009: 185). On the other hand, women's suffrage is linked to the development of civil society (Ramirez, Soyal, and Shanahan, 1997) because states adopted similar practices about citizenship because of a "global diffusion of cultural and political practices" (Walby, 2009: 187). So, even though men's political citizenship suggests a solid connection between the institutional domains of polity and economy, women's political citizenship in suffrage democracies strengthens the connection between politics and civil society. However, in the context of presence-democracy, women's political participation and economic development are related. Women's presence in higher-level jobs (Knutsen, 2001), paid work (Paxton and Kunovitch, 2003), and education are some of the contributions. As the economy and civil society improved, more women have

held decision-making positions and their concerns are better represented in the public sphere (Walby, 2009: 188).

In terms of presence-democracy, which is necessary for women's full political citizenship, the lack of representation in formal politics demonstrates that they still have limited access to their political rights. The Inter-Parliamentary Union – IPU (2023) and the World Bank (2023) data show that women represent only 26.5 per cent of MPs in parliaments, 22.7 per cent of speakers, 22 per cent of ministers, 11.3 per cent of heads of state, and 9.8 per cent of heads of government[40]. So accordingly, to develop the presence of women in parliament (Walby's ninth indicator of the depth of democracy) and women's full political citizenship, a low cost for electioneering and an electoral system with gender quotas (seventh and eighth indicators) must be implemented. Specifically, the high costs for electioneering reinforce the effect of economic citizenship on political rights and the institutional domain of polity, hindering the participation of low-income women and the feelings of belonging and representation among women. Moreover, as Norris (1996) and Wängnerud (2009) suggested, the higher the presence of women in parliament, the higher the awareness of gender equality. The politics of presence theory by Anne Phillips, which supports an inclusive, even-handed polity and equal representation (Phillips, 1995: 20), is also significant in this context. Certainly, representation is not a given, as we previously assumed, but responsiveness, or as Phillips defined it, "fair representation" (1995: 4), provides representation and has the potential to lead to reforms (ibid: 7). Higher participation results in higher representativeness, which, in turn, results in higher responsiveness. Also, the more opportunities for women's political citizenship, the more deepened the democracy.

Lastly, presence-democracy promotes economic and intimate citizenship(s). As a result, presence-democracy and women's political citizenship serve as a tool for changes in other domains of the regimes with the aim of develop economic/bodily autonomy, participation, responsiveness, and representativeness. We next explore the economy and women's right to economic citizenship, explaining what we mean by the economy, forms of labour, and gender-redistributive policy. Then, we provide information on welfare provision and education regarding the participation of women in the market. We conclude by highlighting the role of education in promoting gender equality and the relation between the domains of politics and economy and political and economic citizenship(s).

[40] These percentages will be even lower than those indicated by the IPU. Although it does not consider Vjosa Osmani's presidency in Kosovo, it does consider the presidency of Bidya Devi Bhandari in Nepal (which ended in March 2023). Additionally, it considers Jacinda Ardern, Natalia Gavriliţa, and Sanna Marin, who served as leaders of the governments of New Zealand, Moldova, and Finland. Their terms ended in January 2023, February 2023, and June 2023, respectively.

2.2.2. Economic citizenship: the broader economy and women's economic and social rights

The second dimension of 'gender mainstreaming citizenship' is economic citizenship. One needs to have a thorough understanding of economic gender relations and activities related to the domain of the economy in order to grasp the concept. On the whole, within the institutional domain of the economy, we identify not only public gender relations but also the activities carried out by the state (the welfare aspects of the polity) and private relations produced by domestic and care work outside the market (Lombardo and Alonso, 2020; Walby, 2009; 2020). Firstly, in terms of the economy, the transition from domesticity to the market expresses the shift from a private to a public form of gender regime (Walby, 2009: 111). Second, regarding private relations created outside the market, we follow Walby's definition of the economy as a "system of institutions, relations, and processes concerned with the production, consumption, distribution, and circulation of goods and services" (2009: 102).

This point of view contends that rather than social relations (which can take the form of the market, the state, and domesticity) and the site of production, which can also occur at home, the economy is defined by its tasks (Walby, 2020: 420). This means that, even though housework is not considered free wage labour, it is still a form of labour (Lombardo and Alonso, 2020: 451) as there are empirical parallels between it and paid work (Cox, 2013; Eichler and Matthews, 2004). However, as Walby noted, such valuing does not ignore the fact that as it is unpaid domestic work produces gender inequality (2009: 105). As we explained in the preceding chapter, various forms of gender inequality are produced by the gender division of labour. One instance is the correlation between IPV and unemployment.

Regarding the activities carried out by the state, welfare is considered in the definition of the economy due to its role in redistribution. The Swedish model, which Lewis (1992) previously used to explain this, along with the introduction of childcare facilities and public health services, provides support for this assertion. To some point, women's relationship with the welfare state has been established on distribution (Lister, 1997: 35). Due to welfare's distributional structure, service delivery requires redistribution; public childcare services, for example, follow a gender-redistributive policy. This (like parental leave) aims to promote gender equality, address the consequences of the gendered division of labour, and change the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities (Walby, 2009: 106). For example, states provide childcare services, which are typically performed by women.

Women's political and economic rights undoubtedly go hand in hand as they were able to challenge exclusion from the market (the right to protest, the right to form a social movement...) and

regulate employment (women's presence in parliament or in ministerial positions) when their political citizenship was acknowledged. Economic citizenship considers social rights described by Marshal (1950), but it also emphasizes women's rights to education and employment, reinforcing their roles as providers rather than merely recipients. According to Kessler-Harris, social citizenship may limit women's capacity for participation rather than enhance it (2003: 158), so she supported the addition of a new category to Marshall's (1950) three parts of citizenship, economic citizenship. Kessler-Harris defined it as a "right to work at the occupation of one's choice", as well as the right to a suitable wage and access to education and universal health care (2003: 158-59). That being so, we use the concept of economic citizenship at the expense of Marshall's social citizenship. We use it to describe economic and social rights (Moghadam, 2013: 3) applied to women, including the right to work, equal pay, education, health care, social insurance, and parental protection (e.g., parental leave, childcare facilities, etc.). The latter is one of the benefits deemed crucial by Kessler-Harris to support women's participation in the market (2003: 159). Evidence from OECD countries shows that father-specific leave is related to increased female participation in the market (Bettelli, 2020). Australia, Iceland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal well-represent these figures.

As the economy is covered not only by monetary values but also by tasks produced by domestic labour and welfare activities carried out by the state, it is possible to reconcile economic and social rights in a single dimension of women's citizenship that does not constrain their ability to participate and produce. Nevertheless, this is limited by the models of welfare that each gender regime has. For example, in private/domestic gender regimes, welfare is provided by the family and women are barred from the market (Lombardo and Alonso, 2020: 452). In that case, economic autonomy is non-existent. Contrarily, in public gender regimes, the market provides some services required to support women's participation in the labour market (Walby, 2009: 263). Walby claimed that when neoliberal and social democratic regimes are compared, the former is "more regulated for equality and a balanced life" (working time regulation, equal pay...), whereas the latter suggests fewer employment regulations (2020: 420).

The lack of a gender-redistributive policy may limit women's employment opportunities, especially those low-income women who are more vulnerable (public transportation, care facilities, etc.). Walby agreed that most effects of economic gender inequality result from lax employment regulation because it facilitates precarious work, informal employment, and part-time jobs, so, the more social-democratic the economy of a (gender) regime, the deeper the democracy of a (political) regime (2020: 421). Indeed, as specified by Walby, neoliberal privatization of welfare and labour market deregulation

are examples of how the scope of a democratic polity is reduced (2009: 183–84). On the other hand, in addition to the provision of welfare and employment regulation, Walby reinforced education regulation as a means by which the state incites the participation of women in the labour market (2009: 112). So, employment, welfare, and education are the primary drivers of the private-public continuum, and the more these approaches are applied, the more economic citizenship rights for women will be guaranteed. This process is influenced by the domain of polity (e.g., an organized religion devoted to a private regime vs. a presence-democratic state committed to a public regime), which demonstrates how polity, in addition to the economy, affects economic citizenship.

Gender inequality eases as more women move from private/domestic to public forms of the economy (Walby, 2009: 128). Therefore, the increase in the proportion of employed women indicates a reduction in economic gender inequality, as the non-producing economy is contracting while the amount of people earning an income is increasing (Walby, 2009: 153). This decline is also linked to education, which is a social-economic ladder. This calls to mind the existing literature cited in the Introduction explaining how education is related to GDP (Chaaban and Cunningham, 2011; Elks, 2020), economic development (Bloom, Kuhn, and Prettner, 2018), health (Feinstein et al., 2006), and political participation (Bhalotra, Clots, and Iyer, 2013). Along with the dimensions and domains that we developed so far, they established a framework for 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship' within the structures and institutions of gender regimes. The next dimension we discuss is intimate citizenship, which is related to both the institutional domains of civil society and violence. This dimension of citizenship goes beyond the relation between the individual and the state, stands out in the family and the household, and requires a perspective of citizenship that extends beyond the public sphere.

2.2.3. Intimate citizenship, sexual rights, and "intimate troubles"

The remaining institutional domains of gender regimes – violence and civil society – are related to intimate citizenship. While researching a set of citizen experiences, such as reproductive rights and family law (Bonjour and Hart, 2021: 8), intimate citizenship does not ignore interactions with other domains and suggests a link between the public (citizenship) and private (intimacy) spheres. Before describing how both private and public forms of violence, as well as civil society, affect women's intimate citizenship, we define intimate citizenship and "intimate troubles".

Although some use the concept of sexual citizenship to express an intimate approach to citizenship (Lister, 2002; Richardson, 2017), we use the concept of intimate citizenship, as it does not

only pay attention to SRHR (abortion, contraception, the HPV vaccine, etc.) but also to issues related to the intimacy. Plummer conceptualized intimate citizenship to define “intimate troubles” (marriage, divorce, parenting, child-rearing, sexuality, etc.) in the private sphere (2003: 13). It studies sexuality and intimacy while refocusing an analysis on the institutions that give rise to forms of sexuality. In compliance with Plummer, the relation between the public and private spheres is an endless concern brought up by this dimension of citizenship (2003: 15), which studies a set of “public discourses" on rights, obligations, and recognitions in private life (2001: 238). Thus, under intimate citizenship, we study "intimate troubles" emerging in the institutional domains of violence (gender-based violence, IPV, honour crimes, femicides, etc.) and civil society (CEFMU, SRHR, etc.).

Walby examined the Weberian idea that the state has the monopoly of legitimate violence (2009: 192), arguing that the state is not modern until crimes against women (domestic violence, sexual assault, harassment, stalking, rape, etc.) are fully criminalized and regulated (2020: 422). Effectively criminalizing violence and punishing those who use it would lead to a state monopoly over violence, but without such actions, the state condones it (Walby, 2009: 200). States did not challenge the violence that was practised in households because they saw it as being private and outside of their responsibilities (Walby, 2009: 202). This is what Shire and Nemoto (2020) fixed as “the privatization of the domestic”. Following this view, women are protected by spouses rather than the state, explaining why spousal violence was not criminalized until the 20th century (Shire and Nemoto, 2020: 440-41). Even after states passed laws outlawing crimes like rape in marriage, it was still common practice, and as a result, convictions for such crimes are extremely rare. This is even more disconcerting in Gulf monarchies and other countries defined by Moghadam (2020) as neopatriarchal gender regimes. In line with Moghadam, domesticity-related traits or laws against violence against women are either ineffective or nonexistent in these countries (2020: 468). Also, Russia's so-called Slapping Law, which decriminalized domestic violence in 2017 and limited the state's role to the private sphere, exemplifies a premodern domestic/private form of violence. As Walby covered, violence can take place at home by domestic perpetrators, most of whom are family members (2020: 421). The state supports these attitudes by limiting its involvement in the private sphere and the domain of violence.

In agreement with Walby, democracy makes it easier to regulate violence while making it harder to commit it by establishing a link between the institutional domains of policy and violence (2009: 199). This means that violence varies with the depth of democracy, while the frequency of violence drops as democracy increases. That is why Walby argued that neoliberal gender regimes have higher levels of violence than social democratic gender regimes as they only emphasize laws against

violence while ignoring victim support (2020: 421-22) and the implementation of the law. Neoliberal gender regimes criminalize violence, but this is insufficient given that laws are subject to changes by institutions and that local executors determine how it is put into practice. As Walby summarized, if the police do not arrest the perpetrators or if the courts do not convict them, they are treated as if they were innocent. By non-enforcement of the law, "the state condones the acts of violence and treats these as if they were either legitimate actions or outside its remit", Walby concluded (2009: 200). Intimate issues generally take the form of SRHR in the institutional domain of civil society. In Walby's terms, this domain includes education, intimacy, and sexuality; however, as education has been addressed in the context of economic citizenship, we underline sexuality and intimacy in this section.

Discussing interpretations of modernity in civil society, Walby (2009) emphasized power structures that limit SRHR, recalling Giddens (1992) and Moghadam (2005). The regulation of acts and practices that influence bodily autonomy, like access to contraception, the ability to have an abortion, and the capacity to get a divorce, depends on that approach. As a result, progress in the private-public continuum implies a greater liberalization of civil society because women's intimate citizenship is valued in social-democratic gender regimes (e.g., parental leave, safe abortion, family planning, divorce rights, parental leave, etc.) but is not accepted in private gender regimes (CEFMU, opposition to divorce, lack of access to HPV vaccine, etc.). Therefore, in private/domestic regimes partnering was usually for life, which contrasts with public regimes and "high rates of re-partnering divorce, cohabitation, and children born outside of marriage" (Walby, 2009: 225). Walby argued that when it comes to public regimes, the privatization of childcare makes it harder for men to re-partner women with children, which explains why social democratic regimes have lower "rates of lone parenthood than neoliberal forms" (2009: 225). This is because, as we saw in the previous section, childcare facilities are more likely to be held by the state under social democratic regimes than neoliberal ones. Then, changes in the variety of gender regimes are related to transformations in sexuality or intimacy. Lombardo and Alonso elaborated on the role of ideology in conflicts over abortion and contrasted the People's Party's 2013 bill to restrict access to abortion with the election of a social-democratic government that sought to rebuff the anti-abortion agenda (2020: 463).

Women's sexual and intimate rights violation is a violation of their citizenship. Like other dimensions of 'gender mainstreaming citizenship', intimate citizenship is correlated with the depth of democracy: political regimes with deeper democracies adopt a more women-friendly body policy and respect "intimate troubles" on a larger scale. This undertakes a complex web of relationships between

states, the nature of political regimes, and gender policies, and demonstrates how gender can inspire a better understanding of political regimes, democracy, and political science in general.

2.3. Conclusion

This chapter conceptualized on lines for studying gender power relations and established the theory of gender regimes. We developed varieties and institutional domains and explained how this model engages with dimensions of citizenship.

We asserted this is a useful conceptual framework for examining gender issues in political regimes and discussed the link between women-friendly policies and the depth of democracy. In addition, the chapter establishes the conceptual framework, laying the foundation for the analytical chapters which explain the core phenomenon of gendered de-democratization. We place citizenship in perspective and stress 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship', the alternative approach that bears in mind the political, economic, and intimate experiences of women in the institutional domains of the gender regime. In doing so, we argue that the idea of universal citizenship was a gender-blinded male citizenship. In contrast, we advocate adopting another strategy in which women are intimately recognized, income providers, and politically represented.

This stance is opposed to a private/domestic form of gender regime that reduces women to domesticity and restricts their citizenship and is in alignment with the theory of critical feminism expressed in Chapter 1. Moreover, the chapter sets the context for further looking into the gender regime in Turkey, which Chapter 3 will delve deeper into.

CHAPTER 3

Gender and Politics in Turkey

In an allegory of the Bosporus Bridge, Turkey is a crossing point between Europe and Asia. Formed by Western institutions and Ottoman structures (Akgönül and Oran, 2019: 13), the country has a diverse cultural flow, holds nine linguistic communities[41], the main variants of Islam (Sunnism and Shiism), minor religious groups, and approximately fifty ethnic groups (Schneier, 2016: 158). With 85 million people, the country has the fourth-highest infant mortality rate in the OECD at 9.1/1000 (OECD, 2021). Nearly 20 per cent of its inhabitants are Kurds, the largest ethnolinguistic minority[42]. The employment rate has fallen over the last decade as Turkey has been thrown into an economic crisis that has primarily impacted women. Half of the young adults (aged 25-34) have not finished secondary education, and global institutions, such as the World Bank (2019), noted a literacy rate of 96.74 per cent, which is lower among women (94.4%) than men (99.1%). Turkey joined the Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952), and the European Economic Community, EEC (1963). It is a member of the OECD (1961) and the Customs Union (1995), and since 1987, recognizes the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisdiction. In 1999, Turkey became a candidate for EU membership; however, the European Council stopped the 2005-starting accession negotiations in 2019. A new round of negotiations is expected as part of the unblocking of Sweden's application for NATO membership in 2023.

This chapter places Turkish politics in perspective and explains its political and electoral systems, the political regime, and the democratization/de-democratization processes that Turkey has been going through. It claims that the structures of the First Republic (1923-1960), the rise of Political Islam in the 1990s, and the emergence of a 'New Turkey' in the 2000s all coexisted with different gender regimes: 'State Feminism+ (1924-50) and 'Conservative Gender Regime' (1950-60) during the First Republic; the 'Gendered Political Islam' in the 1990s; and the 2000s 'Gendered de-democratization'. This chapter argues each of these gender regimes had an impact on a set of institutional domains and the way women exercised citizenship. Also, the link between gender and politics reveals changes in the political regime, as well as in society, and the state. Therefore, in contrast to the civic stance of 'State Feminism', the 'Gendered de-democratization' recommends an

[41] Turkish is the mother language of 90% of the population. Kurdish (6%) is the second most spoken, followed by minority languages, such as Arabic (1.2%) and Circassian (0.09%). Other languages, like Laz, Zazaki, Armenian, Greek, and Hebrew, are spoken by 2.71% of the population. On the topic, see Güllü, F. et al. (2015). "Socio-cultural differences of e-learning in Estonia and Turkey". Paper presented at ICERI2015 Conference. Seville.

[42] Estimative vary. The CIA Factbook mentions 19% (CIA, 2021), the Kurdish Institute in Paris 25% (Kurdish Institute, 2017), and Kurdish groups 27% (Kaya and Whiting, 2019: 232).

ideal type based on a gendered national-religious structure and a national identity grounded on a religious (Sunni Muslim) view of the (Turkish) nation.

We first discuss the main Republican principles and then analyze 'State Feminism' and the 'Conservative Gender Regime'. The National Outlook (Millî Görüş) movement is examined to understand the dynamics of 'Gendered Political Islam', which is mostly important to recognize how the veil became politicized and the religious underpinnings of women's citizenship. The final section fosters an in-depth analysis of the political regime and the de-democratization processes that the country has been going through. It looks at 'Gendered de-democratization' and introduces first-person accounts of Turkish women[43].

3.1. Structures and dynamics of the First Republic (1923-1960)

The events that took place from the Armistice of Mudros (1918) to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) might be studied to understand the geographical boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, as well as its distinction as the Ottoman Empire's successor (1299-1922). Led by Atatürk (at the time Mustafa Kemal Paşa), the Turkish National Movement vetoed the opening of the Bosporus and Dardanelles (Hanedar, Hanedarc, and Toruna, 2016: 154) and declared the end of the Ottoman Empire, setting the tone for the War of Independence (1919-23) and detaining the division of the Ottoman heritage imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) legitimized the national sovereignty and the domain over Anatolia[44] and part of Thrace[45] (Akgönül and Oran, 2019: 15), and, on 29 October 1923, the TBMM nominated Mustafa Kemal Paşa President of the Republic of Turkey (Mateescu, 2006: 230). Atatürk's principles, or the "Six Arrows of Kemalism" (Table 6), were presented in the third CHP congress held in 1931, added to the Constitution in 1937, and specified how the country separated itself from the Muslim world. Ataturk held the presidency until his death in 1938. The CHP ruled in Turkey until 1950, becoming the longest-lasting party ruling in the republican history of the country.

[43] Not wanting to anticipate the analytical process begun in Chapter 4, we introduce some quotes from participants to explain the various phases of the gender regime in this chapter. Because the final section of this chapter focuses on the current gender regime, we combine it with contributions from participants on the subject, thereby serving as a bridge to the analytical chapters.

[44] The Asian side of Turkey. It is also known as Asia Minor and the homeland of the Turks.

[45] The European side of Turkey. It includes the European side of Istanbul and Çanakkale and the provinces of Edirne, Kırklareli, and Tekirdağ. It is the extension of the Marmara region up to the north of the Aegean Sea.

Table 6. The Six Arrows of Kemalism

Statism	Favouring state-led development as opposed to private initiative
Populism	A revolution led by an elite oriented toward the people
Republicanism	Replacement of the sultanic regime with a republican system
Reformism	Replacement of traditional foundations with modern institutions
Nationalism	Replacement of pan-Islamism and pan-Ottomanism with a Turkish identity
Secularism	Overhauling the power of religion in the state, favouring the West and science

Source: Emre (2014: 46) and Eslen-Ziya and Korkut (2010: 315). Own elaboration.

Three main characteristics of nationalism should be addressed. First, Ziya Gökalp's national culture set the context in which it was applied and established a link between Turkish and Western cultures (Güngör, 1999). Secondly, it is related to "Sèvresphobia" and "Sèvres Syndrome" (Schmid, 2014), terms formulated to express the fear of the lack of success of national sovereignty. Thirdly, Turkish nationalism took on the form of civic nationalism and recognized that all inhabitants were Turks by virtue of citizenship, regardless of their religion or ethnicity (Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution). Contrary to other nationalist forms, civic nationalism admits that those "who are born in the territory of the national state are members of the nation and, as such, entitled to citizenship" (Grosby, 2005: 33), despite language, ethnicity, or religion. For the first time, rather than religion, citizenship defined the nation (Akgönül, 2019: 328).

Assuming that raising national consciousness would be possible without acknowledging all citizens, the CHP promoted a homogeneous state centred on citizenship (Kuzu, 2019: 71) and a Turkified identity (Smith, 2005: 443). The ruling party attempted to remove all sources of conflict (Yavuz and Öztürk 2019, 3) and permitted the population unmixing initiated in the Ottoman period. In 1925, the prime-minister Ismet İnönü said, "As Turks are the majority, other groups do not have any power" and the state's duty was "to Turkify non-Turkish groups" (in Kaya and Whiting, 2019: 234). Akgönül (2019: 336) contended that the "erasure of the non-Muslim indigenous populations from Anatolia and Thrace" did not stop until the 1930s (e.g., compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey). Other targets were Jews (e.g., the 1934 Thrace pogroms) and Syriacs (Kuzu, 2019: 70), who, such as the Greeks, were non-Muslim minorities (e.g., 1942 Wealth Tax). Religion was settled as a tool for homogeneity and diversity control, even though it was no longer the basis of

national identity. Although the CHP banned religion from politics, the party supported a Sunni Muslim identity as the desirable moral and behavioural aspect of citizenship (Çağatay, 2018: 49).

Along with religion, language was one of the homogenization tools applied, and to bond the heterogenous people and found a unified nation-state, the ruling party subjected non-Turkish-speaking Muslims, Alevis, and Kurds to assimilation politics. If it was successful for Caucasian and Balkan people, as Akgönül noted, attempts to assimilate Alevis and Kurds were ineffective (2019: 336). This is illustrated by the Kurdish Uprising (1925), the Dersim Massacre (1937), the Maraş Massacre (1978), and the Sivas Massacre (1997). The CHP accepted religious and ethnic groups but did not recognize them. Supposing that "who resided within the state's borders" "was a Turk" (Atatürk, cit. in Romano, 2019: 242), it promoted citizenship as the same as ethnicity and did not acknowledge ethnic diversity. This was promoted by the Treaty of Lausanne, the one that unratified the Treaty of Sèvres and ignored recognition of the "local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas" (Article 62 of the Treaty of Sèvres). Therefore, non-Turkish (ethnic) and non-Sunni Muslim (religious) people, such as Kurds and Alevis, were provided with less access to the public sphere (Çağatay, 2018: 49).

Another crucial principle related to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey is secularism. The Caliphate and Sharia Law were abolished in 1924, and Islam was only officially recognized as the state religion until 1928. Nevertheless, the ruling party sought to use religion for its own ends and established state institutions like the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to keep religion and people under control. The purpose was to make religion work with the goals of the secular state. In doing so, Kemalism/Atatürkism[46] did not distance itself from religion, so early secularism should not be seen as the separation of religion from the state. As explained by Öztürk, secularism in the early Republic combined Ottoman state-religion relations with a state-centric approach (2019: 81-85). This hybrid structure worked “as a means to national sovereignty against religious authority” (Çağatay, 2018: 49) and developed civic nationalism along with a French laïcité (Yavuz, 2019: 58), backing the exclusion of religion from the public. Yavuz described Kemalist/Atatürkist secularism as a “secular fundamentalism”, which restricts the religion from the public share and is opposed to tolerant regulation of religious domains (2019: 69). Early secularism, more than the secularization of the state, education, and law (e.g., the 1924 Law on the Unification of Education), promoted the secularization of social life. For the Kemalists/Atatürkists, the state came before religion, which attended to the needs of the state (Yavuz, 2019: 65). Bose observed that Turkish secularism has two peculiarities, including the

[46] Kemalist refers to Mustafa Kemal's sociopolitical thought (Heper, 2012: 139), who received the title Atatürk, “the father of the Turks” (1934). In contrast to Kemalism, which is typically used from a critical standpoint, Atatürkism, as it is also known, expresses admiration for the founder (Heper, 2012: 139). For the sake of impartiality, we use both terminologies.

imposition of secularism through authoritarianism and the exaggerated ambition for European acceptance (2018: 160). Despite the claims that it was working to abolish religion, early reforms sought to reposition the religious establishment as a controlled bureaucratic apparatus under the state hierarchy (Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, 2019: 56).

These principles allowed the establishment from above of a modern secular nation-state. However, understanding this modernization project requires a return to the Ottoman Empire. In the second half of the 19th century, the bureaucracy and the military cadres began to question the authority of the Sultanate (Yilmaz, 2008: 536). Former events, such as the Iliden Uprising (1903), the Young Turk Revolution (1908)[47], the Albanian Revolts (1909-1912), the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912), the Balkans War (1912-1913) and the World War I (1914-1918) affected the demographic balance of the Ottoman Empire by precipitating the exodus to the current territory of Turkey and the loss of areas in the Caucasus and Balkans. As a result, Ottoman social, economic, and ethnic systems disintegrated (Howard, 2019: 392), and despite efforts to forge an Ottoman identity (e.g., the Tanzimat reforms, 1839-1876), modernization failed.

In conformity with Mardin, it occurred because the reforms did not close the gap between "Paris-oriented statesmen" and "country bumpkins" (1969: 274), assembling a cleavage between urban bureaucracy (rulers, judiciary officials, military forces, etc.) and peripheral masses. Ottoman modernization was state-oriented, establishing a cleavage between the modern, educated, urban, and secular centre and the conservative, uneducated, rural, and religious periphery (Azgın, 2020: 2; Turan, 2019: 31). As Mardin suggested, the Ottoman inability to deal with socioeconomic issues forced the building of a new organizational system that split people into two cultures (1969: 280). This schism between Anatolian traditional and religious people and the secular elite – mostly from Rumelia since Istanbul was the capital at that time – has been termed "center-periphery cleavage" (Mardin, 1969), "white Turk-Black Turk dualism" (Waldman and Çalışkan, 2017), and "left-right alla Turca dimension"[48] (Çarkoğlu, 2012). Islam became a marker of Ottoman backwardness and a line dividing modernity from tradition (Akgönül and Oran, 2019: 17). Regarding political parties, this division was embodied by the Committee of Union and Progress (ITF) and the Liberal Entente (HIF), and after the foundation of the

[47] The Young Turk Revolution, also known as the Revolution of 1908, ended with the sultanic regime of Abdülhamid II and initiated the shift to the republic. It was the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era, a period of parliamentary rule between the Revolution of 1908 and the dissolution of Parliament of 1920. On the Young Turks Revolution, see Hanioğlu, M. (2001). *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. New York: Oxford University Press; Turfan, N. (2000). *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse*. London: I.B. Tauris.

[48] This dimension may only be applied to the period after the 1960s when the CHP started defining itself as a social democratic political party. Bülent Ecevit, its leader in the 1970s, is credited as responsible for the institution of social democratic politics in the country, and the current leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, is also recognized for defending social democracy. The same does not apply to other well-known names in the party, such as Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara who for approximately 20 years represented the far-right MHP.

Republic, by the CHP and the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and the Liberal Republican Party (SCF).

The CHP was the continuation of the ITF and the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, the main political force in the Turkish War of Independence period (Emre, 2014: 29), which legitimized it as Turkey's founder. It ruled Turkey as a single party between 1925-30 and 1930-46. Emre stated that the Kurdish Uprising was a critical turning point in the typology of the political regime because it opened the way for the Maintenance of Order Act (1925-29) and gave the government the power to stifle any initiatives it deemed to be hostile to peace and security (2014: 34). After a period of democratization brought on by the end of the Sultanate (e.g., property rights, electoral laws, separation of powers...), the TCF was shut down, and the multi-party system was abolished. Many internal (e.g., the 1930 Menemen Incident) and external (e.g., the 1929 Great Depression) factors contributed to a democratic breakdown (e.g., the SCF's forced closure in 1930, the 1931 Press Act...). Moreover, with a literacy rate under 9 per cent[49] and three-quarters of the inhabitants living in small villages[50], modernization was not evolutional, and the party was revealed to be unable to mobilize the masses (Mardin, 1973: 184). The CHP expected that the population's attitudes would change to accept Western civilization, but labelled Islam as reactionary and ignored its meaning to the population (Yavuz, 2019: 59). It set the stage for the religious counter-reaction, and religion became a form of resistance (Akgönül and Oran, 2019: 18). In the opinion of Özçelik, Kemalists/Atatürkists aimed to promote education and citizenship so that society moves towards democracy (2015: 278). However, this coerced attempt and religious inflexibility came at a high cultural cost (Smith, 2005).

In 1938, Ismet Inönü became President and supported the restoration of the multi-party system. In 1946, one year after the end of World War II and the signature of the UN Charter, the CHP won the first of the multi-party elections. However, the first secret ballot elections, in 1950, would be won by the Democrat Party, DP (Kalaycıoğlu, 2019: 85), which combined populism with patronage and won support from Kurds and sidelined groups unsatisfied with assimilation policies (during Atatürk's rule there were 28 Kurdish uprisings). The DP was supported by religious people, agrarian entrepreneurs, and liberal provincial bourgeoisie (Gür, 2019: 339). Its first term (1950-1954) was known for continuing democratization, increasing freedoms (e.g., assembly, individual, press rights...), and economic growth. Afterwards, in 1954 and 1957, it was the most-voted party again, with 57.6 per cent and 47.9 per cent of the vote, respectively (Bermek, 2019: 86).

[49] Literacy rate of 8.9% in 1927 (Öztürk, 2004: 48). If Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir are excluded, the rate falls to 6.6% (Sayilan and Yildiz, 2009: 746).
[50] According to a statistic published in 1952, 74.8% of the population lived in villages of 500 or fewer inhabitants. See *Küçük Istatistik Yilliği* [Statistical Abstract]. Istanbul: Istatistik Genel Mudiuriugu. No. 343, p. 43. For an English version, see McCally, S. (1956). "Party Government in Turkey". *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 18 (2): 297-323.

Nonetheless, as foreign aid ended in the second half of the 1950s, inflation spiked, prices rose, and living standards dropped (Karpat, 1961: 438), increasing social unrest. Therefore, the DP enacted legislation restricting freedoms (e.g., the 1960 Commission of Inquiry) and repressing opposition and became more authoritarian (Lord, 2018: 60). The failed democratization process stood out as the extension of Turkification but was based more on the religious and ethnic features than on civic issues (e.g., the 1955 Istanbul pogrom). Whereas the CHP misrecognized cultural and ethnic divisions, the DP fed itself on them and spread identity cleavages. Its attempts to create a political structure that represented the will of the people failed, and, like the CHP, the DP revealed a strict intolerance for those who disagreed with it.

Although Article 148 of Turkey's Law of 1930 prohibited military gatherings for political purposes, Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act acknowledged that officers were "protectors and defenders of the Turkish homeland" (cit. in Heper, 2019: 116). As a result, the Armed Forces believed that they had a responsibility to overthrow a government they believed threatened national unity (Yesil, 2020: 4), which led to the coup d'état in May 1960. After the coup, the 1961 new Constitution established a Constitutional Court to restrict governmental powers and imposed a bicameral system (until 1980), the parliamentary choosing of the President for a 7-year term (until 2014), a party-list proportional representation system, and d'Hondt system (Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser, 2020: 125). The new Constitution defined Turkey "as a democratic, secular, social state that was based on the rule of law and human rights" (in Kabasakal, 2019: 301-02), however, former President Celal Bayar, former prime minister Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Zorlu, former ministers of finance and foreign affairs, received death sentences, accused of violating the 1924 Constitution[51].

Forced secularization alienated society from the Kemalists/Atatürkists (Yavuz, 1997: 64) and permitted religious groups and conservative parties to emerge (Yilmaz, 2019: 7). This helps to explain the popularity of right-wing parties and the fact that the left has only won elections four times after that: after the 1960 coup d'état, the 1971 coup by memorandum (twice, in 1973 and 1977), and the first Islamic government in 1996. Following the establishment of the multi-party system, parties pledging to respect Islam received widespread support. These parties recognized that polarization was useful in the campaign to discredit the state's secular elite for marginalizing pious people. They all did it, permitting religious movement to be shown as a struggle against the dominant repressive class; the DP in the 1950s, the Justice Party (AP) in the 1960s, the National Outlook from the 1970s to the 1990s, and the

[51] Bayar's sentence was commuted to life in prison, but he was released in 1964 due to health concerns. Even so, the junta executed Menderes, Polatkan, and Zorlu in September 1961. All the others who had been sentenced to death were released thanks to a new amnesty law that the AP passed in 1966.

AKP in the 2000s. Understanding Turkish politics requires an understanding of how nationalism isolated religious voters while also alienating Kurds. Only by considering that can we understand how Tayyip Erdoğan was promoted as the saviour who conquered the "secular state" for a "pious society" and inverted the state-society dichotomy. Next, we compare Kemalist/Atatürkist and conservative approaches to gender politics, emphasizing the former's indifference to the private sphere and the latter's decline in women's political citizenship.

3.1.1. From State Feminism to the Conservative Gender Regime (1923-1960)

Women's rights are seen as a result of Kemalist/Atatürkist modernization, and it is acknowledged that, among Muslim countries, Turkey stands out for having applied extensive and unprecedented reforms on women's issues (Kandiyoti, 1991: 22). This is well-illustrated by the 1924 Constitution and 1926 Civil Code polygamy ban, recognition of mandatory civil marriage, and equal legislation on parenting, divorce, inheritance, testimony, and property (Adak, 2019: 315; Somer, 2019: 45). Modernization was in line with the request for equal access to the public as the point of imposing (legal) gender equality was to establish a Westernized society (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 43).

The CHP related gender to social progress (Rothman, 2008: 42) under the influence of secularism and the idea that the state was the guard of women's rights (Turam, 2008: 478). This was reinforced by Güneş-Ayata and Tütüncü (2008: 462) and (Eslen-Ziya and Korkut 2010, 311), explaining that modernization was the driver of women's rights in Turkey. Kemalism/Atatürkism assumed the Second Constitutional Era's focus on modernization, which was seriously influenced by gender. The importance of pursuing Western civilization is revealed in Figure 2, which shows a woman flying an aeroplane wearing çarşaf (traditional Ottoman-Islamic clothing) and a man wearing a fez (Ottoman-Islamic hat) trying to approach a woman riding a bike wearing a modern dress from behind.



Figure 2. “Turkey of the Future” and “Healthy mind is to be in healthy body”

Source: Arat (1997: 97-98).

Nezihe Muhiddin attempted to establish the Women's People Party (KHF) in 1923, even before the CHP was founded, but the Turkish National Movement barred her because women lacked political rights (Coşar and Onbaşi, 2008: 329). Because of the quest for modernization, women's rights were owned; however, despite the KHF's efforts, the women's suffrage movement did not have the same impact as in Europe. First-wave feminism in Turkey began a year later when the CHP invited the KHF to start the Union of Turkish Women (TKB), the first Turkish women's organization (Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu, 2017: 152). As the group most subjected to oppression by the Caliphate, women's rights were upheld by the secular elite, which quickly used them as a tool to advance secularization. In that respect, focusing on women’s political citizenship, we consider four stages (Sener, 2014: 72; Yenilmez, 2016: 110):

- 1930: A Municipal Law recognized the right to vote and be elected in local elections
- 1933: Women won the right to be elected *mukhtar* and to the Council of Elders
- 1934: A national law recognized women’s right to be deputies
- 1935: In the General Elections, 18 women were elected and won 4.5% of the seats

The creation of new universities and the institution of secondary education for women contributed to the increased visibility of women's education and participation in the public sphere. On gender and women's issues, there was, however, a retreat, and in 1935, organizations promoting women's rights, including the TKB, were disbanded. The success of women's political citizenship spread the myth of gender equality, refuting the requirement for organizations and bringing first-wave feminism to an end.

The CHP's view of equality was predicated on the idea of sameness in the public sphere, and the typology of the political regime excluded the possibility of gender equality (Kandiyoti, 1991: 44) Early legal achievements had a drawback, as Diner and Toktaş maintained, and women had to accept the lie that women and men had equal rights (2010: 44). Furthermore, in contrast to its support for sameness in the public sphere, the CHP recognized the difference in the private sphere and converted this approach into a hierarchical relationship between men and women (Arat, 1997: 101). As a result, Arat criticized modernization, claiming it was sexist, insulted women, and was only concerned with the public sphere (1997: 104). Also, Öztürkmen said that modernization was an attempt at liberation with no feminist proposes (2013: 255–56), and Kandiyoti explained that women's rights were not the cause but the result of modernization (1991: 23). The CHP recognized women's political citizenship, but women were a political instrument (Engin and Pals, 2018: 23) and their rights were only accepted for the success of the Republic. In Atatürk's words, "Republic means democracy and recognition of women's rights is a dictate of democracy; hence women's rights will be recognized" (cit. in Arat, 1997: 99). Along with this, there was an incredibly patriarchal society and misogynistic parliament[52].

Three criticisms of this approach must be made: classism, control over women's bodies, and state feminism. Due to classism, modernization excluded rural, poor, and uneducated women (Arat, 1994: 57). Unquestionably, modernization benefited urban bourgeois women. For example, the share of women working in law and medicine increased significantly, and Turkey surpassed states such as the US and France (Kandiyoti, 1987: 322). Education for women served as a means of class consolidation as upper and middle-class women entering well-paid jobs "posed less of a threat than upwardly mobile men from humble origins" (Kandiyoti, 1987: 323). Even though women's economic citizenship has improved, reforms were still inaccessible to rural areas, where polygamy, CEFMU, and bride prices were still very prevalent (Kandiyoti, 1987: 322).

[52] This is well-illustrated by Peyami Safa's opposition to women's political rights. Safa accused the "leftists" of supporting "intellectual prostitutes" (women who became involved in politics) at the expense of family morality (Coşar, 2007_ 121). The conservative majority, the Second Group, dominated the First National Assembly (1920-23) and blocked attempts to grant women's rights. Even in the Second National Assembly (1923-27), when progressives dominated, part of the opposition supported polygamy and the reduction of the marriage age to 9 years old (Kandiyoti, 1991: 38).

Moreover, despite advancements in the public sphere, women continued to pay the price for patriarchal structures at home. As gender relations were not a political concern, those women limited to the private sphere (out of the labour market, without political engagement) were excluded (Çağatay, 2018: 49). Kemalists/Atatürkists thought women were subordinated due to reactionary views of Islam, so secularism would guarantee equality. However, this approach to gender equality was limited to the inclusion of those able (considering location, economic status, religion, ethnicity, etc.) to keep up with modernization (Çağatay, 2018: 49). The ideal type of secular, well-educated women ignored the differences between women (Arat, 1997: 100) and did not ensure rights for all women (Mutluer, 2019: 102). Although the CHP brought changes for upper and middle-class urban women, it was insufficient for low-class women in the villages. Modernization increased inequality between women and became an allegory of the centre-periphery dichotomy.

The politicization of women's bodies was another criticism. Dress codes signified a debate between tradition and modernization (Çağatay, 2018: 50), and while women wore religious clothes (*çarşaf, chador, hijab*...) during the Ottoman Empire, the early Republic encouraged them to wear Western outfits (Engin and Pals, 2018: 3). Clothes embodied Republican values and were a way to convey stereotypes and objectify women. Of course, since women were still legally permitted to wear what they pleased, this was not a blow to their (legal) bodily autonomy. On a sociocultural level, however, the encouragement to wear Western clothing and remove the veil relegated those who disobeyed these teachings and reduced their bodies to a fundamental division between those leading a Western lifestyle (unveiled women) and those who follow religious codes (veiled women). Arat referred to this approach, which sees clothing as an item of the modernization-tradition debate, as "cultural secularization" (2010: 870)[53]. Moreover, sexual freedom was still condemned, and the 1926 Civil Code designated men as the "head of the family" (Article 152) and the "representative of the marriage union" (Article 154). In the private sphere, there was a difference based on social and gender stereotypes, contrary to the idea of equality in the public sphere. Regardless of modernization in the public sphere, the ruling party followed "a traditional definition of female roles and emphasized reproduction and childcare as the primary functions of women", Arat claimed (1994: 72). Although emancipated (at least urban and secular women), women were subjected to cultural methods of controlling women's sexuality.

[53] Even today, there is a politicization of women's bodies, and discussions between progressives and conservatives often focus on what women wear. For example, Hüseyin Çelik, a former Minister of Culture (2002-03) and Education (2003-09) commented on a TV presenter's clothes in 2013 and labelled them "too much" and "unacceptable". See Hürriyet (2013). "Çelik'ten dekolte açıklaması" [Çelik's statement on décolleté]. *Hürriyet*. Available at http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=24880396

State feminism is the third gendered argument against modernization (Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu, 2017; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011; Mutluer, 2019). We refer to the early republican gender regime in Turkey as 'State Feminism' as it synthesizes the CHP's gender approach during the First Republic. In general, state feminism promotes women's rights based on particular contexts and a gendered view of the state (Mazur and McBride, 2008: 244). In Turkey, it reinforced political citizenship and legal status while ignoring the private sphere and intimate citizenship. Even though women received economic and political rights and improved their representation, the state claimed to have exclusive control over gender, so their rights were gotten within the patriarchal limits of the state (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 558). Women were granted legal and political rights, but they were forced to uphold republican values and give up their womanhood in order to advance national modernization. According to Kandiyoti (1988), women were forced to "bargain with patriarchy". The regime forced them to participate in the public sphere without having a choice in their intimacy by delegating womanhood to the role of wife and mother (Coşar, 2007: 117).

State feminism did not abolish patriarchal structures. Even as women's roles in the public sphere expanded, their roles in the private sphere remained unchanged, governed by traditional and conservative norms. Kemalists/Atatürkists practised, legitimized, and regulated patriarchal values (Arat, 2005: 18) while struggling to remove the state's religious basis (Tekeli; 1986: 193; 1992: 140). Women should be active members of society, aware of their responsibilities, and pass on republican values to future generations. Mevhibe Inönü's discourse, the wife of President Ismet Inönü and TKB's chair, about "women's understandings of rights, duties, and responsibilities in Turkish democracy"; the duty of "well-educated Turkish mothers for the nation"; and awareness of how to "serve men and children" (in Çağatay, 2017: 114), well-illustrates this stance. Throughout nearly three decades of 'State Feminism', the gender regime faced an initial democratization in the 1920s (women's property and inheritance rights, etc.), underwent a democratic breakdown in the 1930s (closure of women's rights organizations, etc.), and exposed grounds for democracy in the late 1940s (e.g., the TKB 1949 reappearance). Three subjects should be addressed in that context.

First, the de-democratization of the regime was felt less strongly in terms of gender, and even in times of democratic breakdown, women got legal rights in the institutional domains of polity (they did not have the right to vote or run for political office until the 1930s) and economy (mainly, education). Because of the significance of women's education as a tool for class consolidation and the electoral base that upper and middle-class women provided the CHP, there is an exception to the link between de-democratization and opposition to gender equality. This contradicts Çağatay's claim that women

were the most excluded from modernization (2018: 49). Modernization had a different impact on women than on men, and compared to the Caliphate period, there had been a meaningful shift from a private/domestic gender regime to a regime with public forms of polity and economy. Although women's sexuality was primarily confined to marriage and the private sphere, they were allowed to vote and hold public office, and their education was prioritized. Furthermore, significant rights on "intimate troubles" like divorce and parenthood were won, producing a hybrid civil society – "intimate troubles" typical of a public civil society contrasting with a private/domestic form of sexuality.

This happened for two reasons. Firstly, as was already stated, women were the object of modernization. Secondly, the CHP's isolated position in the parliament guaranteed the election of Kemalist/Atatürkist MPs and the spread of republicanism, revolutionism, and secularism. Although there was a limited view of citizenship, Kemalism/Atatürkism recognized the meaning of women's political citizenship. The CHP aided emancipation by removing Islam from the law and including women in a new approach to citizenship (Kandiyoti, 1991: 39-40). As Kasapoglu and Özerkmen assumed, 'State Feminism' granted citizenship rights to women in a short period (2011: 98). These rights were mainly part of political citizenship and economic citizenship. In addition, the legal rights conquered in intimacy, even if intimate citizenship has been little worked on, helped to set a solid basis for women's claims in second-wave feminism and for body politics policy.

Secondly, Kemalism/Atatürkist believed education was the foundation of modern society and promoted several educational reforms. The 1924 approval of mixed education was just one of them. Thirdly, late democratization did not endorse representativeness and responsiveness (Figure 3). In the first republican time, 'State Feminism' (1923-50) and the 'Conservative Gender Regime' (1950-160) coexisted; the main distinction between them was that the latter prioritized the family over political citizenship. 'State feminism' neglected intimate citizenship while establishing political citizenship and laying the basis for the growth of economic citizenship. However, the gender regime that followed ignored these elements, indicating a change in attitudes toward women being active citizens and an increase in caregiving. This is well-illustrated by the DP's Congress held in Konya in 1951, where several male MPs called for the revival of the Sharia and polygamy (Güngör, 2015: 63). They also advocated for anti-feminist proposals like the dismissal of female civil servants and a 250 TL annual tax on women who did not have children (Aydın, 2017: 55). In addition to ignoring citizenship, that congress was an effort to revert women's rights, limit them to the household, and legally reverse the signs of progress made previously. The proposal to collectively dismiss women was created to prevent the (albeit limited) economic autonomy that women began to benefit from during 'State Feminism'.



Figure 3. Women MP during the First Republic

Sources: Adak (2019) and Güngör (2015). Own elaboration.

A nearly 70 per cent gender pay gap existed in the 1950s (Tuna, 2015: 482), and most women's employment was in low-paying industries like textile and food (Aydın and Yıldız, 2017: 56). We term this stage 'Conservative Gender Regime' since it was a period of limited participation in the public sphere calling for a return to the household. Mainly in the domain of polity, there was a regression in the public-private continuum. In contrast to 'State Feminism', the 'Conservative Gender Regime' undervalued women's political rights and civic participation (Çağatay, 2017: 113). It denied women the right to participate in the democratic process (Aydın and Yıldız, 2017: 66) and marked a turning moment in Turkey's gender equality. The AKP's ideal of women as devoutly pious caregivers was stimulated by this male-dominated Conservative Gender Regime.

Next, we will delve into Political Islam and the gender regime we term 'Gendered Political Islam'. We discuss the drivers of Islamization, explaining that religion is a natural feature of society but also a state-long-established tool. We define how gender issues influenced political discourse in the 1990s and boosted support for Islamic political parties. Issues like the politicization of the veil and the religious underpinnings of political citizenship were significant. We are most concerned with the

institutionalization and instrumentalization of religion in the latter half of the 20th century in that section, in contrast to the previous section's discussion of gender policies and procedures. Due to this, despite underlining the Welfare Party's (RP) rule (1996-97), we are not limited to this. Instead, we inform how the veil ban sparked a sense of victimhood that was smartly exploited (firstly by the RP and then by the AKP) and analyze the role of women in garnering electoral support for religious parties. Women's involvement in these parties owned votes and normalized religion in politics and the public space. However, the interest in women's political citizenship contrasted with a disregard for intimate and economic forms of citizenship and set a regressing gender regime.

3.2. Political Islam goes mainstream: Islamization of Turkey in the late 20th century

Four factors are most closely associated with the Islamization of Turkey in the second half of the 20th century. The first factor is the state's instrumentalization of religion, exemplified by Diyanet. It nationalized, instrumentalized, and controlled people's lives (Fabbe and Balıkçıoğlu, 2019: 57) and stressed how Islam was (still is) fundamental to Turkish national identity (Lord, 2018: 215). Diyanet permitted religious actors to integrate state institutions (Lord, 2018: 209), and several of its former heads joined the AKP (e.g., Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu [1987-92] and Tayyar Altıkulaç [1978-86]) and supported dismantled religious parties (e.g., Süleyman Ateş [1976-78] or Lütfi Doğan [1972-76]). The autonomy given by the Kemalists/Atatürkists to the Diyanet to control the religion and enforce a secular state (Bose, 2018: 160), was later, on the other hand, used by a religious counterpart to institutionalize the religion. Although the Diyanet continued to control religion in accordance with the state's aims, it was gradually brought into the public sphere. Religion's roles have not changed; the state's aims have.

Another factor related to the Islamization of the country is the adoption of the 1980 junta regime's Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), which merged right-wing ideals, like Turkish nationalism, Sunni Islam, and conservatism (Lord, 2018: 210). The TIS was devised by a group of intellectuals with ties to the MHP (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 559) and established an ideological framework that sought to unite the most extreme parts of the Turkish right wing, strengthening the connection between Islam and Turkish identity (Şen, 2010: 64). According to Lord, an alteration in the political climate brought about by the TIS allowed religious actors to multiply while also being used to stifle the rise of left-wing ideology in the 1970s (2018: 230). At the same time, this made it possible to calm vindications of religious fractions, achieving two aims at once. The 1980 junta intended to depoliticize society and prevent

fragmentation (Doğangün, 2020: 52) and revealed a different view of secularism by using Islam to forge a homogeneous society. Selçuk contended that elementary schools offered religious instruction, and public schools all over Turkey promoted the TIS (2011: 29). Similarly, Lord (2018) stressed the development of religious education after the 1950s, which one of the most well-known bodies is the Gülen Movement, known for replacing the secular state bureaucracy in 2008. Since the 1970s, it has built up a large network of religious schools, along with the resumption and expansion of Imam-Hatip schools[54] (Ozgur, 2012: 53). Thus, the third factor was the establishment of religious educational institutions.

The establishment of religious political parties was the fourth and last contributing factor. The National Order Party (MNP), the first religious political party, was established in 1970, not long after Necmettin Erbakan's manifesto of the National Outlook in 1969 reinforcing the role of Islam in national identity (Yang and Guo, 2015: 2). Erbakan split from the AP, the ruling party from 1965 to 1971, and rose as a voice of small business owners opposing the AP's economic policies (Yang and Guo, 2015: 3) and lack of relations with Muslim-majority states (Lord, 2018: 226). As the AP's support dwindled, the MNP stood a better chance of growing. Moreover, it seized on the fact that Islam began to resurface in the public sphere as rural-to-urban migration increased (Yang and Guo, 2015: 13). Moreover, it was also the result of the mobilization of various religious groups (Yilmaz, 2019: 7), like İskenderpaşa Community, the branch of the Naqshbandiyya order to which Erbakan, Turgut Özal (a former prime minister [1983-89] and President [1989-93]) and Erdoğan belonged (Lord, 2018: 226). Considering the burgeoning Western secularism, this community significantly contributed to the sense of victimhood becoming a powerful force in society.

However, the 1971 military memorandum imposed the closure of the MNP, leading the National Outlook to start a new party, the National Salvation Party (MSP), with the aid of the military. The military's position can be understood in the context of the secular instrumentalization of religion and how it was used to advance the state's agenda – religious parties were a lesser evil to control the emerging left. In the 1973 elections, the MSP garnered 48 seats and 11.8 per cent of the vote, making it the third-largest force in the TBMM. In 1974, it established a coalition government with the CHP, which was particularly relevant for the normalization and legitimization of political Islam (Yang and Guo,

[54] Middle and high schools ruled by religious leaders (imam) and preachers (hatip). Due to religious parties' inclusion in coalition governments after the 1970s, these schools experienced a rapid expansion.

2015: 4) and religious education in Turkey. Between 1975 and 1978, it also joined the right-wing Nationalist Front governments, along with the AP and the MHP[55].

It was not until the 1980s that religious actors and their political parties began to grow significantly. When political parties were once more permitted in 1983, the MSP reemerged as RP, which would go on to become one of Turkey's most prosperous parties in the 1990s. The RP was the third most-voted party in the 1994 local elections (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 42), and with Turkey surrounded by a wave of violence (e.g., the 1993 Sivas Massacre) and economic difficulties (the 1994 crisis), it won the most votes in the 1995 elections. Even though a coalition government between the ANAP and the DYP was established, the RP led from 1996 to 1997. The success was credited to a mobilization of religious congregations (Yang and Guo, 2018: 15), which gained from rural-to-urban migration, and the 1987 EEC's decision to defer Turkey's membership, legitimizing the anti-Western discourse. "The success of the Islamic political movement in Turkey" "has been concomitant with rapid socio-economic changes" (Yilmaz, 2019: 12), either because it is the "voice of the oppressed" or because it represents the interests of an emerging Muslim middle-class (ibid: 1). In contrast to the MSP, which was restricted to a rural petty bourgeoisie, the RP attracted people from Anatolia's booming capital and underdeveloped urban areas (Şen, 2010: 66; Yang and Guo, 2015: 6).

As Yeşilaba contended, there was a change in the National Outlook's electoral mosaic in the late 20th century (2002: 168). It was greatly influenced by the 1980 left-wing purge. Additionally, the religious sector received resources that were not given to others. For instance, the membership of Islamic unions did not rise significantly until the junta shut down other unions and only allowed statists and Islamists to operate (Duran and Yıldırım, 2005: 233). In any case, the expansion would be stopped by the 1997 military memorandum, which banned the RP.

According to Yang and Guo, the military decided to strengthen the secular features of the state, eliminating political Islam and urging the government to take measures to protect secularism (2015: 18). As a result, the National Outlook formed the Virtue Party (FP) to avoid legal constraints and appeal to a broader range of voters. Selçuk said that the FP "did not see the West as an enemy power and gave up the anti-Western discourse" (2011: 27), while Rabasa and Larrabee claimed that the 1997 military memorandum resulted in this position, which stressed that any attempt to promote political Islam would not succeed (2008: 44-45). Even though this developed a debate on the National Outlook's strategy, Yeşilaba was less optimistic and said that the party opposed NATO membership, modernization, and the free market (2002: 172).

[55] The first Nationalistic Front (1975-77) also included the Republican Reliance Party (CGP), which split from the CHP after its shift to a social-democratic party.

To comprehend the electoral success of the National Outlook parties, Yeşilaba compared the electoral results from 1987 to 1999. First, although all political parties were banned from 1980 to 1983, damages were deeper to the left, which, after having won two elections during the 1970s (1973 and 1977), only won again in 1999. During that time, despite the return of the CHP (1993) and the closure of the Social-Democratic People's Party, SHP (1995), the votes on the left slightly fluctuated: in 1987, 33.27% of votes, resulting from the sum of 24.27% of the SHP and 8.53% of the DSP; 31.50% in 1991 (20.75% for SHP and 10.75% for DSP); 25.3% in 1995 (10.7% for CHP and 14.6% for DSP); and 30.85% in 1999 (8.79% for CHP and 22.06% for DSP). What is noteworthy is the ascending path of the DSP, which gathered votes on the left and was the most-voted party in 1999, earning it the leadership of the DSP/MHP/ANAP government. The second transformation concerns the drop-in support for the center-right parties, the ANAP and the DYP, the successor to the AP. These parties, which in 1987 obtained 55.4% of the votes (ANAP 36.3% and DYP 19.1%), dropped to 25.22% in 1999 – ANAP 13.22% and the DYP 12% (Yeşilada, 2002: 164). In the case of the ANAP, the fall was regular: it dropped to 24% in 1991 and 19.7% in 1995. ANAP and DYP tried to take the votes of the AP but failed, amplifying the fragmentation on the right (Tachau, 2000: 140; Yeşilada, 2002: 164).

The third change is related to the rise of votes on the far right, a political spectrum where Yeşilada locates the ultranationalist MHP, the RP, and the FP (2002: 167). The proportion of votes for it grew from 10.1% (1987) to 33.3% (1999). The ultranationalist vote evolved from 2.9% (1987) to 8.2% (1995) and 17.9% in 1999 (Yesilada, 2002: 161). It would drop to 15.38% in 1999 after the Islamic government was shut down. Tachau explained that the union of Islamism with Turkish nationalism was a remarkable force, improved by the failure of the traditional right (2000: 141). Moreover, the informal structure of the National Outlook was a strong source of electoral support. A network of volunteers from the FP visited families in their homes, and it had a council in each of nearly one hundred districts managing a database on people of strategic neighbourhoods (Yesilada, 2002: 161). According to Beatriz, a policymaker from Istanbul, there were Islamic associations in neighbourhoods, which were very effective at collecting votes[56].

Since the DP's rule, Islamic organizations have begun a process of Islamization of politics. This became more expressive in the Nationalist Front governments led by Süleyman Demirel in the 1970s and was developed by the political-ideological framework of the TIS during the 1980s. This bridged and reduced the gap between centre-right and far-right parties, allowing the combination of Turkish, Islamic, and right-wing centrist wings (Şen, 2010: 64). Before the 1970s, the religious right

[56] Beatriz (fictitious name). Participant 2. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 18 November 2020.

was merely a subset of the centre-right parties, but since then, especially after the TIS, political Islam has grown in the country. The military supported this firming by uniting Islam and nationalism in search of a homogeneous country free of the left, allowing Islamic circles to spread (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 37-38). This gave religion a new place in centre-right politics while strengthening religious parties and raising support for their sociopolitical ideals. An illustration of this was the rise of ANAP in the 1980s, which attracted TIS supporters (bureaucrats and religious conservatives) who disagreed with the economic policies of the National Outlook but shared social ideals (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 42).

The AKP did it twenty years later. Although its cadres have assumed leading positions in the National Outlook (Şen, 2010: 59), this has not barred well-known politicians from centre-right politics from joining the AKP, developing a new right-wing policy combining neoliberalism and the TIS. Although other topics, like Kurdish nationalism, defined the 1990s and matching third-wave feminism, we will only discuss political Islam, given its role in the AKP's electoral success and the establishment of the current gender regime in Turkey, along with the fact that contrary to Kurdism, Islamism remained within the limits of party politics (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 50). After labelling, in this section, the causes, we discuss its effects on intimate (politicization of the veil) and political (pious women as a source of capitalizing on voting) citizenship of women.

3.2.1. The Gendered Political Islam: religion as a means for the politicization of women

While Kemalist/Atatürkist women's organizations maintained after the First Republic, other women mobilized within developing left-wing groups (Tekeli, 1992: 140). The women's movement was altered by a rise of left-wing ideology in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which reinforced a Marxist view of gender and raised criticisms of Kemalism/Atatürkism for failing to address gender-related social issues. Along the same lines, Adak and Çağatay argued that left-wing women's movements promoted a proactive stance that sought new rights for women, in contrast to women's activism of the 1950s and early 1960s, which was limited to the defensive position against the conservative backlash after the transition to a multi-party system (2023: 736). Also, political unrest, violence, and coups d'état prevented the spread of second-wave feminism in the 1960s as it did in the West, delaying its arrival in Turkey until the 1980s (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 45).

Until 1980, in pre-coup politics, women mostly participated in politics through left- and right-wing women's organizations that controlled the agenda, which was the case of the Progressive

Women's Organization (IKD), established in 1975 by members of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), and Idealist Ladies' Association, founded by the nationalist MHP. The women's movement reflected polarization, but the proliferation of socialist organizations split from the IKD popularized women's struggle for "intimate troubles", like abortion (Gürsoy, 1996: 531), and for labour rights, like gender-equal pay (Adak and Çağatay, 2023: 735-36). Moreover, in the late 1970s, the CHP women's branch in Istanbul and the IKD planned joint events, revealing a rapprochement between left-wing fragments of Kemalist/Atatürkist and socialist women (Adak and Çağatay, 2023: 737).

This occurred after Bülent Ecevit, the close ally of left-wing politics who oversaw the CHP's shift to the left, was appointed secretary-general (1966) and general chairman (1972) of the party. Also, the development of socialist feminism in the 1970s due to the debate between radical and Marxist feminisms explains the alliance between left-leaning groups. Even though Tekeli, a second-wave feminist pioneer, did not have as confidence in leftist women's movements in the 1970s because they "formed an obstacle to the spread of ideas from the Western women's movement" (Tekeli, 1992: 140), they did pave the way for intimate and economic forms of citizenship. Tekeli seems to restrict second-wave feminism as being exclusive to radical feminism, excluding Marxist feminism, as explained in the Introduction.

Legislative amendments and the ratification of major international agreements occurred during the first half of the 1980s. While feminists argued that it was drafted for the wrong reasons, namely population control, rather than in response to demands for reproductive rights and bodily autonomy (Gürsoy, 1996: 535-36), Law No. 2827 legalized abortion in 1983, and the CEDAW was ratified in 1985. Consequently, more attention was drawn to gender inequalities (Engin and Pals, 2018: 8) and the need for legal amendments (Adak, 2019: 317). After the civil regime was returned and the ban on political organizations lifted, second-wave feminism gained popularity in the second half of the decade, and discussions of violence against women, misrepresentation, and sexuality started (Tekeli, 1992: 140). According to Diner and Toktaş, the protest against violence against women that took place in Istanbul in 1987 was a turning point as it was the first time that women had ever taken to the streets to fight for women's rights (2010: 45). The 'Solidarity March Against Battering' represented second-wave feminism and suggested "a new form in which the position of women in Turkish society was being articulated within the political terrain" (Sirman, 1989: 1). The second-wave feminism slogan, "the personal is political," was adopted by Turkish women who did not see violence as an intimate issue that needed to be addressed in the private sphere (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 45). In other words, it paved

the way for the discussion of private topics, such as intimacy, sexuality, and body politics, into the public sphere (Adak, 2019: 318).

With a focus mostly on women's formal political citizenship, Tekeli emphasized the SHP's inclusion of a special section on women in 1986 and the implementation of a quota of 25% women at all levels of the party three years later (1992: 141). Tekeli highlighted that as the centre-rightist ANAP, which ruled Turkey from 1983 to 1991, started to lose support from the populace, it began to pay more attention to women (1992: 42), clarifying why Semra Özal, Turgut Özal's wife, founded the Foundation to Promote and Strengthen Turkish Women, which served as the party's women's branch. The foundation reinforced the benefits of marriage, stressing that Turkish society attributed an "honourable role to women, that of self-sacrificing wives and mothers" (Tekeli, 1992: 41).

The establishment of government organizations, such as the General Directorate on The Status and Problems of Women in 1990 and the adoption of the Beijing Declaration in 1995, show that the institutionalization of women's issues grew more pronounced in this decade. Additionally, the tools for collaboration in the field of gender equality policy have also expanded thanks to the emergence of women's rights associations and organizations over the decade (Adak, 2019: 317). The Purple Roof Woman's Shelter Foundation (1990), Women's Solidarity Foundation (1993), and Flying Broom Foundation (1996) are some of the institutions interviewed[57] and are still fundamental in Turkey's women's movement today.

The upsurge of postcolonial and black feminisms ushered in a new era in the women's movement, bringing identity politics (Güneş-Ayata, 1997: 60) and changing the actors and topics in Turkish politics. Thus, political Islam called for the overthrow of secularism and blamed Western imperialism on Muslim societies (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 42), while Islamic women attempted to integrate gender with Islamist values based on a gender-conservative narrative of progressive Islam (Badran, 2005: 11). Islamic women in Turkey experienced one of the most unexpected effects of feminism, feeling marginalized by both mainstream feminism and their male counterparts (Engin and Pales, 2018: 4). They opposed feminism primarily due to its Western values, but many also actively battled to enter universities and find a place in society without compromising their religious beliefs (Tekeli, 1992: 142). Although first examples of how the Quran had been misread to oppress women and keep them in the private sphere started to emerge (which would materialize in 2018, by the Havle Women's Association, the first Muslim feminist organization in the country, according to Rümeysa

[57] Elif Ege (participant 3), Nihan Damarlı (participant 10), and Ürün Güner (participant 5) represent those foundations.

Çamdereli, Havle's founder and head[58]), the veil ban was the most noticeable struggle of the women who actively protested it (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 42). Berrin Sönmez, a columnist and activist from Ankara, one of those women herself, spoke about her experience:

> I withdrew from the university considering the situation of February 28. Because of that, I could not finish my thesis. I withdrew and joined the women's movement[59].

The 1982 Regulation Pertaining to the Attire of Personnel Employed at Public Institutions started the requirement that women's heads be uncovered while working as civil servants (Yildirim, 2013: 4). The first veil ban at universities was instituted in 1984, but during the 1980s and 1990s, it was not strictly enforced. Nevertheless, after the 28 February 1997 military memorandum, the National Security Council called for the prevention of reactionary groups in the educational system and state bureaucracy, and the ban was extended to universities (Yildirim, 2013: 4). Elif Esen, former Women and Democracy Association (KADEM)[60] board member and a DEVA's MP nominated by Istanbul in 2023, revealed that the memorandum, and consequently, the veil ban, encouraged her to enter politics[61]. In contrast to the 1980s' successful efforts to disband leftist organizations, First Republic-era attempts to rein in political Islam proved futile and boosted the participation of Islamic women. The politicization of the veil and women's role in maximizing voting had their roots in such active participation. Diner and Toktaş corroborate this by stating that Islamist women visited every home in strategic neighbourhoods to spread propaganda and win supporters (2010: 51). Fatma Bostan Ünsal, an AKP founding member and an RP former member, experienced this and confirmed these claims:

> Women went door to door to make people vote for Refah Partisi [Welfare Party] because it was so easy to use women. Generally, women in Turkey do not work, so especially during the daytime, they are at home. They could reach ordinary people through women's propaganda, and party elites recognized the importance of women. At first, women in the party thought, 'Okay, we do it, the political activities, with the consent of God'. They didn't do it for political reasons; they only did it for religious reasons[62].

The veil became a political subject in the 1970s in tandem with religious parties in the TBMM (the MNP gained 48 and 24 seats in 1973 and 1977, respectively) but very few women demanded that their heads be veiled in the public sphere. In the 1990s, as religious parties gained representation in

[58] Rümeysa Çamdereli. Participant 13. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 18 March 2021.
[59] Berrin Sönmez. Participant 35. Interview. Ankara. 28 June 2022.
[60] Sümeyye Erdoğan, Erdoğan's daughter, is a founder and former vice chairwoman. It is a Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization.
[61] Elif Esen. Participant 37. Interview. Ankara. 1 July 2022.
[62] Fatma Bostan Ünsal. Participant 7. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 27 January 2021.

parliament (the RP gained 62 and 158 seats in 1991 and 1995, respectively) and the restriction on wearing the veil tightened, it became a source of open conflict with the state and secular sectors (Saktanber and Çorbacioğlu, 2008: 519).

However, to say representativeness increased the public debate on the veil is not enough, as the struggle of Islamic women for the right to cover their heads in public institutions, principally in universities, capacitated voting in religious parties. Therefore, there is a correlation between the Islamic women's lobby and the representativeness of religious political parties. As Saktanber and Çorbacioğlu reinforced, in the 1990s, veiling became a social phenomenon, and a symbol of an urban, modern, well-educated identity of Islamist women (2008: 519). That is why we identify this era as 'Gendered Political Islam'. Religious women got more involved in politics to support religious parties and get access to public spaces without having to take off their veils. Public discourse on gender grew, and religion was used to promote political participation. Nevertheless, just as 'State Feminism' was limited to promoting secular women's political and economic citizenship, 'Gendered Political Islam' was limited to promoting religious women's political citizenship. Political Islam used religious women as a tool to advance Islamic revivalism, just as Kemalism/Atatürkism used secular women as a tool to advance modernization.

During the 1990s, issues like the participation of women in the workforce were ignored, as women's (formal) labour force participation decreased from almost 35 per cent in 1990 to about 26 per cent in 2000 (Engin and Pals, 2018: 7). Men's participation also declined, but the ratio was three times lower for women (Çavdar and Yaşar, 2019: 80). Buğra (2010) studied employment patterns in OECD's Southern Europe and concluded that Turkey was the only country where the ratio of women in the workforce fell in the late 20th century (Figure 4). Even Italy, a country with a historically low ratio, registered a slight increase between 1970 (25.5%) and 2000 (25.8%). Despite having the highest women's workforce participation rate in the 1970s (50.9%), Turkey had one of the lowest ratios in the 2000s (25.9%), far behind Portugal (53.4%). It was in keeping with how Islamism saw economic autonomy, given the level of women's work was "consistently low in states with a largely Muslim population" that "discourages women from doing most types of work", stated Moghadam (1993: 31). In contrast to the Lisbon-born democratization, which saw an increase in women's economic citizenship, Turkey saw a failure in women's employment participation of about 50% in the second half of the 20th century.



Figure 4. Women's employment patterns in the late 20th century

Source: Buğra (2010: 29). Own elaboration.

Women's political participation increased, but their economic autonomy suffered a setback. Also, in the institutional domain of economy, progress in education would not occur until the end of the RP government and the 1997 educational reform (compulsory schools from 5 to 8 years, massive construction of classrooms and recruitment of teachers, etc.) promoted by Mesut Yılmaz during his third prime ministerial term (1997-99). That reform had a huge impact on girls' education, with a 160% increase in the number of girls enrolling in schools in rural areas in a year (Dulger, 2004: 1). Regarding violence, only in 1998, adultery was no longer a crime, and "a law that required the intervention of the police in cases of violence against women and children was passed" (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 46).

The RP was concerned with women's involvement in politics, but only to own votes and normalize the role of religion in politics and the public sphere. However, these women "didn't have any position [in the party] and just did what they were told", as Fatma Bostan Ünsal stated. The same cannot be said for the other institutional domains, but advancements have been made in the domain of polity, albeit for its own sake and for a particular group of women. In all other institutional domains, there has been a regression in the private-public continuum. We study next the 'Gendered de-democratization', the gender regime that is part of the 'New Turkey'. The relation between the current

political and gender regimes is established after a brief discussion of electoral and political systems. We stress the main domains of intervention and the implications for women's citizenship.

3.3. The birth of a 'New Turkey'

3.3.1. Turkey's electoral and political systems

Turkey has a party-list proportional representation system and a closed-party list. In other words, the number of votes cast, and the number of seats won correspond in a proportional manner, and the political parties of the candidates determine the order in which they are elected. Each one of the 89 provinces corresponds to electoral districts and elects MPs according to their inhabitants. Turkey has eighty-seven electoral districts:

- Istanbul and Ankara are divided into three electoral districts
- Izmir and Bursa are split into two electoral districts
- The other provinces represent a single electoral district

Bayburt is the only single-nominal district; the other eighty-six are plurinominal ones. The number of elected MPs per district ranges from two (e.g., Artvin and Gümüşhane) to thirty-five (Istanbul I and Istanbul III), and the d'Hondt system calculates the conversion of votes into seats. The country had an electoral threshold of 10 per cent, the highest in the world, but in March 2022, the TBMM approved legislation lowering it to 7 per cent[63].

The Ministry of Interior appoints provincial governors, local elections take place every five years, and local governments are composed of provinces, municipalities, and villages. For example, the Governor of Istanbul, Ali Yerlikaya, was selected in 2018, while Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (province), and Riza Akpolat, the Mayor of Beşiktaş Municipality (district of Istanbul province), were elected in the 2019 local elections. Villages and neighbourhoods (Ortaköy is a neighbourhood in Beşiktaş) are ruled by muhtars elected in local elections as well. It is worth noting that local elections use different voting systems. Indeed, municipal and provincial councillors are

[63] It occurred in line with the predictions that only four parties would garner enough support to win seats in the 2023 elections (AKP, CHP, the Good Party [IP], and HDP), not including the MHP (7.8% in the polls). With the lowering of the threshold, the MHP would guarantee representation (it won 10.1% of the vote). The 7% threshold remains one of the highest in the world, surpassed only by Kazakhstan's 9%.

elected by a proportional representation system, and the mayors and muhtars are elected by a first-past-the-post voting system (European Council, 2019: 10). Regarding presidential elections, the President is elected by universal suffrage and is the candidate who gets the absolute majority of the votes. Presidential elections are held on the same day the parliamentary elections, every five years (Article 77), and a runoff will be held on the second Sunday after the first ballot if the absolute majority is not obtained in the first round (Article 101).

According to Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser, the d'Hondt system and the high threshold could no longer be justified in the name of stability after the switch to a presidential system (2020: 125). Turkey's electoral system and high threshold benefit large parties as the d'Hondt system is the least proportional system (Lijphart, 1990), and if combined with a high threshold, limits smaller parties' representation (Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser, 2020: 132). For instance, the AKP won 34.28% of the votes and almost two-thirds (363/550) of the seats in 2002. With 19.39% of the vote and 178 seats, the CHP was the only opposition political party to win representation, and unrepresented voters made up 46% of the electorate. The DYP received 9.55% of the vote, which means it would have won about 40 seats. However, the high threshold left it out of parliament.

The results of November 2002 and June 2015 were compared by Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser (2020) to illustrate how the electoral system promotes the most-voted political parties. In 2002, the AKP won 16% of the vote and 8 out of 10 seats in Diyarbakır[64]. However, when the HDP passed the threshold in 2015, the AKP won 14.8% of the vote but only won 1 seat (Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser 2020: 134). It leads to strategic voting, which may help to clarify why typical CHP voters switched to the HDP in 2015 (Grigoriadis, 2016: 43), avoiding the AKP from governing "with a large enough majority to change the Constitution" (Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser, 2020: 136). Pilar, an unemployed woman from Istanbul who resides in the Netherlands, also used this strategy:

> I usually vote for CHP, but I tried something different once. Political parties in Turkey said enough, and in a very important election some CHP voters supported the Kurdish party HDP to ensure its representation[65].

Constitutional Referendums, which legitimize the political system, are another essential component of Turkish politics. In 2007, a referendum established popular presidential elections, making Tayyip Erdoğan, in 2014, the first president to be chosen by the people. In 2017, a referendum replaced the parliamentary system with a presidential one, giving him complete control over Turkey in 2018. The latter repealed the office of prime minister and removed the expression "if the elected President of the

[64] Diyarbakır elects 12 MPs, however, this was before the 2017 reforms, when the TBMM had 550 and not 600 MPs (Article 75 of the Constitution).
[65] Pilar (fictitious name). Participant 25. Online interview. Braga-Haarlem. 20 May 2022.

Republic has an affiliation with a party, this will be terminated" from Article 101. The same referendum granted him the authority to appoint vice presidents (Article 106) and ministers and to issue presidential decrees (Article 104), making him the head of state and the head of government. The Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors is politically dependent because, according to Article 159, the President recommends four members, the Parliament seven, and the Undersecretary and the Ministry of Justice the other two. The President also appoints twelve out of fifteen judges of the Constitutional Court (Article 146). That is why Scheppele accused President Erdoğan of filling the "Constitutional Court of Turkey with judges of his own choosing" (2018: 551).

Importantly, the appointment of Irfan Fidan had a high impact on this Court. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Fidan had "close ties to Erdoğan" and handled legal proceedings involving the government, like Sledgehammer, Gezi Park, and the case against Osman Kavala (2022: 12). The Index also informed that since 2016 approximately 30% of judges and prosecutors "have been dismissed while many more have been transferred or forced to resign" (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022: 12). Furthermore, by repealing Articles 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, and 116 concerning the Council of Ministers, the President got control of the executive branch. The TBMM requires an absolute majority (301/600) to take office, open an investigation, and present motions of censure and vote of confidence, and a three-fifths majority (360/600) to launch an investigation. A two-thirds vote (400/600) is needed to indict the President (Article 105). A two-thirds vote (400/600) is required for direct ratification of a constitutional amendment and a three-fifths majority (360/600) to put it on the ballot for a referendum (Article 175). The need for these majorities prevents the opposition from doing it, which, adding to the control of the judiciary, the legislative, and the executive, led Yilmaz to describe it as a “plebiscitary presidential regime” based on six elements (2020: 275):

- Institutionalization of the supreme power of the President
- Suspending separation of powers
- Repressing the power of intermediary political institutions
- Turning of elections into an approval of the trust to the leader
- The role of group acclamation and opinion
- Strategic legalism

Since he first suggested an "American-style presidential system" (cit. in Yilmaz, 2018: 34) in 2003, Erdoğan's views have always included the presidential system. The transition started in the 2007 Referendum (Akman and Akçalı, 2017: 578), and the AKP proposed it in 2011. The ruling party put it on the agenda in 2015, the MHP supported it, and Tayyip Erdoğan approved it (Yilmaz, 2018: 36).

Initially, the literature exposed favourable analyses of the change. Hasan Tahsin Fendoğlu wrote that the presidential system was suitable, ensured stability, and did not threaten democracy (2012: 52). However, the literature began to criticize it, mostly because of its lack of representative legitimacy and deferral of the separation of powers. Özsoy-Boyunsuz expressed concern about the "hyper-presidentialism", the erosion of legislative and judicial powers, and the consolidation of Erdoğan's power (2016: 84). Similarly, Esen and Gümüşçü (2018) made use of the idea of "super presidency", and Yilmaz contended that democracy would end with the end of the parliamentary system (2018: 46). Furthermore, civil rights can be suspended during the state of emergency (Article 119), which had just been used to create a narrative about keeping secular groups under control, polarize society, weaken the military, rally the people around the threat, and in this case, change the Constitution. Considering Linz's (1997) analysis of the challenges of the presidential system, Esen and Gümüşçü warned about the de-democratization as Erdoğan does not need to rely on other agents (2018: 46) as previously done with former premierships of Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014-16) and Binali Yıldırım (2016-18).

Along with this executive centralization of powers, there is an autocratic legalism, a legal change to advance illiberal agendas (Scheppele, 2018). For example, Article 299 of Turkey's Penal Code deems it illegal to insult the President, leading to tens of thousands of inquiries[66]. Also, courts frequently apply Article 309 to force "a penalty of aggravated life imprisonment" against dissidents "who attempt to abolish, replace, or prevent the implementation of, through force and violence, the constitutional order". Osman Kavala's judgment, which was contested by the ECHR, the CoE, and many Western Embassies, is the most recognized case. Emergence Decrees 667-674 of July-September 2016 imposed nearly 150,000 arrests, 130,000 dismissals, the blocking of thousands of websites, and the shutting of many associations and unions[67]. According to Corrales (2015), the first to theorize autocratic legalism, states became more autocratic through this "use, abuse, and non-use of the rule of law".

[66] Between 2014 and 2021, the judiciary launched 160.169 investigations for insulting the President, resulting in 12.881 convictions. Duvar. (2021). "Top European rights court calls on Turkey to change law on insulting president". *Duvar.* Available at https://www.duvarenglish.com/top-european-rights-court-calls-on-turkey-to-change-law-on-insulting-president-news-59246

[67] See World Organisation Against Torture. (2022). *Briefing Note on the Legacy of the Emergence Decrees in Turkey*. World Organisation Against Torture/SOS-Torture Network. https://www.omct.org/en/resources/reports/turkey-years-of-emergency-decrees-still-impact-rights-and-freedoms

Firstly, constitutional amendments determine the application of the "use" of the rule of law. As an illustration, the 2010 Referendum changed the structures of the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors and the Constitutional Court, granting the AKP-controlled TBMM the power to nominate judges and prosecutors (Borsuk et al., 2022: 23). Afterwards, the 2017 Referendum transferred those powers from Parliament to the President, allowing the approval of new laws and amendments without opposition consent (Borsuk et al., 2022: 24). Presidential decrees are also an important illustration, proving the link between autocratic legalism and executive centralization in Turkey. Nominations of the Boğaziçi University Rector, Melih Bulu, in January 2021 and Mehmet Inci, seven months later, by presidential decree, show how Erdoğan controls without parliamentary scrutiny. Another significant example was the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention.

In 2022, a new law was passed overturning alliance laws and changing the requirements for competing in elections and how seats are distributed in light of the "use" of legal norms. Thus, the opposition had fewer opportunities to take over the legislature in the 2023 elections since seats were distributed based on the votes received by the party, not the alliance. The new election law, which includes the threshold lowering to 7 per cent, is a legal change but is the "use" of the rule of law to benefit the People's Alliance. Autocratic legalism gave the AKP the opportunity to introduce new laws (use), misuse (abuse), and ignore (non-use) laws to further its aims (Borsuk et al., 2022: 24).

Kutlu's (2022) study serves as a good illustration of how the rule of law can be "abused" as, despite being legal, expropriation is only employed in situations involving national security. However, Kutlu evaluated the decisions made by the Constitutional Court regarding expropriations for hydropower plants and contended that the government was abusing the law to attend its own goals (2022: 129). The same is true of the decline of media freedom and pluralism. 90% of newspapers are pro-government (Uteuova, 2018: 12), and the 2016 Decree No. 668 ordered the arrest of eighty-nine journalists and the closure of three news agencies, sixteen television channels, forty-five newspapers, fifty magazines and twenty-three radio station. The 2017 Venice Commission brought attention to the detentions (Barrett et al., 2017: 10), however, they were done according to the law. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that at least four journalists were detained over the 2023 earthquake coverage[68], under the so-called disinformation law, which transformed Article 217 of the Criminal Code and made it possible to sentence them to up to three years in jail for spreading false information. Thirdly, the "non-use" of the law was seen in electoral backgrounds plagued by irregularities. In the

[68] Committee to Protect Journalists. (2023). "Journalists covering Turkey earthquake detained and harassed". *Committee to Protect Journalists*. Available at https://cpj.org/2023/02/journalists-covering-turkey-earthquake-detained-and-harassed/.

2019 local elections, AKP candidates in Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Kars, and Van replaced HDP candidates; the latter was the most voted, but its representatives were not recognized as mayors.

The political playing field is tilted in favour of the President, who has been ruling with no checks and balances, separation of powers, regard for the law, or freedom. The legitimization of a non-democratic agenda has been made possible by constitutional referendums and changes to the electoral law, and electoral and political systems have been promoting Erdoğan. The presidential system did not de-democratize the political regime; however, the legal changes, the limited judicial independence, and the control over the parliament damaged the depth of democracy. Thus, there is a correlation between the political system and the political regime, even though there is no cause-and-effect relationship. Next, we look at the link between the de-democratization of the political and gender regimes, giving rise to the 'Gendered de-democratization'. Considering the previous focus on the democratic breakdown that convoyed changes in the Turkish political system, the following section will concentrate primarily on the dynamics of the gender regime. The aim is to explain that contrary to what occurred in the early Republic, the political de-democratization process in the 'New Turkey' is directly related to the gender regime. We identify the stages and explain the process of gendered de-democratization from a public gender regime to a hybrid gender regime.

3.3.2. Turkey's four-stage gender regime: the process of gendered de-democratization

The AKP received a boost from the Islamization of the late 20th century, which also gave it the green light to support new right-wing politics in Turkey and challenge secular political ideologies (Baser and Öztürk, 2017: 5; Yavuz and Öztürk, 2019: 4). Whereas the Felicity Party (SP) inherited the National Outlook legacy, the AKP, established in 2001 after the ban on the FP, has developed as a catch-all party, far from Political Islam, that supported liberal democracy, neoliberalism, and the TIS. By adopting this political strategy, the AKP was able to win support from the far-right (the MHP and the SP did not exceed 11% of the vote, a drop-in of more than 20% compared to 1999), the centre-right (the ANAP and the DYP did not exceed 15% of the vote, a drop-in of about 10%), and even the moderate left (the CHP and the DSP did not exceed 21% of the vote, a drop-in of 10%) in the 2002 elections.

In the early 2000s, the new ruling party led a period of Europeanization in which Turkey made some developments in democracy and women's rights (Koyuncu and Özman, 2019: 736), adopting laws to meet EU gender equality criteria. At that time, women's rights organizations took advantage to

advance feminist agendas and achieve significant legal changes (Dursun, 2019: 951). For instance, in 2003, a Reproductive Health Program with EU funding was introduced, covering subjects like STIs and motherhood (Telseren, 2020: 366), and the new Labor Code updated the employment laws to ensure gender-neutral treatment and established a legal framework for equal pay for equal work. Moreover, a women's movement campaign in 2004 resulted in an inclusion of approximately thirty amendments recognizing women's bodily autonomy and sexual rights (Women for Women's Human Rights [WWHR], 2018). Consequently, marital rape and virginity checks were criminalized.

Helena, a political researcher from Ankara, told us that many reforms that occurred after the women's rights movement requested changes to the Civil Code and the Penal Code[69]. Similarly, Elisa, a professor of political science from Ankara, claimed that these modifications brought about significant gains and embodied one of the most well-liked topics among Turkish women[70]. However, Elif Ege, an Istanbul-based advocate for women's rights, pointed out that the AKP promoted new initiatives on gender equality to advance itself in the EU[71]. Thus, as membership prospects failed, gender equality and the strength of democracy declined. Gradually, the authoritarianism-Islamism anthology became the purview of the 'New Turkey', and as the AKP recovered the Islamic identity, authoritarianism replaced the failed democratization. The AKP maintained a good relationship with the EU until its goals were consolidated (Bose, 2018: 209). Then, Turkey gave up on the prospects of membership as nationalist and religious elements multiplied, the democratic breakdown became more apparent, and the gap with the West grew. 'Gendered de-democratization' was the term used to describe gender inferences at the time and is the final gender regime we studied. We considered four different stages.

During the second term (2007-2011), Turkey experienced the first phase of the Gendered de-democratization, which we conceptualized as 'State Pro-feminism'. At that moment, in line with Alev Özkazanç, a forced retired Professor of Political Science from Ankara[72], the ruling party "acted as a moderate conservative party, revealed a favourable gender policy, and was committed itself to a gender equality vision in line with the EU". Nonetheless, although efforts were made to adjust national laws to EU gender equality standards and the 2011 signature of the Istanbul Convention, the AKP's Islamic agenda became clearer. The Gülen Movement's overthrow of the state secular bureaucracy and the beginning of the lift of the veil ban in 2008 (promoting pious women's freedom of expression and bodily autonomy while using women for its own agenda) as well as the denial of gender equality in 2010, well exemplifies a new direction. This became so evident that the head of Diyanet himself, the moderate Ali

[69] Helena (fictitious name). Participant 14. Online interview. Braga-Ankara. 7 April 2021.
[70] Elisa (fictitious name). Participant 9. Online Interview. Braga-Ankrara.10 February 2021.
[71] Elif Ege. Participant 3. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 6 January 2021.
[72] Alev Özkazanç. Participant 19. Online Interview, Braga-Ankara. 21 May 2021.

Bardakoğlu (2002-10), after asserting that Islam did not require the use of the veil, was replaced by Mehmet Görmez (2010-17).

Additionally, rather than advancing women's rights, neoliberal policies deepened roles as caregivers. The 2008 Regulation on Private Employment Agencies and 2011 National Employment Strategy both suggested flexible work for women – who were expected to ensure care and domestic work – and paternity leaves were limited to 10 (public) and 5 (private) days (Telseren, 2020: 370). On the Istanbul Convention, Teresa, a Professor of Political Science from Ankara[73], argued that "the intention was never to support the Istanbul Convention, but it [the government] wanted to use its achievements and benefit from the relations with the EU and the West". Teresa told us that she co-authored "a study with a colleague in which we conducted interviews with people working in the Ministry of the Family and Social Policy. They were proud of signing it but weren't happy with it".

We conceptualized the second period as 'Pro-family Conservatism'. It started when the General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women was renamed the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (2011), which took place during the ruling party's third term (2011–15). In contrast to the previous stage, which followed the early stages of Europeanization, this one marked the end of membership prospects and dispelled any lingering doubts about opposition to gender equality. Elif Ege and Alev Özkazanç agreed. Alev contended that the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention was "the culmination of a long-term government policy that began in 2011", and Elif said that "feminists identify 2011 as the time when everything started to shift". Similarly, Teresa reinforced that "things have been going very badly since 2011".

In 2012, the AKP withdrew from 2004 menstruation leave and launched an educational reform program known as 4+4+4 that increased the length of compulsory education from eight to twelve years. However, it allowed homeschooling after the 4th grade and the abandonment of formal schooling, mostly worrisome for girls in rural, poor areas. From here, one would start to see that the AKP converted secular schools into Imam Hatip institutions, which adopted gender-segregation-related educational materials as they worked to raise political-religious awareness of the connection between political and religious convictions and gender exclusion (Sarfati, 2015: 685). According to Kibar Daşçı Özdemir, a women's rights activist and former policymaker from Kahramanmaraş[74], this means the "weakening of the right to education and a restriction of women's rights in the name of Islam and faith". Also, the Istanbul Convention was enacted into domestic law by Law No. 6284, and the AKP again attempted to outlaw abortion in 2012. Even though there is no questioning of the intent behind

[73] Teresa (fictitious name). Participant 34. Interview. Ankara. 29 June 2022.
[74] Kibar Daşçı Özdemir. Participant 33. Online interview. Ankara- Kahramanmaraş. 28 June 2022.

Law No. 6284, gender issues were included under the heading of "family", and it provided a shield for the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention.

In 2013, the Committee on Equality for Women and Men was replaced by the Committee on Family and Social Policies. The Gezi Protests also served as a platform for polarization between secular and religious women while championing a new ideal of a woman as a pious mother, wife, and caregiver. Although there were veiled women in the protests and unveiled women supporting the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attacked protesting "secular feminists" and praised non-protesting "religious mothers". Women wearing veils were the role models of purity and decency, while those who did not are depicted as having "assertive sexuality" (Cindoglu and Unal, 2016: 39). As a result of the Islamization of women's bodies and dress codes, the veil has come as a symbol of inclusion or exclusion (Mutluer, 2019: 99): religious women deserve protection; secular women do not (Kandiyoti, 2016: 106). Secular women are more vulnerable to violence in this way because the state relieves the perpetrators by placing the blame on the victims' dress or behaviours. Moreover, by labelling the family as the sole institution of women's sexuality (Özyeğin, 2015: 197), the state weakened women's intimate citizenship and domesticated the domain of civil society.

That period was followed by 'Anti-gender Familialism', which arose from 2015 to 2021 and was followed by a rise in neoliberal and authoritarian policies (Baykan, 2018: 247). In 2018, the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) report on Turkey identified several issues requiring further action to prevent gender-based violence. Forced marriage, so-called honour crimes, and the lack of gender-sensitive policies and awareness-raising efforts are some of the problems identified (GREVIO, 2018: 9). Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün said that, after initial legal advances, a limited improvement in gender equality gave way to a gender climate with strong Islamic contributions, making legal changes impossible (2017: 611). This stance is related to the family and motherhood, and as in the previous stage, women are mentioned in the family context, and equality is replaced by the protection of motherhood (Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017: 618). We highlight three features at this point that stand out.

Firstly, during the state of emergency (2016-18), women's mass unemployment caused an increase in co-dependent relationships and IPV, and economic and bodily autonomy drop-in[75]. Considering women's unemployment and low labour-force participation, this era lacks an analysis in terms of economic autonomy. Although employment and labour force participation rates rose until 2015, a closer reading of the figures proves that part of the growth in labour force participation was due

[75] Confederation of Public Employees Trade Union. (2017). *İhraçların Toplumsal Cinsiyet Boyutu* [Gender Dimension of the Dismissals]. Ankara. Available at https://www.kesk.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/OHAL-KHKrejimi_ihracKurultayi.pdf

to the unemployment rate, which rose during this period (Çavdar and Yaşar, 2019: 81). Çavdar and Yaşar explained that, when analyzing the evidence on broad unemployment, the official unemployment was underestimated; there was an increasing number of women outside the market as they were discouraged or not looking for a job (usually housewives) but were able to work (2019: 84). In addition to the effects of the economic crisis on unemployment, women's participation in the market has declined because of neoliberal policies of flexibilization, a lack of adequate public childcare, and patriarchal standards (Dursun, 2019: 952). From 2014 and 2018, the employment rate of women aged 29 to 49 who had kids under the age of 3 varied between 24.3 per cent (2014 and 2015) and 27.4 per cent (2017), while the employment rate of men aged 29 to 49 ranged from 89.2 per cent (2016) to 90.4 per cent, in 2018 (Telseren, 2020: 375). This demonstrated the unequal distribution of care as an obstacle to women's employment and economic autonomy and the disregard for a gender-redistributive policy. The ruling party normalized women giving birth to many children and working in flexible conditions to fulfil care and domestic responsibilities. As Kocabıçak observed, the AKP, whether by encouraging women to have children or by supporting women in roles as full-time caregivers, had a major impact on women's exclusion from the public sphere (2020: 825). In 2016, a law on temporary work offered women months of part-time work for each child, reinforcing gender norms, and recognizing their roles as caregivers (Telseren, 2020: 378). Despite the achievements in the 2000s, formal advances would not mean gender equality.

Secondly, the 'Anti-gender Familialism' adopted cultural nationalism rather than the civic position. In line with this view, like in the 1950s, women are pious mothers, wives, and caregivers serving the country, in opposition to "immoral" or "deviant" secular women. Some manifestations of this change include Decision 2015/51, which removed the requirement that religious marriages be first formalized, the Divorce Commission in 2016, and the 2017 bill allowing Sunni servants to officiate at civil weddings. This bill stated that newborns could be registered with just a declaration, allowing families to pressure daughters to give birth to avoid prosecution, leading to a rise in early motherhood, teenage pregnancies, and underage marriage.

This conservative position on the role of women has been promoted by Islamic women's Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs), which, by stressing their role as caregivers, have contributed to opposing gender equality (Dursun, 2019: 949). These women's organizations supported AKP, pushed for moralization and privatization of welfare, and shifted protection to the family. Interviewing members of these GONGOs, Dursun noted that when asked about political ideology, these women repeatedly cited Turkish nationality and Islamic religion as if being

Muslim and Turkish were somewhat related (2019: 955). The TIS supported by them played a significant role during the 'Anti-gender Familialism' to conceal obligations to combat the rising levels of poverty and violence. For the first time, in 2018, the KCDP registered an annual death toll of more than 400 women, a figure from which Turkey has not been able to go down since then[76].

This leads to a third feature, familialism and the politicization of the family for nationalist reasons. Elisa explained there was a turning point in 2015 in gender issues. From this perspective, men and women "play different roles in the family; some work and others care for the children":

> I would say they [the AKP] didn't suddenly reject the terminology of gender equality. Instead, they didn't renew the policy [National Action Plan on Gender Equality] and integrated it into other action plans. For example, in 2018, they accepted the Strategy and Action Plan on Women's Empowerment. After 2015, policies on strengthening the family, and more recently, anti-LGBT policies, started.

Nonetheless, this should be seen as an extension of the de-democratization process rather than a standalone incidence. Erdoğan's aim of raising a religious generation was first indicated in 2012[77], and the plan to impose gender segregation in schools followed the Education Reform of that year. The restructuring strengthened homeschooling and made it possible to keep girls at home, "where they are expected to do housework and caregiving work" (Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017: 622). According to Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, chair of the Political Science Department at Middle East Technical University[78], education is viewed in conservative circles as a means of assisting women in becoming "good mothers, good wives, good citizens, and good believers" rather than as a means of preparing them for the market. The neo-liberalization of education, by reducing the number of public schools and increasing Imam-Hatip institutions, was in line with this position (Telseren, 2020: 378). In this context, Engin and Pals argued that gender equality was deteriorating in Turkey and worried the growth of religious institutions (2018: 22).

Finally, we term the fourth stage, which began with the 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, 'State Anti-feminism', and make three conclusions. First, it contradicts previous works that described Turkish gender policy as a problem of implementation and not of legislation. Now, as Kibar said, there is "a legal setback regarding women's rights". Secondly, if we assume gender equality protects women from violence, incumbents sent a populist-nationalist political message by withdrawing from the Convention. "This is how the government says we will protect our women in our way, not in

[76] KCDP. (2018). *Digital memorial for women's violence death*. Available at http://anitsayac.com/?year=2018
[77] "A pious generation will be raised by our hand". Erdoğan, R. T. 8 November 2019. Ankara University Address. Ankara.
[78] Ayşe Güneş-Ayata. Participant 15. Online interview. Braga-Ankara. 1 May 2021.

the Western world way", explored Noa, a sociologist from Istanbul[79]. In other words, the AKP is reinforcing the distance from the West (them) and the idea that Turkey defends women on its own terms (us). Thirdly, one may locate the country within a larger context of worldwide anti-feminist and anti-gender stances (Grzebalska and Pető, 2018; Gwiazda, 2021; Ilonszki and Vajda, 2019). "In a larger picture, it is part of the so-called anti-gender conservative movement in the Balkans", added Noa. This is an allegory of the political regime and gender regime correlation; as the former became less democratic, the latter regressed in the private-public continuum, increasing private/domestic forms of exclusion. Thus, women's participation in the market is declining, while violence and authoritarian attitudes toward "intimate troubles" are increasing (the ability to have an abortion, the access to contraception, the capacity to get a divorce, etc.). In the next chapters, we examine how the political regime opposes gender equality. We want to know how women interpret the gender regime's situation, including how the regress on the private-public continuum affects women's citizenship experiences (and how their experiences of citizenship influence their prospects on the gender regime).

3.4. Conclusion

In the century-long existence of the Republic, Turkey has gone through numerous democratization and de-democratization processes. These developments occurred during the First Republic, the rise of Political Islam, the establishment of the 'New Turkey', and the emergence of several gender regimes. These gender regimes were defined as 'State Feminism', 'Conservative Gender Regime', 'Gendered Political Islam', and 'Gendered de-democratization'. Each of them affected how women experienced citizenship, and aside from 'State Feminism', processes of political de-democratization were always related to stages of gendered de-democratization.

This chapter places in perspective subjects as diverse as the rise of the AKP in the early 2000s, the role of the political citizenship of pious women in the 1990s, and the role that religion and nationalism play in the country's politics. Moreover, we attempted to shed some light on veiling, a meaningful subject when examining Turkish women's citizenship. Furthermore, as we discuss in this chapter, civic and cultural approaches to nationalism produced different ideal types of women. This contrast, embodied by women, seems to represent the polarization that plagues the regime, which is next analyzed in the in-depth feminist-grounded theory study of the current gender regime in Turkey.

[79] Noa (fictitious name). Participant 23. Online interview. Braga-Istanbul. 17 September 2021.

Since it represents the phenomenon of the democratic backsliding of gender structures and institutions, this gender regime is known as ‘Gendered de-democratization’.

In the following chapters, we described the study's methodological approach in Chapter 4 before presenting it in detail in Chapter 5. In that chapter, women's prospects for each domain will be presented using the model produced in Chapter 4. Consequently, we will comprehend the gender regime better and be in a better position to make recommendations for achieving gender equality in the country.

CHAPTER 4

A feminist-grounded theory study on the gender regime in Turkey

After analyzing the multiple processes of democratization/de-democratization and the succeeding gender regimes in Turkey and explaining their correlations in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 is dedicated to the treatment of data that allows it to be possible to determine the meanings that women attribute to their experiences in Turkey. To that purpose, we use a feminist grounded theory that reconciles critical feminism with the grounded theory method to analyze gender experiences of citizenship under the gender regime. We aim to understand how different categories impact such experiences.

Chapter 4 will start by explaining feminist epistemologies, distinguished between acritical feminist empiricism and critical approaches like standpoint feminism and feminist postmodernism. We reinforce the interrelationship between critical feminist epistemologies and techniques of data collection such as interviews. Secondly, the chapter will shortly explain what we mean by feminist grounded theory and underline the role of grounded theory as a feminist research method. Because grounded theory develops research questions throughout the research process and is based on an analytical rather than a descriptive scheme of a phenomenon, the research does not succumb to pre-existing androcentric biases or assumptions. The final section focuses on our feminist-grounded theory study on women's experiences under the gender regime in Turkey that led to our theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey. Women's prospects for each domain will be presented in Chapter 5 using this model.

4.1. Critical social science research: a gender perspective, a feminist approach

> The aim is to make them [the students] aware of the differences – through a gender perspective, I see *this*, without this perspective, I see *that* – and aware of the fact that in a high percentage of the cases, the gap between this and that is an issue of gender discrimination (Perini, 2016: 19).

Feminism serves as a fundamental illustration of critical social science research and the promotion of social change (that is, knowledge as a tool for women's emancipation), with its own ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspectives on crucial concepts of political science, such as the state, the agency-structure relationship, and power (Wigger and Horn, 2016: 48).

Feminism convicts the androcentric approach of man as the single subject of autonomy and knowledge (Fraisse, 2008: 41) for spreading exclusionary structures, depriving women of the body of knowledge, and subjecting them to institutions favouring social injustice (Fine and Gordon, 1989: 165). Unlike liberal feminism, which takes an a-critical standpoint, critical feminism (not all feminist approaches that focus on women in political science are critical perspectives) emphasizes the household as a site of unequal power relations, and it does not view the state as an abstract, unhistorical idea (Wigger and Horn, 2016: 49). Critical feminism is grounded on unequal political, economic, and social relations and challenges the structure in which the agency is formed (Ticker, 2005: 6). Rather than focusing on a particular institution (e.g., the parliament), critical feminism seeks to understand how institutions came to be and what mechanisms of power can be changed (Wigger and Horn, 2016: 49). As seen in Chapter 1, each feminist theory interprets political science concepts differently; for example, whereas liberal feminism understands the state as a neutral institution, critical feminism considers that the state institutionalizes male power and is culturally associated with men. This results in different positions on neutral and gender-inclusive approaches of the state.

A gender perspective offers new insights into the phenomena of politics and emphasizes that differences between men and women are not grounded on biological differences but rather on how they interact with and are influenced by politics, in contrast to an androcentric approach to political science: it "has nothing to do with the point of view of women or with gender as women's stuff" (Perini, 2016: 19-20). A gender perspective is an instrument that can go beyond the gender bias of androcentric science written by men, about men, and for men (Smith, 1987: 18). It suggests rejecting positivist assumptions that subjectivity[80] is an obstacle to knowledge as well as reflecting on how science obscures gender inequality (Sprague, 2018; 45; Sprague and Kobrynowicz, 2006: 25). Gender established new paradigms and condemned foundationalist epistemologies due to the universal approach to knowledge, while gender power relations that political science studies were stressed by critical feminism. Thus, from feminist theories, epistemologies are identified that break with the androcentric view of political science that has sought to hide that gender difference is a patriarchal concept to which social and political content is provided (Plascencia, 2021: 21).

[80] Positivism presupposes that truth results from eliminating subjectivity because it can lead to observation errors that make objectivity impossible by incorporating the ontological assumption that there is an objective reality (Campbell and Wasco, 2000: 779). On the other hand, some feminist epistemologies acknowledge subjectivity, criticize the pursuit of objectivity (Miljeström, 2016: 30), and contend that conscious subjectivity enables the development of an alternative body of knowledge (Braidotti, 2006: 40). In these terms, subjectivity refers to the viewpoint of the individual rather than a neutral, objective viewpoint distinct from the experience of the individual. When Beauvoir said that man was the "Absolute" and woman was the "Other", she sums up the significance of subjectivity for feminism, especially in contrast to the male perspective on history, which places men as subjects and women as secondary (Kruks, 1992: 100).

Harding (1986) established three epistemologies to produce new theories of knowledge – feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism, and feminist postmodernism. The first one adopts a positivist stance that does not forbid the use of conventional quantitative research methodology but seeks to contextualize them (Olesen, 2005: 250) and remove androcentric biases (Harding, 1991: 111). Feminist empiricism allows the feminist inquiry to enter the traditional body of knowledge, however, Harding admitted that it is insufficient in eliminating gender biases (Harding, 1991: 116). From a different perspective, standpoint feminism rejects positivism, arguing that each subject (woman) is unique and knowledge is socially constructed (Harding, 1993: 56). Standpoint feminist perspectives interpret women's experiences (Sylvester, 2010: 369) and criticize androcentrism's distortions that underrate and ignore them (Wuest, 1995: 126). In contrast to feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism is based on the unique features of being a woman in societies where gender roles are stratified (Harding, 1991: 119) and is an interpretivist perspective that provides the locus of knowledge required to address the chauvinistic practices of the states (Sylvester, 2010: 369). According to standpoint feminism, the “universalized woman” is substituted by a “situated woman” in specific experiences and knowledge (Olesen, 2005: 267).

According to Sprague and Kobrynowicz, a dialectical relationship can be established to allow one standpoint to counteract the bias of another (2006: 39). Mies (1983) described this as "conscious partiality," where the researcher takes the side of one particular group and consciously creates space for reflection and dialogues on both sides. Other significant contributors to standpoint feminism include Nancy Hartsock and Dorothy Smith. Hartsock's standpoint feminism is based on a "feminist historical materialism" that bares “the laws of tendency which constitute the structure of patriarchy" (Hartsock, 1983: 283). Drawing on Marxism, Hartsock said that women's material activity had epistemological and ontological implications for understanding social relations (2019: 279) and considered that groups should not be judged merely because they exist in a social setting (ibid: 186). According to Smith, there was a correspondence between the standpoint of men and “the standpoint in the relations of ruling” (1987: 2). Smith assumed that the androcentric discourse was to blame for practices objectifying women (1987: 74) and proposed an alternative viewpoint (ibid: 197). Using women's experiences as a starting point, standpoint feminism stresses gender differences and challenges dominant paradigms and knowledge assertions (Harding, 1991: 120). Standpoint feminism privileges women (Harding, 1986: 141), but despite supporting the diversity and interaction of marginalized identities, it has an essentialist understanding of gender (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 5-7) and frames women's experiences through the lens of a single, shared identity (singular difference).

A third approach, feminist postmodernism, which is based on the theoretical framework of constructivism, social constructionism[81], and poststructuralism (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 5) was settled in opposition to androcentric positivist science as well (Harding, 1991: 137). While standpoint feminism aims to reconstruct the goals of science, feminist postmodernism challenges those goals (Harding, 1986: 141) and relates women's experiences to dominant patterns of power and knowledge (Sylvester, 2010: 369). Feminist postmodernism sees reality as total dependence on those who seek it and the contexts in which it is integrated (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 5). Truth is not neutral in the feminist postmodern interpretation; it is sexualized and related to power structures (Beasley, 1999: 86). Feminist postmodernism views truth as an assumption of situated knowledge (Heywood, 2004: 7) and rejects empiricism, objectivity, and positivism, contending that there are as many realities as consciousnesses (Harding, 1986: 194). This is perhaps the most significant distinction between feminist postmodernism and feminist empiricism. This epistemology holds that reality is an illusion and that the world is composed of texts that combine oppression and power (Olesen, 2005: 270). It plays a performative role in the production of conceptions (e.g., power, knowledge, truth, gender...) through a set of metaphors, representations, images, claims, and discourse (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 9), resulting in an exact version of an event (Burr, 1995: 32). Feminist postmodernism employs deconstruction as an analytical tool, and in contrast to positivist analyses, sees women are the subject, not the object of study (Sylvester, 2010: 369). This is done to offer avenues of resistance to empirical research that is to blame for the oppressive structure that is put in place in women's lives (Olesen, 2018: 270–71).

Harding's epistemological debate had methodological implications that are still pertinent today (Sprague and Kobrynowicz, 2006: 36), and even though there is no method that is exclusively feminist, some procedures stand out as being predisposed to feminist epistemologies (Harding, 1987: 2; Marecek, 2003: 51; Ticker, 2006: 40). This position is reinforced by the interrelationship of feminism with the interview as a hierarchical form of social relationship that allows for a broader understanding of gender experiences (Sprague and Kobrynowicz, 2006: 36) and a qualitative study of the analytical capacity of the speeches and experiences of marginalized groups (Vromen, 2010: 251-52). Even though feminism is not exclusively associated with qualitative methods (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 1), it does not show much confidence in quantitative methods and practices that reject the knowledge of subjectivity and limit experience to quantifiable/measurable variables (Sprague and Kobrynowicz,

[81] Social constructionism underpins the social and humanistic approaches to studying humans as social animals. It is distinguished by a critical attitude toward objective knowledge and its grounds on cultural specificity, social reality, and social action (Burr, 1995: 2-3). Its terminological use is related to fields like sexuality, gender, and race and emphasizes the meanings that social actors give to their experiences (Weinberg, 2009: 283). Social constructionism rejects claims of a fixed, singular identity, and opposes biological essentialism.

2006: 37). This was sustained by Mies, who specified that quantitative methods were means for structuring reality and universalizing power relations (1991: 67). Also, critical feminism is steered toward a qualitative methodology by the realization that complex gender issues rarely have straightforward solutions in standard data (Ticker, 2006: 38).

One of the main differences in this regard is the methodology, as feminist postmodernism and standpoint feminism favour alternative methods like research mobilization for social change, language/discourse awareness, intersectionality, or reflexivity (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 12-13). Feminist empiricism, on the other hand, follows positivist methodologies. Reflexivity studies the research process (Fonow and Cook, 1991: 2) and reveals that, at both micro and macro levels of analysis, the research cannot be split from the social context it seeks to comprehend (Weinberg, 2009: 292). Reflexivity situates the researchers in the process and includes personal, functional, and embodied reflexivity. While functional reflexivity examines the processes that lead to results, personal reflexivity tailors the topic to the contents (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 12-13). In other words, the research's role within the procedures for conducting research is its functional reflexivity. Lastly, embodied reflexivity highlights the dynamics between the researcher and participants and how the former introduces conceptions of “conscious partiality” (Wigginton and Lafrance, 2019: 13). As a critical thought enabling raising awareness and public disclosure of the nature of women's submission and emancipation, reflexivity has a fundamental position in feminist research (Kushwer and Morrow, 2003: 36).

Reviving Harding's (1987) and Tickner's (2006) arguments about the lack of a feminist method, there are, however, methodological characteristics with epistemological implications that qualify feminist research. The methodological and epistemological compatibility of feminism and grounded theory emerges in this context (Plummer and Young, 2010: 305), as we will explain next. This study is based on a post-positivist critical feminist epistemology, which reconciles elements of standpoint feminism and feminist postmodernism. We contest feminist empiricism, asserting social knowledge is situated, and contend that more than performative, gender is a social construction impacting dynamics and experiences. However, intersectionality proves there are several identities, and women do not share a common identity. Reiterating a claim already made in the introduction, “the experiences of an uneducated, elderly, poor, south-eastern Kurdish woman are not the same as those of an Istanbul-based, middle-class, well-educated, young Turkish woman”. The feminist-grounded theory analysis of the gender regime in Turkey is proposed by the grounded theory, which is covered in more detail in the following sections.

4.1.1. Towards a feminist grounded theory

Grounded theory is a qualitative research method for collecting and analyzing data to generate a theoretical model. It is based on observation and conducting in-depth unstructured, semi-structured interviews (Kushwer and Morrow, 2003: 32) and creates an analytical schema of a phenomenon rather than describing it. Grounded theory is a research method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) on the grounds of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism[82] (Charmaz, 2005: 531), which develops inductive medium-range theoretical structures to explain the data gathered from social research (Charmaz, 2000: 306; Creswell, 2007: 62; Glaser and Strauss, 2006 [1967]: 3; Kushwer and Morrow, 2003: 33). All the study participants must experience the process, and the theory is grounded on participant data (Creswell, 2007: 63).

As the analysis occurs concurrently with data collection (Charmaz, 2016: 1), the research questions in a grounded theory study emerge as the research goes through (Wuest, 1995: 129). This enables the research to overcome the assumptions that underpin research questions arising from androcentric domains of knowledge (Harding, 1987: 6), as it is not based on a men-centered analysis that political science tends to produce. In this process, grounded theory develops analytical interpretations of the data to improve the theoretical analyses under development (Charmaz, 2000: 509). Denzin argued that grounded theory is not a unified structure because it has evolved from positivism to post-positivism and post-modernism (2007: 454). This interpretation is similar to that of Charmaz, which asserted that despite its positivist roots, it has adopted a constructivist approach that has shifted away from positivism (Charmaz, 2000: 510). Although Glaser (2002) stated that grounded theory was not constructivist, reiterating that even if this practice has constructivist data, it only corresponds to a small part of the process. Corbin and Strauss, despite the initial claim of a positivist position saying that objectivity was required for an impartial and accurate interpretation, guaranteed that full objectivity was impossible and that the researchers had parts of subjectivity and "paradigms, including perspectives, training, knowledge, and biases" (2008: 33). With the aid of this contemporary application of grounded theory, the research is placed in historical and social context (Charmaz, 2016: 1), giving it a more women-experiences-disclosed-compatible interpretive stance (Plummer and Young, 2010: 305-07).

[82] The emphasis of symbolic interactionism is on socially constructed meanings that promote social interaction and change (Wuest, 1995: 127). According to Denzin, interactionism makes the assumption that people construct the world based on the meanings they give to experiences (2007: 25). These meanings result from the interaction between social interaction and self-reflection, which enables the growth of the relationship between structure and agency (Denzin, 2007: 27).

The research process and the interviews both benefit from the grounded theory approach (Campbell and Wasco, 2000: 773; Plummer and Young, 2010: 309). Since the grounded theory compares the discourses produced in the interviews, it developed the data collection by introducing categories (Wuest, 1995: 130) that spread the interrelations required for an integrated theoretical framework (Glaser and Strauss, 2006: 40). Given that grounded theory is data-based, any concerns about the likelihood that feminism will affect observation and the subjects of analysis are dispelled. Only concepts that emerge from the final data make up the theory (Wuest, 1995: 133), dispelling doubts that may have existed. According to Campbell and Wasco, such interaction shows meanings and understandings of social reality (Campbell and Wasco, 2000: 782). Grounded theory contends that meanings emerge from social interaction in a similar way to how feminism is grounded on the idea that knowledge is generated through social exchanges (Plummer and Young, 2010: 310). Indeed, grounded theory notes that individuals have intrinsic impulses in addition to interpersonal interactions (Plummer and Young, 2010: 313). The intersection of grounded theory and feminism can also be attributed to this instinctive action, which is known as reflexivity (Wuest, 1995: 135).

Kushwer and Morrow said that generating knowledge and new insights into how people interact is indispensable for grounded theory (2003: 37). In addition to confirming the break from positivism, Corbin and Strauss made room for a feminist-grounded theory when asserted that the purpose of grounded theory was to effect social change by equating who we are with the research we conduct (2008: 11). This is demonstrated by six points of congruence elaborated by Plummer and Young, which involved (a) the role of human experience in the development of knowledge, (b) identification of knowledge of social processes, (c) definition of meanings through the language, (d) reflexivity, (e) the rejection of subject/object dualism, and (f) promotion of social change (2010: 318). As feminism claims gender equality, the grounded theory produces sociopolitical implications that follow the process of empowering women.

Next, we present our feminist-grounded theory study of the gender regime in Turkey. The study is preceded by the identification of participants and the procedure. It is then explained how data was gathered and how it was analyzed to determine the results.

4.2. Qualitative data analysis: a feminist-grounded theory study

This is a feminist-grounded theory study. It develops codes/categories from the data and generates a middle-range theory from the analysis process. The data analysis was based on transcriptions of the fifty-three interviews on women's experiences of citizenship under the gender regime in Turkey, documentary evidence, field notes, and memos. The theoretical model derived from these data will be presented at the end of the chapter.

4.2.1. Participants

The research included 53 women ranging in age from 26 to 74. Twenty-three women were from Istanbul (Marmara Region), twenty were from Ankara (Central Anatolia Region), three were from Gaziantep (Southeastern Region), two were from Kahramanmaraş (Mediterranean Region), 2 were from Izmir (Aegean Region), two women lived abroad, and one was from Eskişehir (Central Anatolia Region). Istanbul and Ankara are home to the majority of women's rights organizations and political parties headquarters, so a significant part of the participants are from those regions. Three of the participants were Kurdish, one woman was Laz, and one woman was Alevi. The others were Turkish or did not specify their ethnicity or minority religion. Three women exhibited low PIA, six a lower-middle PIA, eighteen middle PIA, fourteen upper-middle PIA, three high PIA, and the remaining did not specify. Participants' educational levels ranged from primary education to having a PhD degree. One woman usually votes for the GP, one for the MHP, one for the DEVA, one for the VP, one for the KP, two for the IP, two for the TIP, seven for the HDP, thirteen for the CHP, and the remainder twenty-four women did not specify any party. Although none of the participants had assumed to vote for the AKP, a few expressed sympathy for the ruling party during their interviews. Legal issues, such as the prohibition on public servants having party affiliations, may explain such a stance. 13 participants were ordinary women, which means while they used to participate in elections, they hardly participated in demonstrations or other political activities. Fifteen women were active in the women's rights movement and participated in street politics and informal political participation, 11 were policymakers or sought for elected positions, and the remaining were academicians working on gendering political science or other Social Sciences. All the participants had Turkish citizenship and identified themselves as women. Cisgender and transgender women were both considered in the selection process, but all participants identified themselves as cisgender women.

4.2.2. Procedure

4.2.2.1. Entry into the field and fieldnotes

The research participants were recruited through networks, direct contact with target groups, such as women's organizations and political parties, and snowball sampling. According to this technique, the researcher begins with a group of initial contacts who meet the research criteria and are invited to participate. Then, the researcher asks the participants to suggest additional contacts from people who meet the research criteria and are open to participating and so on (Parker, Scott, and Geddes, 2019).

All participants were contacted via email or WhatsApp, and we established contact with approximately 200 women, getting 68 responses. Of the 68, 53 became participants. Six declined for professional reasons, four for personal reasons, three gave up during the selection process, and two considered not responding to the selection criteria. Each one received an email outlining the study, along with the interview consent form (with a focus on confidentiality and the necessity for an interpreter/translator), and the reference sheet asking for socioeconomic/demographic data (their age, ethnicity, education, party identification, province, and PIA). Following the scheduling of a meeting, we reviewed consent at the beginning of the recorded interviews. To protect identities, participants who requested anonymity were referred to by Portuguese names. Thirteen participants requested an interpreter/translator.

The 28 in-person and the 25 online interviews were conducted from October 2020 to July 2022 and lasted an average of 46 minutes. The locations of the in-person semi-structured interviews ranged from the Foreign Policy Institute, offices, headquarters of political parties, coffee houses, and universities. Although more in-person semi-structured interviews were anticipated, the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting lockdowns, travel bans, and social distance compelled fieldwork to be adapted and more online interviews to be conducted. In any case, even though the original project called for 35 interviews, many more interviews were conducted than expected.

Considering our qualitative approach, the interviews were led in a semi-structured format. Open-ended and theoretical-based questions are both used in semi-structured interviews to gather information from the participants' experiences as well as from the field's pre-existing constructs (Galletta and Cross, 2013: 45). For this reason, the interview guide identified many prompts to be addressed throughout the interview (Appendix B). Moreover, we opted for semistructured interviews because, compared to structured ones, they provide more follow-up, and compared to unstructured interviews,

they suggest more control over how the discussions are directed toward specific topics (Leavy, 2020: 437). After the interviews, a thank you email was sent, appreciating the participation, asking for potential participants, and informing the possibility of adding/reviewing information. All participants who requested it were sent a copy of the interview transcript.

Before the interviews, we realized a pilot study, which provided the theoretical-conceptual sensitivity required by grounded theory, details on the target groups, experience in fieldwork, and knowledge of qualitative research. We met online with an activist and two academicians working on gender and politics with the ambition of going over the initial question guide and learning more about the ongoing political and social situation. Most of the time, it was easy for us to get in touch with and meet participants. It was more challenging to get in touch with those connected to the People's Alliance, though. While it is true that we interviewed participants who, despite identifying themselves as independent, have previously held or run for political office in the ruling party, all the AKP politicians contacted either did not respond or declined to participate. This contrasts with the CHP and HDP, which agreed to several interviews and made themselves available to meet with us at their headquarters in Ankara. For this reason, they are the two most represented parties in the sample.

Finally, I believe my identity as a well-educated, non-Muslim, Western woman influenced the dynamics of the interviews and the fieldwork. This became clear when the assistant of a Popular Alliance MP used the label of the "Western girl" to justify why she would not agree to an interview. Nevertheless, we felt this barrier, which made an essentialist representation of the researcher as an outsider, was established for nationalist rather than religious reasons. Although there was less of a trend to identify commonalities among the veiled, religious women we met (e.g., the pronoun "we" was used recurrently by secular women to refer to themselves and me as part of a secular, Westernized subject), these interviews went very well, and the participants were open and eager to learn the results.

4.2.2.2. Data sources, collection, and analysis (open, axial, and selective coding)

The data consists of over forty-five hours of semi-structured interviews. All the audio records were transcribed, and the data covers 650 pages of transcriptions and field notes. The grounded theory was used in the analytical process and covered constant sorting, coding, and comparisons, which was essential to contrast categories and identify patterns/similarities.

Analysis began with open coding, which Corbin and Strauss described as "breaking data apart and delineating concepts to stand for blocks of raw data" (2008: 195). Open coding indicates the analysis of text sections composed of "individual words, phrases, and sentences", Morrow and Smith said (2007: 290). Based on the participants' statements, *in vivo* codes (participants provided the conceptualization) and researcher-denoted concepts (the researcher delineated a conceptual name) were used to code and develop categories. For example, Figure 5 demonstrates an excerpt of a transcription in which we outline conceptual labels from the data (androcentric polity; polity; (under)representation; gender regime; (non-)representation; and gender inequality) but also coded *in vivo* (patriarchal world).



Figure 5. Screenshot 2 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

During that process, we wrote memos to detail the analysis and make considerations that seemed relevant to themes addressed by the participants. As Corbin and Strauss explained, writing memos is a "mental dialogue occurring between the data and me" (2008: 169). "It helps the analyst to get inside the data" and "directs the inquiry by suggesting further areas for data collection" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 170). In the memo depicted in Figure 6, we discussed a potential category, the national health system, the 10-week legal limit for abortion, and a potential interaction between SRRH and ethnicity. When the participant claimed that abortion has been compared to a massacre, she admitted that abortion is an issue in Turkey but did not explore potential correlations. We later conducted this analysis, albeit based on her words.

10 March 2021

Sexual rights and the issue on abortion

Some hospitals do not do that [abortion]. It is against the law, but it happens. And also, when we go there, they say "come next month", and then, in the next month, it is forbidden. So, you have no more option to have an abortion. The right to abortion is not recognized by the government, so it is a political problem. For example, someone from the AKP said once, it was Erdogan I think, that every abortion is "Uludere". Uludere was a massacre that was made by the Turkish army against civil people. It is also called "Robosky". Robosky is the Kurdish name; Uludere is the Turkish one. There is a message there they refer to a massacre when they talk about abortion.

There are three *in vivo* codes here. One is "abortion", which is related to the higher-level concept of "sexual and reproductive health and rights". Abortion was decriminalized in Turkey in the 1980s and the legalization has widespread female support. Furthermore, it was about demographic issues rather than women's rights. The fact that she speaks openly about it does not imply that she considers herself progressive, though this may be the case due to her party affiliation. Additionally, she might be criticizing the fact that the law allows for abortion only up until ten weeks of pregnancy when she says, "Then, in the next month, it is forbidden." The second *in vivo* code is "law". By stating that hospitals that refuse to perform abortions are not complying with the law, she makes a disparaging assessment of the healthcare system, but, above all, by relating the president's statements to this refusal, she suggests political interference in the national health system. The third *in vivo* code is "Uludere". I do not know if the participant mentioned the distinction between the Kurdish and Turkish words prepositionally, but we checked in the Turkish media that Erdogan used the Kurdish word. This requires a more extensive analysis, as it could be a message for Kurdish women. It would be interesting to investigate whether abortion rates are higher among Kurdish women or perhaps to compare the numbers in regions with a larger Kurdish population and other regions.

Figure 6. Screenshot 3 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

Axial coding, which congregated data in new ways by linking categories and subcategories around a phenomenon (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 136) and crosscutting and relating concepts to one another (ibid: 195), went hand in hand with open coding. Morrow and Smith (2007: 290) argued, as did Corbin and Strauss in former editions[83], that axial code came after open coding. Nonetheless, Corbin and Strauss explained distinctions were "artificial and for explanatory purposes" (2008: 198). "As analysts work with the data, their minds automatically make connections because, after all, the connections come from the data" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 198). Considering that, we followed the approach used by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and proceeded with the open and axial coding process simultaneously.

For example, in Figure 1 presented in the Introduction, when we wrote in the memo that "under the high-level concept of 'locating the self' come lower-level concepts", such as "religious, Islamic_Muslim, and veiled", we are relating them and associating subcategories (religious) and

[83] Contrary to this 3rd edition (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), the 1990 and 1998 editions present Strauss as the first author.

categories (locating the self) around the phenomenon (gendering de-democratization). The same is shown in Figure 5. When a participant contended that "politics in Turkey appears to be a job for rich old, heterosexual men", we accepted "(non)-responsiveness" and "(under)representativeness" as part of the category of "polity". When we noted that "(non)-responsiveness" is representative of the domain of "polity", contributing to the hybridism of the regime, we are creating interpretative descriptors of the gender regime and explaining the limited role of women in formal institutions in Turkey.

The third coding method is selective coding. It is the final step and connects all categories around a core category. High-level and lower-level concepts obtained from open and axial coding were linked to a core category in the selective coding stage and expressed the core phenomenon (Figure 7).



Figure 7. Coding process – open, axial, and selective coding in NVivo

4.2.3. Results

Our theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey is based on Corbin and Strauss' (2008) methodological framework, Morrow and Smith's (2007) proposal, and Creswell's (2012) explanation. Next, we show the detailed results of the study, explaining the causal (events influencing the phenomenon) and the intervening (events qualifying the impact of causal conditions) conditions. Then, we introduce the central phenomenon (the core concept), the context (conditions), the strategies (actions resulting from the central phenomenon), and the consequences (outcomings of the strategies). The strategies refer to the actions taken by the structure (the political regime) as a result of its gendering de-democratization rather than the agency (women).

4.2.3.1. Causal conditions of the gendering de-democratization

Based on the meanings that women assign, two types of causal conditions emerged from the data on the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey. These causal conditions are related to political and gender issues. Political issues at the basis of the phenomenon include ideologies – Islamism, conservatism, neoliberalism, nationalism, and populism – power relations – cronyism – and forms of government – authoritarianism. On the other hand, gender issues demonstrate three categories, including patriarchy (or patriarchal world, according to the in-vivo code produced), toxic masculinity, and familialism.

Elisa related attempts against freedom of expression to opposition to gender equality by saying the events at Boğaziçi University against feminists and the LGBTI+ community "were an act of violence against democracy". Congruently, Francisca, a Professor of Political Science living in Güzelyurt, considered that the AKP's shift on gender equality was in line with the intensification of authoritarianism and conservatism in Turkey[84], and Helena mentioned the role of conservatism in opposition to gender equality and related it to neoliberalism. Helena said that, although gender does not matter for neoliberalism when patriarchy acts and works with market preferences, women become the first group to leave the market because they assume a large part of caregiving duties. She considered that "if there are no care facilities for children, women have to withdraw from the market working as invisible workers in the domestic sphere", "where they can be more regulated". This is the way neoliberalism and

[84] Francisca (fictitious name), Participant 11. Online interview. Braga- Güzelyurt. 16 March 2021.

conservatism interact. Ayşe believed this approach is strongly oriented toward and by Islam and evoked that the AKP's governments increasingly funded religious organizations and family-oriented activities. "Even though a woman cannot be a religious leader, they recruited a very large number of women" to "provide family counselling" and even "mediate in violence issues". Ayşe's explanations reveal that women play an important role in this approach, as they serve as a vehicle for propagating the state's patriarchy. Moreover, although these actions are illegal and all cases of gender-based violence must be reported to the authorities, state-funded religious communities took them to decrease divorce rates, forcing women's presence in abusive relationships.

This brings us to the gender causal conditions of gendering de-democratization. These conditions are part of a normative order that reinforces the role of the family in the Turkish nation, relegating women to private caring roles and disseminating a system in which men hold political and/or economic power, moral authority, and social privilege. "We have to finish with this toxic masculinity", said Berrin. When asked about how she assigned the status of women in the market, Nihan Damarlı, a women's rights activist from Ankara, said that the AKP perpetuates a familialist approach against the role of women within the public sphere[85]. She recalled political discourses from several members of the AKP's governments defining the women's place "within the family" since "the best thing that a woman can do is to be a mother". She even claimed that an AKP member had once claimed that men's unemployment is caused by women's participation in the workforce, exposing a misogynist view of women's place in society. That is why, she assumed, there are no affordable childcare facilities in the country. This family-oriented approach views the woman as a mother and the axis of the nuclear family rather than as an individual. This is better understood in terms of the idea of gender justice, which holds that men and women are not equal but rather complementary. This attitude is turning "family into a more patriarchal and authoritarian institution", Helena claimed.

Even the participants who do not recognize the patriarchal system admit the existence of a social structure that confines women to the home and the private sphere. Benedita is a housewife from Gaziantep and had this experience when she married underage. She never entered the labour market, has only primary education, and said that girls' education is a real problem in the country, mainly in Southeast Anatolia. Many girls, similar to her several decades ago, "do not attend school because their families believe it is unnecessary"[86].

Thirty-one of the 53 participants agreed that patriarchy has become more intense under the AKP's rule, including six women who insisted that the ruling party upholds and propagates this structure

[85] Nihan Damarlı. Participant 10. Online interview. Braga-Ankara. 12 February 2021.
[86] Benedita (fictitious name). Participant 49. Online Interview. Istambul-Gaziantep. 14 July 2022.

through GONGOs. Only one participant said that the AKP was working on it, while the remaining twenty-four did not reveal an opinion on its role in the subsistence of patriarchy. Most of them recognized that these practices were political. However, one participant asserted that it is a worldwide, non-political phenomenon; one asserted it is a social and cultural phenomenon; and six did not comment on that.

4.2.3.2. The phenomenon brought on by the regime's political and gender issues

The causal conditions resulted in one core category, which is gendering de-democratization. Not only did thirty-one participants recognize this correlation, but another seven participants recognized the democratic backsliding and gender equality, though not establishing a correlation. This means that 71.7% of participants openly recognized the de-democratization in Turkey (Akkoyunlu, 2017; Aytaç and Elçi, 2019; Çalışkan, 2018; Sarfati, 2017), which supports the literature on competitive authoritarianism in Turkey, and opposition to gender equality (Çavdar and Yaşar, 2019; Doğangün, 2019; Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017; Kandiyoti, 2016; Özkazanç, 2020). Additionally, as Walby's (2009) theory implied, democracy requires equal representation of women in parliament and state institutions, a flaw that most participants acknowledged. This research shows that such a connection is deeply ingrained in Turkish women's underpinnings to the point where it is difficult to distinguish between the analysis of political (political regime) and gender issues (gender regime). That being the case, the category “political_gender regime” is coded as a single theme rather than two. This is exposed by terms like "conservative patriarchy”, “religious patriarchy", "authoritarian patriarchy", "patriarchal authoritarianism” and “pro-family conservatism". Ayşe mentioned one of these concepts when she said that the low participation of women in the market was because of conservative patriarchy:

> Conservative patriarchal is our biggest problem as it is an ideology with very potential. It is not new in Turkish society, but the state's ideology is different. And when the ideology of the state is different, new role models are promoted.

As we found similarities among participants from diverse profiles and socioeconomic backgrounds, this category began to form and become a core category. Laura, a veiled woman, contrary to Ayşe, is much younger (28 and 68), from a different province (Istanbul and Ankara), represents a different pre-

established profile (activist and academician), and with another PIA (middle and upper-middle), also recognized a shift in the state's ideology, which is gradually hostile to gender equality[87] (Figure 8):



Figure 8. Screenshot 4 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

This category was adjusted throughout the analytical process to take the data into account and was compared to existing/newly developed codes or categories. During the analytical process, we found the phenomenon that was labelled "gendering de-democratization", which we described as the gendered-oriented de-democratization that controls how institutions engage with society (see the Codebook for qualitative analysis in the Introduction).

4.2.3.3. The context that led to the gendering de-democratization

Several contextual markers related to causal conditions influence the strategies of the gendering de-democratization, including the AKP's approaches to the economy, polity, gender-based violence, sexuality and intimacy, and education.

In the category of economy, women's experiences and reports point to issues related to the market – (non-)participation, (under-)representation, economic (non-)autonomy, the gender pay gap, (im)balance in management positions, and feminization of precarious work – the welfare state, and the household. Several references to femicide, IPV, and so-called honour crimes were revealed in the discussion of gender-based violence, while on education, the 2012 Educational Reform was mentioned

[87] Laura (fictitious name). Participant 20. Online Interview. Braga-Istanbul. 11 June 2021.

as a significant legal change. Also, religious schools are mentioned as the single option for "families who do not have money to pay for scientific and secular education". Even though in Chapter 5, due to the reasons identified in Chapter 2, we reveal the results of education as part of the institutional domain of the economy, we represent it as a high-level concept. This allow us to compare education with high-level concepts and understand how they impact each other. Reports on polity vary from (non-)representativeness, (under)representation, androcentric polity, and the gendering of local politics, while sexuality and intimacy are related to divorce, the lack of body autonomy, contraception, marriage, and women's health. This category was previously referred to as SRHR, but data regarding divorce forced a change to include "intimate troubles".

4.2.3.4. The intervening conditions influencing the phenomenon

The theoretical model also identified intervening conditions, which are contextual conditions that influence the strategies (Creswell, 2012: 426) for spreading the gendering de-democratization. The intervening conditions include identity, religious beliefs, cultural practices, patriarchal values, and the political agenda.

Firstly, religious beliefs were mentioned as justifications for minor codes of the category of economy, like non-participation in the market and economic non-autonomy. It was frequently linked to the category of intimacy and sexuality as well, mainly in relation to opposition to divorce and abortion. "Some Islamic religious women activists are totally against abortion", and "someone from the AKP said (...) every abortion is Uludere (massacre)". Secondly, the relationship between the gendering de-democratization and patriarchal values and cultural practices is demonstrated in Figure 9.



Figure 9. Screenshot 5 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

The identity that AKP governments assigned to Turkish women was another intervening condition, and participants who located themselves as feminists explained that "Erdoğan started to have more negative discourses about feminists", and "If you are a women's rights defender, if you are secular, or if you are a feminist, you are the enemy". Lastly, a great example of the political agenda was the conservative cadres' opposition to alimony, one of the two driving forces behind the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. Out of the 53 participants, at least seven showed concerns regarding alimony.

4.2.3.5. Strategies influencing the situation and prospects of the gender regime

Participants recognized three strategies resulting from the phenomenon by which AKP authorities dealt with gender issues. The strategies are indoctrination, polarization, and control, and all of them cut across multiple categories. Indoctrination, for example, is principally evident in the categories of education, the economy, and sexuality and intimacy.

Education as a tool of indoctrination is not a new phenomenon in Turkey. It was employed to spread Kemalism during the early Republic and is now a tool for promoting traditionalist ideas, patriarchal ideologies, and religious values. This is manifest in the rise in enrollment in Iman Hatip institutions, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's claims for a "pious generation", the repeal of laws prohibiting religious instruction, the addition of religion-based optional courses, the educational reform, and the extensive revisions, including the removal of historical events and a replacement with Islamized ones. Canan Aslan Akman, a Professor of Political Science from Ankara said that "the government supports the religious education system by financing it and increasing nonpayer numbers in many high schools"[88]. About Educational Reform and distance learning, Gökçe Bayrakçeken, former UN advisor and a women's rights activist from Ankara, asserted that "it's a problem for girls because, at school, friends and teachers can be a very important tool to save them from violence at home or early marriages"[89]. This means that while education does serve as a tool for indoctrinating the state ideology, it also spreads it to other categories, reframing the role of women in the economy. Starting from the premise that the family, not the individual, is what makes the nation, it supports the idea of the role of women within the family and not in the market (household), thus relieving the state of providing social well-being (welfare). This is supported by the AKP's allies and religious circles, but it is also widely reported in the media, which the AKP controls and uses to indoctrinate mostly older generations.

[88] Canan Aslan Akman. Participant 17. Online interview. Braga-Ankara. 8 May 2021.
[89] Gökçe Bayrakçeken. Participant 26. Interview. Ankara. 17 June 2022.

Participants reported there are government members appearing regularly on TV and in newspapers saying that "women to stay at home and have more children", "women's place is at home" "taking care of children" and "being a wife".

When this discourse comes from above, it not only normalizes these practices but also promotes them, having repercussions in the category of sexuality and intimacy as well. On the one hand, this preserves the idea that women's health means maternal and child health. If we compare the interviews, there are different positions. For example, while Simone, a preschool teacher from Gaziantep, praised women's health, emphasizing "mothers' and children's health services"[90], most of them criticized the AKP for public policies on HPV vaccination and abortion. Sera Kadıgil, an Ankara MP, believes that not only are these categories ignored, but they are also put at risk due to associations with sexuality. "If she is a woman, she's not supposed to have sex, so why should we pay for this HPV shot?", she satirized, referring to the government's position[91]. On the other hand, the idea that abortion is a "Uludere". Nevertheless, no participant showed agreement with the AKP on abortion, and indoctrination did not express a contradiction in this topic; either they criticized it or did not make any reference.

The second strategy resulting from the phenomenon is control. This is closely related to the causal condition of authoritarianism and manifests itself mostly in the categories of sexuality and intimacy and violence. The following conversational passage from Sera serves as an example of this control:

> Another topic is abortion. Now, it is not like this 20 years ago. It was allowed and provided free of charge in all state hospitals. After 20 years, they didn't forbid abortion because the law is still there, but no one is implementing it. If I got pregnant and didn't wanna give birth to that child, I had to have money to get an abortion. In public hospitals, doctors are saying to you, "I am not doing abortion, we are not doing that in this hospital". They are giving these answers to women. I also heard that, because complaints are coming to us, they are secretly collecting names of pregnant and unmarried women and making a list of them, like a "wanted women section".

A similar observation was made by Elisa, who also lives in Ankara. Although she did not refer to a "wanted women section", she said that in her "family doctor, there was a paper on the wall saying that if your neighbour is pregnant, please let us know". The government claims this propaganda is to "reduce maternal mortality", but it is also "ideological" because considers that "pregnancy without

[90] Simone [fictitious name). Participant 29. Online interview. Ankara-Gaziantep. 23 June 2022.
[91] Sera Kadıgil. Participant 28. Interview. Ankara. 22 June 2022.

marriage is a problem". However, a positive point, according to Elisa, is that "you can do pap smears for free with family doctors". However, many women do not get screened for cervical cancer because they are afraid of not being able to get permission from their husbands, which is keeping with the literature (Cankaya and Yuksel, 2020).

Other participants claim that the AKP forces women into co-dependent relationships by restricting access to divorce and defending an ideal type that is confined to the household, robbing them of their economic autonomy and placing them under men's control. "The AKP and Erdoğan want to see women in the family, not in public. They desire to control women through their bodies and their sexualities", Ana, a lawyer and women's rights activist from Istanbul, argued[92]. "You don't have any autonomy over your body, the government said. The children are ours, and ours means a male state. You shouldn't have any sexuality of your own, you shouldn't have any decision over your body, which includes c-sections, abortion, or contraception", unburdened another participant. "We have a very restrictive regime that seeks to control, survey, and limit women's sexual and reproductive rights".

The several forms of gender-based violence also reflect how patriarchy controls women's bodily autonomy. Gökçe spoke of her opinion: "Violence, in a broader sense, is everywhere, and is the central manifestation of patriarchal control over women's bodies and labour". Gender-based violence, mostly violence between partners, exposes a power relation where perpetrators impose themselves. In the opinion of Sera, these acts are allowed by the state because "when you go to a court with these cases, it is always finding a way to justify the men" and "there is always something going wrong". This was recognized by the OECD, which noted the use of the defence of provocation by victims in court (OECD, 2019: 5). "The ones who are in power are you, so you have the duty to prevent that. The government's discourse is not that women can be murdered or that men can be violent against women, of course, but when you're not doing what you should do to prevent it, and if you are the people in power, we can say there's no real political will to prevent violence", Nihan said.

Finally, the last strategy is polarization. In addition to weakening women's resistance, the AKP divides the populace further, reviving old issues like religion and ethnicity. This is consistent with the research on gender, politics, and religion in Turkey (Mutluer, 2019), a subject we already covered in Chapter 3, and is recognized by some participants, who said that "polarization is high", "there's a severe polarization in Turkey", and that "patriarchal understanding of religion divides women". The AKP strategically targeted these cleavages, with gender and societal repercussions. Noa, a veiled participant, argued that it doesn't matter if you disagree with the government. "You carry the etiquette, even if your

[92] Ana (fictitious name). Participant 1, Braga-Istanbul. 16 October 2020.

ideas are different". It is interesting to note that some participants believe that polarization among women no longer exists and that the ruling party has cleverly taken advantage of the fact that it was a watershed issue for many years. Beatriz expressed that "they are using that argument even though this problem does not exist anymore". In addition to religion, ethnicity is exploited by the AKP, which uses "differences between ethnicities" and enhances the effects of "a century-old historical political triangle" among secularism, Islam, and Kurdism. Except for women's rights activists, the tendency is for Kurdish women to identify an ethnic cleavage and secular women to see a religious one.

4.2.3.6. The consequences of gendering de-democratization

The AKP's strategies were not without consequences, the last topic of our theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey (Figure 10). Overall, strategies contributed to keeping women underrepresented in the public sphere (including politics and the market), non-recognition of women in the private sphere, bodily and economic dependence, and violence.

Apart from the participants who were part of Profile 3 (women politicians), only one said she felt politically represented at a national level. When participants look at the Turkish parliament, they do not feel represented, constantly saying "I don't feel represented", I'm not represented", "I don't feel I'm represented", "I can't say I feel represented", "it's impossible to feel represented", and so on. However, some participants claimed to feel represented by opposition parties, saying that "the CHP represents me", or specifying MPs as "Sera Kadıgil", "Filiz Kerestecioğlu", or "Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu". Also, there are participants who claim to find representation at the local level. Inês revealed that she voted "for Ekrem İmamoğlu who is the mayor [of Istanbul]. So, when I look at what is going on in my city and district, Beşiktaş, I feel that I'm represented as a woman because I see that many issues are being taken care". It is from Istanbul that another case of responsiveness comes from. Canan Kaftancıoğlu, the de facto CHP Istanbul chair, is referred to by two participants as "an incredible woman" who "represents me". Others said to felt represented by women's rights organizations. "Only the women's movement and women in civil society represent me". Several times, participants mentioned that they felt like "a half-citizen" and "a secondary citizen". The AKP "does not take the woman as an individual, but it treats women inside the family, as a mother, for instance". According to the KCDP, current or ex-husbands/partners are responsible for the majority of cases of femicide, so

this lack of recognition of women is what lies at the heart of many violent incidents[93]. This is also largely related to the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, as "what we have started to see (...) is that certain cases are not recognized as violence against women", said Inês. The non-recognition of women's rights, not only in the public sphere but also in the private space, is a consequence of a position on women that, in favour of the family, keeps them hostage to abusive relationships.

Underrepresentation and non-recognition resulted in women's both bodily and economic dependence. And it is this lack of autonomy that often forces them to subject themselves to abusive relationships. This is represented by the Sultan's experience introduced in Chapter 1. As she wasn't working and "was a housewife without economic independence", she couldn't take care of herself. This mixture of underrepresentation, non-recognition, dependence, and violence restricts women's experiences of citizenship and represents the situation of the gender regime in Turkey. As Benedita said, "The fewer girls in school, the fewer women in politics, and the less women's empowerment". "The employment rates of women and their participation in politics are alarmingly low in Turkey", and "a more social-economic power would be a very strong tool for increasing of women's power". In the next chapter, we will focus on these prospects of the gender regime, identifying patterns and contradictions in each of its institutional domains.

4.3. Conclusion

By focusing on a feminist grounded theory, this chapter traced the differentiations between acritical feminist empiricism and critical approaches, developed the link between feminist epistemology and grounded theory, and explored qualitative methods like semi-structured interviews. It produced a feminist-grounded theory study of gender and politics and theorized a model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey.

We argue that gendering de-democratization in Turkey emerged from political - Islamism, conservatism, neoliberalism, nationalism, populism, cronyism, and authoritarianism – and gender issues – patriarchy, toxic masculinity, and familialism. The phenomenon was developed under an economic, educational, political, gendered, and intimate context and some intervening conditions, including religious beliefs, cultural practices, identity concerns, and a specific political agenda. The gendering de-democratization operates through a traditionalist indoctrination of the role of women, a

[93] Sozcu. (2021). "Kadınlar en çok yakınlarındaki erkekler tarafından öldürülüyor" [Women are most often killed by men close to them]. *Sozcu*. Available at https://www.sozcu.com.tr/hayatim/yasam-haberleri/kadinlar-en-cok-yakinlarindaki-erkekler-tarafindan-olduruluyor/.

polarized discourse on gender, and control over their bodies, resulting in the underrepresentation of women in the public sphere, women's non-recognition in the private/domestic domain, women bodily and economic dependence, and violence against women.

The following chapter will analyze the phenomenon in each institutional domain because restrictions on women's citizenship are much more complex and varied than we could explain in a single coding process. However, it is evident from the analysis in this chapter that gender-based violence was a category that all the participants tended to agree on. There was not a single woman who did not recognize it, regardless of the profile, socioeconomic markers, or political background. Another similarity concerns the issue of abortion, with almost two-thirds of participants recognizing problems in this concept. The participants have different experiences and prospects, though, so there are contradictions in addition to patterns. One is related to women's healthcare service, but there are others, as we will see in the following chapter.



Figure 10. Theoretical Model for the Situation and Prospects of the Gender Regime in Turkey

CHAPTER 5

The situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey

The current chapter establishes our last analysis on the grounds of the feminist-grounded theory study on the gender regime in Turkey. In the previous chapter, we analyzed the conditions and the context behind the gendering de-democratization in Turkey. We also identified the strategies leading to that backsliding, explaining its consequences for women's lives and experiences of citizenship in the country.

We will now look at each of the domains that make up the gender regime using the more comprehensive analysis coming from the previous chapter. We sought to understand the private and domestic forms of exclusion identified by participants in each of the analytical categories. In each section of this chapter, we begin by presenting a set of empirical data on each domain before interpreting women's prospects under the gender regime. The objectives are, on the one hand, to comprehend individual prospects in relation to the concepts/categories identified in the previous chapter, and, on the other hand, to interpret the consequences of gendering de-democratization in various domains. We claim that these women interpret the gender regime in a variety of ways but also point out some contradictions and singularities, which demonstrate how the experiences they are exposed to lead them to interpret the gender regime in various ways. So, the discussion in this chapter focuses on the patterns, tensions, and singularities among the participants. Which women face more difficulties in accessing education? Is there a group that feels less represented? Does gendering de-democratization affect their experiences of citizenship equally? According to critical feminism, women have a variety of experiences that influence their prospects and lives. Therefore, we study these experiences and how they affect women's everyday politics.

The institutional domain of polity is covered first in this chapter, and then we study the institutional domain of the economy. Leaving violence for the final section, we approach the domain of civil society from the perspectives of sexuality and intimacy. We base the recommendations to advance gender equality in Turkey on the analysis conducted in Chapters 4 and 5. This analysis, ultimately, underlies the middle-range theory that results from our feminist-grounded theory study.

5.1. Polity

We quickly review some empirical data on women in politics in Turkey before moving on to the analysis of data from interviews. In terms of national-level polity, Japan (9.9%) and Hungary (12.6%) are the only OECD countries presenting lower levels of women's representation in Parliament than Turkey (17.4%)[94]. Turkey, however, has the worst results among OECD when it comes to women in ministerial positions (5.9%), followed by the Czech Republic (7.1%) and Japan (8.3%). In terms of the local level, according to the EIGE (2023) report covering 32 countries, the rate of women in regional assemblies in Turkey is 8.4 per cent, the lowest one[95]. This percentage conflicts with those shown by countries openly supporting gender equality and women's representation, like Denmark (50%), Finland (48.4%), and Sweden (48.3%).

After reviewing the evidence, we apply Walby's (2009) theory. To better comprehend and theorize women's prospects in Turkey's gender regime, we analyze the domain of polity. We want to identify how they understand the current situation and how different interactions and experiences structure their insights. The points proposed by Walby (2009) were:

- Suffrage-democracy (no unelected positions; no colonies; no non-democratic governance; de facto and de jure universal suffrage; and free, fair, and competitive elections)
- Presence-democracy (suffrage-democracy plus the low cost for electioneering; proportional representation; quotas for underrepresented groups; and balanced presence of women in parliament)
- Broad democracy (presence-democracy plus governance over a wide of institutions, such as welfare services)

The categories/themes resulting from the analysis undoubtedly relate to this framework. Figure 11 serves as an example. We identified three lower-level concepts in the category of polity – gendering of local politics, (non-)responsiveness, and (under)representativeness – which are associated with the balanced presence of women in parliament and proportional representation. Furthermore, the remaining two points proposed by Walby (2009) within the context of presence-democracy – quotas for underrepresented groups and cost for electioneering – are visible in Figure 11. The participant covered

[94] Given that the analytical period ended in 2022, we considered data referring to the 27th legislative term of the TBMM (2018-23) and not relating to the 28th term (2023-).
[95] See footnote 11.

the high cost of electioneering, saying that "if you are rich and can donate enough money, you can be a candidate", and questioned the absence of gender quotas in Turkish politics, claiming she does not "think parties have attempted to increase women's representation, only the Kurdish party, which had a big internal voluntary policy of 50% women and 50% men".



Figure 11. Screenshot 6 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

Additionally, participants accuse the lack of indicators related to a broad democracy, expressing that "women mostly depend on their families for childcare", "there is a lack of support regarding childcare", and that "there are not enough care facilities". Joana, a retired Professor of Economics from Istanbul, observed that "if you have money, you can hire a nanny or use private care facilities. Otherwise, there are almost no public care services"[96]. Some were aware of the difficulties brought on by the liberalization of care, particularly for women from the low and lower-middle class, which is consistent with the position defended by Walby (2009) regarding the limitations of neoliberalism (also a lower-level concept of the political and gender regimes) for gender issues.

Even at the level of suffragist democracy, which Walby (2009) considered required for the institution of a public gender regime, elections are not fair nor free, and there are references to authoritarianism frequently, questioning the public form and introducing private/domestic forms of exclusion. It "is becoming an authoritarian regime" and "an example of an authoritarian right-wing populist regime", some participants said. The political regime "is getting more authoritarian", "there is a more authoritarian tendency", and "an intensification of authoritarian, Islamist, populist, nationalist politics" are some of the labels. Rita, an MP from Ankara, showed her discontent, saying that Turkey is

[96] Joana (fictitious name). Participant 18. Online Interview. Braga-Istanbul. 11 May 2021.

“an authoritarian regime where one person’s will prevails”[97]. This claim is consistent with Alev's opinion, according to which it started in 2011 and developed gradually until 2015:

> Gender politics became tougher in parallel with authoritarianism. After 2015, there was a clear and very sharp break from the earlier period, and Turkey quickly fell into a strictly authoritarian regime, along with the gender regime.

Alev said that “they were promoting family values from the very beginning” but “the government was under the influence of feminist politics and collaborated with feminist NGOs”. Nevertheless, in 2011, they followed “more apparently pro-family and pro-natalist policies”. Then, “after 2015, we see different gender politics reflecting an attempt to restore patriarchy”, which “perfectly matches with the authoritarianism at the top of the regime (...) They need each other. They support each other”. This is in keeping with Fraser's claim that authoritarianism institutionalizes masculinity and is shared by many participants. The majority referred to 2011 as the year of change, arguing that “the period of 2011-2012 was the one when everything started to shift drive'' but there were those who referred to 2007, claiming, “When I step back to 2007, I can easily see the difference in my life”. Others based their claims on the events of Gezi, mentioning that ''after 2013, the AK Party changed its policy''. Overall, who recognized the phenomenon of ‘gendering de-democratization’ identified the stages we previously defined as ‘State Pro-feminism’ and ‘Pro-family Conservatism’.

Regarding androcentric politics, which is the other concept in the category of polity, it is related to the gender conditions of the phenomenon, which are toxic masculinity, patriarchy, and familialism. This is shown by expressions like “the regime is becoming more and more male and patriarchal” and narratives condemning that women “can't go to the authorities because they are patriarchal. Your husband is hitting you, and you go to the police? But the police is also a man, a patriarchal man”.

However, considering tensions surrounding women's prospects in representation, a more thorough analysis is needed. Compare Figure 12 and Figure 13, considering the socioeconomic and demographic profile of the two participants is quite different. Figure 12 refers to Alev, a forced retired Professor, aged 53. She lives in Ankara, belongs to a ''very tiny minority group'', has a PhD, usually votes for the HDP, and her PIA is high. Contrarily, Figure 13 refers to Simone, the 32-year-old preschool teacher living in Gaziantep. She has a degree and did not specify her PIA or ethnicity.

[97] Rita (fictitious name). Participant 27. Interview. Ankara. 22 June 2022.

28 November 2021

Polity and representation: informal, local, and national politics

In Turkey, you know, women's political representation has been extremely low. Before and during the Republican period it was extremely low, just below 2%. It was extremely low until the late 1980s. For example, in 1987, the political representation of women MPs was 1.3%. 1.3! But then, only thanks to the efforts of struggles of women's moment, you see a steady rise, not a big rise, but a steady rise, in the representation. And when we came to 2015, 2015, we reached 14% or around 15%. And today it is 17%. This is one of the lowest, I guess, in OECD countries, and is low compared to other countries, and has been the most important indicator of gender inequality in Turkey. Education and health issues are not so bad, but the employment rates of women and their participation in politics are alarmingly low in Turkey. This is at the National Assembly level. When you look at the municipal level, it is worse.

The participant is a political scientist who was forced into early retirement. Her observation is supported by empirical data and is consistent with the literature: the percentage of women in the Turkish parliament was around "17%", "one of the lowest, I guess, in OECD countries". She recognizes the "steady rise" in women's representation, although "not a big rise", but attributes it to the women's movement (she revealed at the beginning of the interview that she has "been a part of the feminist movement from very early times" and has "been always in the movement, in many ways"). In any case, even though the subjectivity of her feminist and activist identity may call this argument into question, the literature also praises the women's movement (and other factors) for this achievement. At the local level, also according to empirical data, she recognizes that these figures are even lower (around 11% of councillors and 3% of mayors). The expression "alarmingly low" reinforces the negative rating with which she assesses women's political and labour market participation in Turkey.

Figure 12. Screenshot 7 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

22 October 2022

Representation and participation: a confident approach

I'm 32 and remember my childhood times when there were fewer women in politics, fewer women ministries, and fewer women in political life. I think it's much better right now. I don't know the women's participation rates, but I think we see many women being our voice and before it was a more man-dominated system. The people of every high rank were men. Now we see women being ministers or party leaders, and they're in the government and municipality structure. So, it's getting better now, but I hope much for our country.

There is a division between the pre-AKP and the AKP era, with the latter reinforced by the increase in representation. There is no reference, e.g., to the women's movement, pro-Kurdish parties, or EU demands. I'm not sure if she means women in general or those with whom she shares points of convergence (veiled women, closeness to gender justice, public servants...) when she says "our voice". As she reinforces that there are "many women" and as AKP deputies represent around 40% of women MPs, it could be a reference, especially because she mentions that "we see women being ministers", ignoring that the rate of women in ministerial positions is around 6%, so unlike the percentage of MPs, it does not represent a signable increase compared to the previous period. I believe that when she refers to "ministers" and the "municipality structure", she refers to Fatma Şahin, the mayor of Gaziantep elected by the AKP (2014-) and former Minister of Family and Social Policy. Since there is no empirical support for some claims, I suppose that the rise in this sense of representation is due more to some political figures' responsiveness than to representativeness. Another political figure that the participant may be alluding to, although it seems less likely to me, is Meral Akşener. She is a party leader (IYI Parti) and was a minister during the first Islamic government.

Figure 13. Screenshot 8 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

On the participants, one must consider that Alev is one of the Academics for Peace who signed the petition “We Will Not Be a Party to This Crime” demanding the end of state violence in Southeast Anatolia. Regarding Simone, because she is a public servant, she did not feel “comfortable saying anything about her political views”. Both discuss women's participation in politics, which they think is mandatory. However, while Alev described women's participation in politics as “alarmingly low”, Simone considered that it is “much better” and there are “many women being our voices”. This means that different agencies (citizens/women) relate differently to the structure (state/regime) as different experiences develop different interpretations of the same phenomenon.

Empirically, Alev is right that women's participation is low, as this is easily proven when Turkey is compared to its OECD and European counterparts. Moreover, stating that “now we see women being ministers”, as Simone said, is a hyperbolized expression, given that the country has not had a constant growth in this field as has happened with women's participation in Parliament. However, this does not deny that Simone feels represented as it comes from the responsiveness that she finds in how representatives encourage her interests and not because they resemble her. More than being present, representation entails taking on the role of speaking up for other women. This aids in making two inferences.

Firstly, representation is a matter of responsiveness rather than representativeness; and secondly, veiled women identify forms of representation that unveiled women ignore or reject. The veil, which has always been used as a political tool by Turkish politicians, is more significant than religion itself in this context as it serves as “a symbol of polarization”. It served as a pariah for the early Republic's modernization, backed a sense of victimhood in the 1990s, and was exploited by the AKP in the 2000s. “The end of the headscarf ban was a gift from the AKP to Muslim women, encouraging them to vote for the AKP. It is a very natural result of Muslim women's long struggle, and we paid the price”, stated a veiled participant. This is covered in several interviews, and all the veiled participants, except two, mentioned the veil ban. Fatma assumed that “when it was proposed [be an AKP founding member], I accepted because we had said, after the Refah Party closure, that we would fight for the headscarf issue”. It is true that at the time of the semi-structured interviews, most of the veiled women said they did not feel represented by the AKP and criticized it, but only one said she was considering voting for the CHP, the face of Turkey's secular establishment. The remainder of those who declared their intention to vote said that they would support either DEVA or HDP.

Alev is significantly more representative of the participants because the vast majority of them acknowledge that they do not feel represented in the Turkish parliament (except by members of the

opposition), but Simone raises a tension that is important for understanding the structural problems that inspire women's representation in Turkish politics. Also, despite the CHP dominating participants' party identification, no veiled participants came out as CHP supporters.

5.2. Economy

Of all OECD member states, Turkey has the lowest women's employment rate (32.8%), with 34.9% of women's participation in the labour force and a 13.1% unemployment rate. The ones appearing next, however, present much higher rates, as is the case of Costa Rica (41.3%), Italy (44.8%), and Greece (45.5%). The gap is higher when we compare Turkey to the countries having higher labour force participation of women, such as Iceland (84.7%), the Netherlands (82.5%), and Switzerland (80.7%). The gender pay gap increased, and men earn 31.4 per cent more than women, which is meaningly higher than the global average of 20 per cent and raises gender-distributive concerns. Turkey is at the bottom of the OECD regarding the trends in the gender gap in employment rates among youths, and women embody 66 per cent of the illiterate in the country.

Like the previous section, the analysis is based on Walby's (2009) definition of economy, so in addition to public gender relations, we consider state-sponsored actions to improve women's lives and private gender relations involving domestic or care work. Moreover, we also consider the concept of education, not only because we are based on Kessler-Harris' (2003) categorization of economic citizenship, which includes access to education, but also because education is a social elevator with the capacity to promote women's economic autonomy. For this reason, in the domain of the economy, two categories are considered: economics and education. Regarding the economy, we consider 6 concepts related to gender public relations, that is, (non-)participation in the market, (under-)representation in the market, economic (non-) autonomy, feminization of precarious work, gender (im)balance in management positions, and the gender pay gap. Moreover, we consider the welfare state and household. Concerning education, we highlight two concepts: educational reform and religious schools. The interdependence between the categories of economy and education is well illustrated in Figure 14 and Figure 15:

I22: Considering that half of the population in Turkey is women, their participation in the labour force is less than half of that of men and high women's unregistered employment is still an issue. If we take into account the negative effects caused by the pandemic, we see women are affected much worse because the industries that involve women employees and entrepreneurs are the most affected.

I: And what challenges remain?

I22: Firstly, domestic care comes to the front as a challenge for many women who want to work. Secondly, the lack of education and skills shows its effect while searching for jobs. Lastly, those factors can be mentioned for working women: unregistered employment, unfair salaries, lack of support regarding child/elderly care, and discouragement.

I – Do you think there are still barriers to women's education?

I22 – Yes, especially in some disadvantaged regions, many girls are deprived of schooling. This is applied to children in general, but girls are the first to be left behind when a family can afford the schooling of a limited number of children. Moreover, many girls face the possibility of never getting back to school after lockdown measures are over. Economic barriers are very important for women's education.



Figure 14. Screenshot 9 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

I16: Turkey has the lowest women's labour market participation among the OECD states and the Mediterranean region. I think it is a major issue and why are they not participating in the labour market? Because there are many structural reasons for that, including the structure of the labour market and the care responsibilities of women that have not received enough public recognition. I think it's a major issue, but also women's access to education, because what we see is that when women are graduated, their participation in the market increases, so these two go hand in hand. One of the major issues also is to get the girls to receive equal education as boys. At the primary level, the gap has been closed, but after secondary school, that gap, at the high school level, that gap is high.



Figure 15. Screenshot 10 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

There is a general awareness among participants that women's participation in the market is low. When asked about the causes, the majority of participants concur that taking care of the home and other domestic responsibilities are the main factors. Only one of the participants who discuss this subject, Simone, offers another perspective, arguing that "is easier for men [to get a job] because women are more psychologically and physically fragile". Other issues that women are concerned about include the gender pay gap and feminization of precarious work, given the high presence of women in the informal sector. At least ten participants expressed concern about the first, while nine emphasized the second. At least three of them – the MP Sera Kadıgil, the professor of political science Gia, from Istanbul, and the retired professor of economics Joana — bared concerns about both.

Some of these women recognized an upper-middle PIA, saying they were in "a privileged position". This, however, does not deny her empathy for women from lower socioeconomic classes. Moreover, the three Kurdish participants revealed a broad social awareness. Despite having a high PIA, one of them showed a strong awareness of women's economic situation in Turkey, suggesting possible

ethnicity-class connections. However, as two of them are HDP MPs, given their socialist bases, it also seems to reveal an ideological stance.

The MP Rita, who defined herself as a “social democrat”, speaks for other voters but is also aware of this. She said that the economic situation of women in the country is conditioned by “the high ratio of unemployment that takes women out of the workforce. Also, some employers don't want women to work with them because of their marriage leave or because they get pregnant and have to rest”. Rita is the only one to mention the marriage leave, which shows the patriarchal basis of the legal code. Although Article 2 of Labor Law No. 4857 calls for a 3-day marriage leave for both women and men, it also offers a woman employee who requests a 6-month unpaid leave. The MP said that "in academic life or white-collar jobs, like teachers or doctors, there are many women, but in some low segments, we see that women are working just in gardens or something like that, without insurance". This means that not only is unemployment a gender issue, but it is also a problem that mainly affects women from the lower social classes. As a result, these women are at greater risk of experiencing gender inequality. Nevertheless, “even some educated women are housewives because social roles determine that a woman should take care of kids, cook, and clean”, Rita said. This is in line with Ayşe’s explanation that “education in conservative circles is not necessarily for women to participate in the labour force, but to be good mothers, good wives, good citizens, and good believers”. “We see they have not promoted women to go out and work”, she assumed. Additionally, these statements by Rita and the Kurdish MPs seem to be in line with what Young (2000) defined as “feminist awareness”.

Empirical data supports the stance that education is the primary strategy for improving women's low rates of market participation. As Inês 16 noted, “When women are graduated, their participation in the market increases”, so girls’ education can be seen as a gender redistributive policy. Within that particular category, we prioritize the ideas of Education Reform and religious schools; the following memo was selected as an example of both (Figure 16). This memo presents a pattern, a tension, and a singularity.

20 December 2022

Education, the Kurds, and the villages

There are many reasons for restrictions on girls' education. Firstly, social society and equal opportunity, particularly for the Kurdish side of the cities because they cannot receive an education in their mother Kurdish language. Secondly, economic reasons. There are social roles, and when families are forced to make decisions, girls are the first to drop out of school. And, thirdly, this 4+4+4 system. After four years of learning to write and read, a girl can get married, have children, and have to be at home. In Mardin, between March and April, they go to some Anatolian cities as seasonal workers, and because of that, not just girls but also boys, can't receive an education. They have to work because of the economic structure. In recent years, there were also some cases of child rape in dormitories. Because there are no schools in some villages, these kids have to go to some far cities and live in dormitories. There are state-funded institutions where there have been child violations, and, similar to femicide, no one has been punished, especially with regard to religious foundations. Because of that, families get nervous and don't want their children to go somewhere like there. I don't know if you heard about Gülistan Doku. She was a student in Dersin and she disappeared 901 days ago. And no one found her, the government didn't find her because it supports her murderer. We don't know if she was murdered or kidnapped, but they couldn't find her.

The participant begins and ends her answer with a reference to the Kurdish issue - she begins by highlighting the issue of the Kurdish language and ends with a reference to Gülistan Doku. Among the hundreds of cases that occur in Turkey every year, she mentioned a Kurdish victim. Just like a veiled participant we met the previous day made a reference to a veiled femicide victim. I'm not sure if this is a trend, but it would be interesting to look back on earlier interviews to see if this occurs more frequently and if secular women show a similar tendency. What she is thinking about when she says "We don't know"? We who? The Kurdish community? Women? MPs? Two core topics, in addition to the opposition to Education Reform and the reference to class as a condition of these experiences (aspects shared by many participants), are references to child abuse and portraying the educational situation in Southern Anatolia (Mardin). This advances the understanding of the educational systems in the poorest and most rural spaces.

Figure 16. Screenshot 11 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

The pattern is a source of concern for several participants and is related to the Education Reform, also known as the 4+4+4 system. By allowing parents to choose home education after the first four years of school, especially in the poorest areas, girls are the first to drop out. This happens mainly due to the role of patriarchy in social norms. As Carolina, a content manager from Eskişehir understood, "One of the biggest obstacles preventing girls from attending school regularly is the burden of domestic labour and care"[98], which assumes that “boys have to study to have jobs that allow them to support their families, contrary to girls, who will be housewives”, mentioned another participant.

The tension stems from the reference to Kurdish language teaching. Only one of the three Kurdish participants, the MP Ebru Günay, addressed this topic as a gender issue[99]. This is not to say that other Kurdish participants would not have similar concerns; however, they did not see it as a

[98] Carolina (fictitious name). Participant 52. Online Interview. Istanbul-Eskişehir. 14 July 2022.
[99] Ebru Günay. Participant 30. Interview. Ankara. 24 June 2022.

gender issue. Nevertheless, by focusing the issue on the Kurdish language, it is the participant herself who seems to push the gender issue into the background. For instance, another Kurdish participant, the MP Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit, explained that Kurdish girls are the ones who are most denied the opportunity to receive an education as girls' illiteracy is higher in Southeast Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia is mainly populated by Kurds[100]. In this case, ethnicity and class both impact gender issues. However, Ebru seems to be assuming that as the illiteracy rate among girls is higher in Southeast Anatolia and Kurds are most of the population, Kurdish language instruction is the most excluded.

The state of education in the poorest, most rural areas, primarily in Southeast Anatolia, is the singularity. Many participants, including housewife Benedita, former UN advisor Gökçe, and Istanbul advertiser Vera[101], are aware of the challenges that girls in Southeast Anatolia face when attempting to exercise their right to an education. Nonetheless, Ebru was elected from Mardin and reports on the province, focusing on abuse and child labour.

The second code shown is religious schools, and among the participants who highlight it, there is a pattern of how the expansion of religious schools has political-religious concerns, and "most families, especially those from lower socioeconomic groups, have no option other than to send their children to these religious schools". "They [girls/children] have to go to religious schools because rather than opening public schools, they [the government] just open religious schools", argued Irem, a teacher and a women's rights activist from Istanbul[102]. Empirical data showing a 20-fold increase in the number of Imam Hatip institutions (from 65,000 to 1.3 million) from 2002 to 2018 provide evidence for this ongoing increase in the number of religious schools (Yilmaz, 2022). In any case, Irem's opinion contrasts with Simone's views. The preschool teacher praises the education in her province, highlighting the education of mothers:

> Girls' education has not recently faced any problems, mostly in Gaziantep. The Gaziantep mayor is a woman and supports education for women and children [a reference to Fatma Şahin, a former AKP MP]. She always supports education, especially for mothers. There are libraries, and she arranges courses and seminars. Near cities were shocked when they heard that. Gaziantep is getting better at women's education.

Given the understanding of women's issues as maternal issues, Simone's interview is frequently mentioned as a point of contrast to her counterparts. Throughout the interview, she never discloses an anti-feminist position, demonstrating outrage at the cases of femicide and defending the political

[100] Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit. Participant 39. Interview. Ankara. 1 July 2022.
[101] Vera (fictitious name). Participant 45. Interview. Istanbul. 8 July 2022.
[102] Irem. Participant 44. Interview. Istanbul. 7 July 2022.

participation of women, but seems to share a vision of women limited by gender norms. Simone's remarks appear to support the AKP's view of the family as an alternative to womanhood, in which women are mainly acknowledged as mothers and wives while having restricted access to the public sphere. This does not imply that women are excluded from the job market. The priority, however, is being a mother and a wife because, as Erdoğan stated, "being a mother is the highest position". Using the same approach can aid in understanding Simone's claims that the physical condition of women is a contributing factor to unemployment. In that speech, Erdoğan said that "physiques are different", so "you cannot place a mother breastfeeding her baby on an equal footing with men". "You cannot make women work in the same jobs as men do, as in communist regimes. You cannot give them a shovel and tell them to do their work. This is against their delicate nature"[103], he argued. Consequently, there might be a possible benevolent sexism related to her remarks.

5.3. Sexuality and Intimacy

In terms of intimacy and sexuality, the gender regime continues to oppose women-friendly policies (procedures promoting women's health by treating them with dignity and respecting their bodies and choices) and CEFMU is still perpetuated in some provinces. According to the international network Girls Not Brides (2018), 15% of girls in the country get married before 18; however, this may not accurately reflect the scope of the problem because most child marriages are unrecorded[104]. It is the second worst OECD country in this field, only surpassed by Mexico (21%). Among women aged 20-49, one in five was married underaged (UNFPA, 2020).

There are several gaps in care for contraception, family planning, STIs, and abortion (only 3.4% of state hospitals provide unrestricted abortion services). The unmet need for family planning had been declining steadily until 2013 (6%), but the findings show that it has suddenly risen to 12% in 2018, reverting to levels of the 1990s (UNFPA, 2020: 3). The unmet need for fertility restrictions affects 1 million women and 30% of married women don't use any form of contraception (UNFPA, 2020: 6). This issue affects all women, but it is especially difficult for uneducated women, who are three times more likely than well-educated women, according to the UNFPA report. Moreover, poor women are also more exposed to these problems, as they do not have the economic means to pay for them. The

[103] AFP. (2014). "Erdoğan: 'Women not equal to men'". The Guardian. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/24/turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-women-not-equal-men.
[104] Girls Not Brides. (2018). Turkey. Girls Not Brides. Available at https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-atlas/regions-and-countries/turkey/.

category of sexuality and intimacy refers to Walby's (2009) institutional domain of civil society (education, sexuality, and intimacy). However, in this analysis, education is part of the category of the economy. We selected this label for that reason. This category analyzes citizenship experiences beyond the public sphere (intimate citizenship), and in addition to noting sexual rights, it also strains concepts related to intimacy. Bodily (non-)autonomy, contraception, women's health, marriage, and divorce are the concepts we identified under this heading. In addition, six lower-level concepts are recognizable: alimony, child marriage, c-sections, the HPV vaccine, pap smears, and abortion.

We stress the presence of three groups of participants in this category. The first one is the majority group and presents a critical position regarding this category while focusing on the rise of private/domestic forms of exclusion. This group frequently criticizes the AKP's stance in this field and has similar views on topics like abortion, divorce, and bodily (non-) autonomy. The latter covers a range of issues, such as husbands forbidding pap smears or doctors declining to prescribe contraceptives to single women. Moreover, they have favourable views of alimony, contending that the one who is "harmed by divorce", mostly when she/he was devoted to "having children and taking care of them", should not be denied economic autonomy. Figure 17 depicts this group:



Figure 17. Screenshot 12 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

Like Figure 17, Figure 18 shows several concepts related to the category of sexuality and intimacy.



Figure 18. Screenshot 13 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

The second group tends to show an opinion established from the legal framework. In other words, they are not aware that family planning does not apply to all women, or that, for example, despite legal, divorce and abortion are becoming increasingly difficult to access in Turkey. They provide insight into the subject and even point out cultural limitations, but because they only focus on the legal framework, they do not differentiate between legislation and implementation. This perspective is well illustrated by the statements of Burçak Başbuğ Erkan, a founding and boarding member of the GP from Ankara, and Olga, an academic from Ankara as well. They are well-educated women, vote for opposition (the conservative GP and centre-left CHP), and have an upper-middle and middle PIA, respectively. Burçak acknowledged that some women live in patriarchal families, which limits bodily autonomy, but does not acknowledge public hospitals' refusal to perform abortions, saying, "Nobody forces them not to have an abortion". The same occurs with Olga, who expressed, "There are all kinds of rights and opportunities" while contrarily recognizing that "generally, men decide":

> Nobody forces them [women] to give three or four births, nobody forces them not to have an abortion. There's a kind of freedom and I think we're lucky that way. But we are a paternal society where fathers and grandfathers are very important figures in the family, especially in Anatolia and small villages. In rural towns, there is still a system where man has more power and authority but educated women from Metropolitan cities like Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul can make their own decisions.[105]

> I think there is no problem concerning reproductive and sexual rights. There are all kinds of rights and opportunities. C-sections, abortion, contraception... Everything is legal. You know, abortion is still a controversial issue in America, not in Turkey. But of course, it depends on whether you want an abortion or contraception, and generally, men decide.[106]

[105] Burçak Başbuğ Erkan. Participant 8. Online interview. Braga-Ankara.5 February 2021.
[106] Olga (fictitious name). Participant 24. Online interview. Braga-Sivas. 12 October 2021.

Finally, the third and smallest group, with only two participants, praised reproductive women's and sexual health policies. Similarly, they are based on the analysis of maternal health and lower-level concepts outside this area, such as the HPV vaccine or pap smears, are not mentioned. Simone said, "Mothers' and children's health care is good in Turkey". She mentioned that "it was very bad, but it's getting better". "In some provinces, we have little hospitals with one or two doctors, which are good for taking care of mothers and children". Likewise, Ruhsar Demirel, a former MHP MP and doctor, said that "there is no problem with reaching health services in Turkey":

> For more than 30 years, I have been in the healthcare structure in Turkey. Most women and children use health services in Turkey. Before pregnancy, during pregnancy, to give birth... women always use health services. Contraception is mostly free in the country for both men and women, and there are no problems in health services. In Turkey, you can reach it easily. There is no problem with reaching health services in Turkey[107].

The fact that the three groups identified don't share a sociodemographic profile seems crucial to emphasize. True, Kurdish participants are very critical of this category, but no such link is found in terms of class or religion. Although religion denotes one of the main pillars of support for Erdoğan, some religious women have taken a critical stance regarding this category. For example, Rümeysa revealed that "reproductive and sexual rights are getting worse because, although abortion is not banned in Turkey, it's not really implemented", and "is not possible for women to reach their right to abortion". This is Fatma's situation as well, who empathically shares the experience of a secular friend in the following excerpt, highlighting the consequences of promoting citizenship limited to private space:

> I have a friend who is a mechanic and experienced discrimination because of being a woman. The truth is, I have heard that the perspectives of the new elite about women are very discriminatory against secular women too. She complained about discrimination. She said that not wearing a headscarf prevented her from getting the job. She is a secular woman, and now, this is a bad thing for women. She thinks that the elite's perception of women is only to be a wife and a mother at home. The discourse is that women must be and stay at home and obey.

Such an example of sisterhood places feminism and the advocacy for women's rights side by side with other concepts of "locating the self". This is not to say religions' traditionalist and patriarchal foundations are ignored (the president himself often mentions the status attributed to women by Islam), but rather that women's political positions are not determined by whether or not they wear a veil. The

[107] Ruhsar Demirel. Participant 36. Interview. Ankara.28 June 2022.

interview with Laura provided a concluding example of this parallelism. She explained that this stance is not caused by religion (Islamic_Muslim) but rather by a perception of "Islam as a political belonging" (Islamism/Political Islam). Laura is 28, "was born in a radical Muslim family", and her parents are "intellectual Islamist activists". The participant "grew up in a very doctrinal family environment" and learnt "to behave like a girl, to be silent". "In the very beginning, I was defining myself as a Muslim feminist" "but now I'm just a feminist woman". It's not the veil covering her hair that prevents her from declaring that "body topics", including restrictions on "abortion and sexual rights", are one of the biggest problems women face in Turkey.

5.4. Violence

> A woman once said, "This is not our land or country, but it is the country or the land of those who would like to kill us". Sometimes, I feel like that. I feel like it is not my country, but it's the country of those who would like to kill us, me, or people like me.[108]

Femicide murders more than a woman a day in Turkey, with cases rising from 67 in 2008 to 403 in 2022[109]. The victims' divorce and desire to divorce are the main motivations behind femicides. 40 per cent of women have been subjected to physical and sexual violence in the country, and it is the OECD state where the most women report having suffered IPV (38%)[110].

A gender regime assumes a private/domestic form when the violence maintained by the perpetrators is not regulated by the state, regarding another category in which we draw on Walby's (2009) framework, this time from the institutional domain of violence. Turkey has never regularly emphasized victim assistance, but by stressing the criminalization of violence by the ratification of the Istanbul Convention and Law No. 6284, it moved closer to a neoliberal public gender regime. However, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention in 2021 was a setback in the prevention of gender-based violence, protection of victims, and prosecution of perpetrators, and got the country close to private/domestic gender regimes. In this category, we study the concepts of femicide, IPV, and so-called honour crimes. Figure 19 presents a memo where we discuss this issue:

[108] Helena (fictitious name). Participant 14. Online interview. Braga-Ankara. 7 April 2021.
[109] See footnote 15.
[110] OECD. (2019). *Violence against women*. OECD. Available at https://www.oecd.org/gender/vaw.htm.

10 November 2021

Violence(s) and the premodern state

I'm not just talking about physical violence, although it's a huge problem. Men are killing women, and the numbers are increasing. There are many reasons for this, such as patriarchal politics, anti-feminist attacks, and because they feel there are not going to be any consequences. They get a lot of amendments or, you know, these men, they say they did it for jealousy, etc., and they get reductions in sentences. Then, they feel like not much is going to happen to them and continue doing it. Gender inequality is at the basis of gender-based violence, but, as I said, I don't just refer to physical violence, but also emotional abuse, psychological violence, economic violence, and not being able to use your own money, not having a say over the family budget.

She highlights various forms of violence and the political responsibilities of femicide. The participant highlights, similar to a report published by the OECD, the use of perpetrators of arguments against victims to reduce sentences. This discredits the victim, violates their dignity, and normalizes violence due to the perpetrators' sense of impunity. Additionally, it places the state in a premodern position because the conceptual framework contends that a state cannot be considered modern until all crimes against women are fully criminalized. She also makes a reference to economic issues that could give rise to lower-level concepts, such as economic violence or economic (non-) autonomy.

Figure 19. Screenshot 14 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

The participant blamed the government for the violence in Turkey, given the lack of actions against perpetrators ("they feel that there are not going to be any consequences" and "feel like not much is going to happen to them"). There are several participants who disagree with the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention (contrarily, none said to support the decision), saying that "it's terrible. It is very catastrophic", "a very unfortunate announcement, and an unfortunate decision". They agree that "the Convention was not turned into practice from the very beginning, but it has succeeded in constructing a norm to struggle with violence against women", said Laura, while another participant noted that the "Istanbul Convention is about violence, and it wasn't sufficiently politically applied". Diana considered, "They didn't honour the Convention and there was always some problem, but it gave women a legal framework to hold the government or its institutions accountable", while Elif Ege raised a few questions and did not understand the decision behind the withdrawal, "How do the government identify the Convention as something that destroys the family?" Because it "gives women equal rights in terms of participation in public space?" "In terms of women's rights within the family, not just in public spaces, but in private spaces as well?".

The prospects in this category are generally consistent with the literature on so-called honour crimes (Sakallı-Uğurlu and Akbaş, 2013), which links such behaviours to the perception of honour as part of the ideal of masculinity threatened by women's empowerment. Furthermore, participants agree with the literature (Brownridge, 2009) that identifies divorce as one of the leading causes of femicide.

Olga, for example, commented that "the biggest reason why women are killed is to divorce or act as if they want a divorce", and Sera said that women are being murdered "just because they don't obey their husbands. Just because they want a divorce from their husbands. Even though they got divorced, they got killed". IPV, femicide, gender-based violence, and so-called honour crimes are naturally linked, which the participants identified several times. This articulation is depicted in the following excerpts from interviews with Alev, Elif Ege, and Diana, respectively:

> [The biggest threat] is gender violence. (...) It's the femicide problem. Violence against women mostly takes place within the domestic sphere, so this is a real domestic problem. There is a systematic killing of women by their intimate partners, husbands, ex-husbands, lovers... this is a problem within intimate relations. This is the most important problem because it is the bloodiest problem.

> Violence is a big issue in Turkey. Violence against women is a very prevalent issue. This has been the case for a long time, but it has become much more visible right now and there are much more areas around it. That's why it became more and more top over agenda.

> One of the most acute ways in which being a woman in Turkey can have an impact on your, on your life, is your safety, your physical safety, because you can be subjected to domestic violence. I have been subjected to domestic violence in my previous marriage. It didn't matter how educated my ex-husband was. You can be harassed on the streets; you can face discrimination at work (...) it depends on how conservative your family values are, your family relationships, how conservative your parents raise you, and how conservative your husband is. All these things, culturally and economically, have different impacts.

Participants also make connections between violence and other categories, primarily the economy, as can be inferred from some of the preceding excerpts. Some of them even developed connections with the nature of the political regime, theorizing the phenomenon of gendering de-democratization. This was the case of Gökçe, who established a correlation between political (e.g., authoritarianism) and gender (e.g., the patriarchal world) causal conditions and violence. She pointed to violence as the primary manifestation of gender inequality and introduced the topic of insecurity as one of the consequences of violence (Figure 20):



Figure 20. Screenshot 15 from the grounded theory analysis in NVivo

Violence is the most prominent manifestation of gender inequality, and it also serves as the best example of how Turkey has regressed in the public/private continuum and how forms of exclusion have grown in the country. Similarly, gender-based violence is the category in which the participants are most united, and not a single participant fails to recognize it.

Therefore, as gendered de-democratization grows, the gap between women's prospects decreases. However, this did not prevent feelings of representation and closeness. After reflecting on the memo represented in Figure 16, we analyzed all the references made to cases of femicide and related them to the category of "locating the self". In fact, not only did Kurdish women present examples of Kurdish victims, but also veiled women reported veiled victims and unveiled women identified unveiled ones. This does not permit us to create any correlation with religion, given that many religious women do not wear a veil, but it establishes another case point on representation.

5.5. Discussion

Although there is significant literature on 1) gender regimes and 2) the de-democratization of the Turkish political regime, this study stands out because it examines the phenomenon of gendering de-democratization, thereby linking the two fields of study. A theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey was constructed through qualitative analysis of interviews with 53 participants. This model produces a coherent framework centred on their constructs about the

phenomenon and identifies the diffusion process strategies and the consequences on women's experiences of citizenship.

A variety of political and gender issues set the stage for the phenomenon of "gendering de-democratization". The relationship between the regime's de-democratization and opposition to gender equality can be explained by the non-autonomy and lack of empowerment experienced by women, the state's control over them, indoctrination, and political polarization. As the participants underlined, this is induced by intervening conditions such as religion, cultural practices, identity, and the ruling party's political agenda. Women's experiences of de-democratization are controlled by a specific context made by economic, political, and intimate issues. Thus, not all women are equally exposed to the phenomenon, as different experiences provide other realities. Even without imposing pre-existing categories, as the socioeconomic profile of the participants was considered, the intersectional approach gave a more in-depth understanding of these experiences.

The present analysis is congruent with Fraser's (1995b; 1996; 1997; 2003; 2005) and Walby's (2009: 2020) theorizations. Most of the participants in the study are aware of the costs of unequal distribution, lack of recognition, and low representation when exercising their citizenship. This study also shows, in line with Walby's findings, that such a gap produces inequality in four domains, which affects women's daily practices, acts, and experiences. Most participants, however, emphasized that women's economic non-autonomy is primarily caused by non-participation in the market. Furthermore, they related this lower-level concept to other analytical categories, such as violence, which produced findings in line with the studies by Anderberg et al. (2016). This evidence questions the role of SRT for gender equality and proposes full employment as a redistributive economic gender policy: it is up to states to promote women's participation in the market. Also, among proposals for gender justice, the findings of the present analysis disagree with criticism of women in decision-making positions. This seems to be a case point for gender equality since it is responsiveness, more than representativeness, that produces a feeling of representation. In this instance, gender equality studies may find representation studies to be a valuable ally.

A third and final piece of evidence that questions the existing literature, in this instance, Walby's argument, is that the Turkish gender regime did not follow the private-public continuum. It will be suitable to study other non-democratic regimes to better understand the phenomenon as the evidence suggests that the literature did not predict the de-democratization of gender regimes. Is the Turkish gender regime's regression on the continuum exclusive, or is it a pattern shared by other de-democratization processes?

Following feminist concerns about recommendations for advancing gender equality, we propose an eight-step model for gender equality in Turkey based on the categories that emerged from this study. Firstly, the way to advance gender equality is by carrying out strategies promoting the representation of all women. This comprises representativeness, responsiveness, and women's presence in decision-making positions. As the data suggests, representation is not only ensured by representativeness but also by the responsiveness of women in decision-making positions. Thus, this assumes that more women take on key government positions and ministerial positions. The greater the representativeness, the greater the responsiveness and the legitimization of women's leadership.

In second place, gender equality depends on gender-redistributive policies promoting full employment and public secular education. This must be accompanied by the promotion of a two-breadwinner family model and by the establishment of public childcare facilities that generate the required conditions for the stability of this model. Policies such as parental leave in replacement of maternity leave can, like symbolic representation, not only increase women's participation in the public sphere but also contribute to altering social gender norms and legitimizing women in the political and economic space. Furthermore, it's critical to keep in mind that respect for all religions and secular education are prerequisites for the growth of the democratic process when considering the fifth step of this proposal, public secular education.

Third, we propose bodily autonomy, safety, and recognition. This requires an acceptance of 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship', which promotes not only women's political (representation) and economic (redistribution) citizenship but also intimate citizenship (divorce, family planning, HPV vaccination...). This calls for a wide range of public policy changes supporting women-friendly policies. A strong effort against gender-based violence that punishes perpetrators and protects the victims could be the first step, along with an effective implementation of the abortion law. In a world where the advancement of women's rights is under scrutiny, it is critical to remember that sexual rights are a component of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These findings offer a theoretical and analytical framework to promote gender equality and democratization of the gender regime in Turkey.

5.6. Conclusion

The gender regime in Turkey is the main topic of this chapter, which also attempted to contextualize the participants' reports of private/domestic forms of exclusion. Additionally, we demonstrated in this

chapter how women's prospects compare to or differ from those of the analytical concepts and categories and how the gendering de-democratization affects women differently, depending on the context. This chapter exposed how semi-structured interviews' qualitative analysis revealed several patterns in the interpretations of these women. However, it also highlighted some singularities and tensions, revealing how the experiences they are exposed to influence how they observe the gender regime.

In this chapter, we examined the four institutional domains proposed by the theorization of gender regimes. More specifically, in the institutional domain of polity, we showed that there are many references to authoritarianism, calling the public form of the regime into question. According to the analysis, representation is mostly a matter of responsiveness, and veiled women seem to recognize forms of representation that unveiled women reject. On the subject of the institutional domain of economy, women's top concerns include the gender pay gap, feminization of precarious work, (non-)participation in the market, and educational reform, and there is a broad awareness among participants that poor women are more exposed to inequalities. The class has an impact on education, just like the economy, and Kurdish girls are the ones who lack access to it the most. Thus, ethnicity has an impact on how women experience citizenship, along with class and religion.

On the topic of sexuality and intimacy, the chapter identified three groups of participants. The first one exposed a critical stance, emphasized the rise of private/domestic forms of exclusion, and criticized official government positions on bodily autonomy, divorce, and abortion. The second, on the other hand, provides insight into the topic but only focuses on the legal framework and does not distinguish between legislation and implementation. Lastly, the third applauded the government and the country's sexual and reproductive health. Still in this category, two key conclusions about the lack of a sociodemographic trend in relation to religion were drawn: firstly, feminism has to be considered alongside other concepts that fall under the category of "locating the self"; second, the opposition to gender equality stems from a perception of Islam as a political belonging rather than from the religion.

Finally, the main point of convergence for women is present in the institutional domain of violence. The majority of participants were against the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, and many of them blamed the AKP for the prevalence of gender-based violence and femicides. Participants established connections between violence and other categories – mostly the economy – highlighting the significance of economic autonomy for safety. As the most visible expression of inequality, it is the best example of how the regime's hybridity is turning to the private/domestic side.

Our eight-step model to promote gender equality in the country was based on the analysis conducted in the previous chapters. This is an attempt to respond to the identified private/domestic forms of exclusion, and it is hoped that it serves as a theoretical and analytical framework for the promotion of gender equality and the democratization of the gender regime in Turkey.

CONCLUSION

Drawing the link between de-democratization and opposition to gender equality

"Political regimes are founded on unequal power relations that shape experiences of citizenship". We are reusing the opening line as no other one took the main points of this research so well. On the one hand, we look at political regimes and conceptualize Turkey as an authoritarian competitive regime that controls the media, disrespects the judiciary, and advantages the incumbents over the opposition. Elections are neither free nor fair, but they are still competitive, allowing the opposition to challenge the political power. On the other hand, gender-unequal power relations have developed within institutions and structures of the political regime and settled a gender regime. As a result of gender power relations, or what is known as patriarchy, gender regimes restrict women to a variety of private/domestic forms of exclusion, constraining their experiences of citizenship. In Turkey, the gender regime has taken on a hybrid form, with rising private/domestic forms of exclusion. So, the less democratic the political regime, the more asymmetrical gender relations are. We concluded that not only is the political regime gender-oriented (gender regime), but it also has a gender vision of its citizens (gender nature of citizenship).

This gender nature of citizenship has raised concerns about women's exclusion from the public sphere, allowing for the development of alternative approaches to citizenship on the grounds of women's participation in civil society, politics, and the market. This approach served as the basis for 'gender-mainstreaming citizenship', in which we propose women's political representation and participation (political citizenship), participation in the labour market actively and equally (economic citizenship), and recognition on an intimate and sexual level (intimate citizenship). Additionally, the concept of gender regimes identifies a framework for the gender dynamics of political regimes and clarifies the functioning of states' political dynamics because it assumes a link between democracy and the public sphere and authoritarianism and domesticity. This means, we argued, that women's exclusion from the public sphere is linked to a non-democratic approach to polity.

It was asserted that states tended to develop along a private-public continuum, giving up forms of exclusion. However, the recent de-democratization of several political regimes has raised concerns on this perspective, challenging approaches to gender equality and calling into question UN SDG 5 on gender equality. This enabled us to comprehend why the continuum was not applied to Turkey and to generate new understandings of gender in non-democratic political regimes. We

contended that academia should work to both identify the phenomenon and advance methods for resolving the research problem. So, after identifying 'gendering de-democratization', we advise an eight-step strategy for advancing gender equality and develop a "theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey".

Main findings of the study

The main question of this thesis was, "How do women interpret the political regime in Turkey from a gender perspective?". This question was made in response to the growing academic discussion on gender inequality in non-democratic political regimes. We are witnessing a widespread backlash against gender equality, as well as a democratic backsliding affecting democracies that were once thought to be stable, so it is critical to understand the relationship between these two phenomena. Once a pioneer in granting some women citizenship rights, Turkey has the worst gender equality indicators among OECD and NATO counterparts, making the country a noteworthy case study in this field. Furthermore, two other questions were raised, including "How does the political regime locate itself regarding gender equality?" and "What restricts women's experiences of citizenship in Turkey?". These questions present a micro-meso-macro basis and seek to establish a relationship between women's experiences of citizenship, the gender regime, and the political regime.

We conducted the analysis grounded on these questions in Chapters 4 and 5. Previously, in Chapter 1, after identifying the theoretical framework, we proposed a new approach to critical feminism that results from the concepts that emerged from the data. This enabled us to develop a middle-range theory, which we expanded on in Chapters 4 and 5, arguing that women must achieve full employment to reach economic autonomy and responsive women in decision-making positions to represent other women., Chapter 3 contextualized early civic nationalism, Kurdish assimilation politics, and forced secularization since the establishment of the Republic to make sense of findings considering Turkish politics. This illustrates multiple things. Firstly, Islam came to represent the people in their fight against the repressive state as a symbol of victimization, a feeling that the AKP took advantage of. This counter-reaction was made possible by the instrumentalization of religion as a tool for diversity control. Furthermore, this explains why veiled women's support for the CHP is not a pattern, which can be a case point for understanding women's voting behaviours in Turkey.

Afterwards, in light of ‘gender-mainstreaming citizenship’, we studied women's prospects on the situation of the gender regime's domains conceptualized in Chapter 2. We analyzed how attributes affected how women felt about their citizenship and how the political de-democratization was experienced in the domains of the gender regime. In Chapter 2, we contended that there was a correlation among the domains, and in Chapter 5, we analytically explored this intersection based on the participants' reports. Because of the economic non-autonomy sustaining co-dependent and abusive relationships, we concluded this correlation is primarily expressive between the categories (or institutional domains) of violence and economy. Also, we concluded that there are a correlation between opposing gender equality and the nature of the political regime, as the participants usually recognize a loss and a threat to their rights over time. Additionally, what Fraser (1998) referred to as "subaltern counter-publics" are more likely to experience the consequences of the phenomenon of gendering de-democratization. Social groups that are antithetical to the state's ideal type, such as Kurdish women, are included in this group. Overall, the gender-biased structure of the regime kept women out of the public sphere. The indoctrination endorsing traditionalist and patriarchal ideologies and religious values and the control over women's bodies developed this approach.

This leads to the second finding: the political regime supported religious structures and institutionalized non-equal familialist social rules. The AKP's treatment of women gradually became more religiously conservative, and the family became the foundation of national unity, normalizing gender-based violence. That is, the family, which takes on the function of the unity of the nation, cannot be jeopardized by complaints of domestic violence. In the present case, women in abusive relationships are no longer protected by the state since upholding the traditional family is prioritized over the welfare of the individual. So, another strategy for spreading *gendering de-democratization*, polarization, is fundamental, as it supports a populist idealized view of women that discredits secular unveiled women. It would be wrong to assume that wearing a veil has a direct effect on one's exposure to violence; however, the discursive side-lining of unveiled secular women exposes them to a higher state's violence, stressing the state's failure to protect the victim. If the state condemns unveiled women because of their “assertive sexuality” (Cindoglu and Unal, 2016) and “provocation”, who are the victims and who are the perpetrators?

Third, we argued this authoritarian (first argument) and nationalist religious-conservative (second argument) stance has implications for care policies and is consistent with the ruling party’s economic policy. This is related to the last ideological political causal condition identified in Chapter 4, which is neoliberalism, along with Islamism, conservatism, nationalism, and populism. Because of the

lack of a public policy promoting gender equality and gender redistributive policies, women assume care responsibilities and are persuaded to leave the market. This may help explain the low participation of Turkish women in the market, and two findings may be highlighted. Firstly, the lack of public childcare facilities and the politics of flexibilization are often used as primary examples of the AKP's economic policy in the literature (Çavdar and Yaşar, 2019; (Dursun, 2019). Although the politics of flexibilization is a concept only identified by two participants of Profile 3, the lack of public childcare facilities is a category shared by a large majority of participants. As a result, we can conclude that participants value the welfare state and the government plays a significant role in advancing gender (in)equality.

Another finding is the fact that poor women are the ones who suffer the most from the AKP's gender economic policy, just as Kurdish women are more exposed to state authoritarianism. This is an outcome of two factors: they are underrepresented in the market and are the ones who rely on welfare state assistance the most. Poor women are the ones who are most deprived of their citizenship during the Gendered de-democratization, just as they were the ones who were primarily excluded from State feminism's modernization in the First Republic. It is among the lower social classes that women's participation in the market is lowest (economic citizenship); it is the poorest women who are most deprived of bodily autonomy and access to SRHR, given the impossibility of paying for these services (intimate citizenship); and it is poor women who are least represented on party lists, given the high costs for electioneering (political citizenship). This reinforced calls for full employment as a gender redistributive policy to promote women's economic autonomy. Moreover, it showed the contribution of participation in the market in other categories, such as sexuality and intimacy and polity.

The main finding that different agents interact differently with the same structure because they have different experiences of citizenship came from these claims. These findings supported Beauvoir's feminist existentialism since women's experiences are influenced by structural elements and attributes, including age, income, race, and religion, even though they are ontologically free. This research showed that, though, as 'gendering de-democratization' rises, this difference tends to shorten. This is evident in concepts related to the category of violence, as defined in Chapter 5. Moreover, the growing of gendering de-democratization has brought points of convergence among women, developing new acts of citizenship. This is often visible in references to sisterhood shared by participants who do not even share the previously mentioned attributes. This is mostly typical among feminists and advocates for women's rights, which led us to the conclusion that political gender stance may be considered an attribute in and of itself.

As such, looking at Turkish women's interpretation of the political regime from a gender perspective, there is a majority identification of the phenomenon of gendering de-democratization. They identify underrepresentation, non-recognition, dependency, and violence as consequences of this phenomenon, implying a direct response to the second research question: the political regime opposes gender equality. The third research question is also directly related to the previous ones: what restricts women's citizenship experiences in Turkey is 'gendering de-democratization'. This phenomenon is expanded by population indoctrination, social polarization, and gender control, and it is caused by political - Islamism, conservatism, neoliberalism, nationalism, populism, clientelism and authoritarianism - and gender issues - patriarchy, toxic masculinity and familialism. 'Gendering de-democratization' was developed in a specific context in the economy, education, violence, polity, and sexuality and intimacy, and its spreading is facilitated by the singularities of economic policies, laws governing education, and rules on gender-based violence. Other examples include the lack of gender quotas, the high cost of electioneering, non-implementation of the law on topics such as abortion, and legal amendments that make divorce challenging.

Originality and contributions of the study

This thesis is an attempt to address the gap in gender equality in non-democratic political regimes. Literature has argued that states evolve along a private-public continuum but did not explore the backlash against gender equality during de-democratization processes. The study seeks to analyze the link between the political regime and gender issues in Turkey while providing new insights into how gender relations, institutions, and structures influence women's experiences of citizenship in the country.

In addition, we believe that this thesis makes three additional significant contributions to the academic community. Firstly, it produces a discussion of gender and policymaking in Turkey. We present a detailed analysis of the political regime from the study of gender policies and women's experiences of citizenship. This gives us a better understanding of particular structural issues in Turkish politics and enables us to propose an eight-step strategy for advancing gender equality in Turkey. This strategy proposes safety, responsiveness, gender-redistributive policies, public secular education, and bodily autonomy. Also, it suggests representativeness, presence in decision-making positions, and recognition.

Second, it advances theoretical-methodological fields by fostering specialized knowledge of gender and politics. We work for a broader insight into political science and to opposite gender unrecognition, as "gender is still ignored in much academic political science" (Celis et al., 2013: 2). A research agenda that ignores women's political behaviour and methodological androcentrism are two examples of exclusionary political science analysis that we would like to help demolish. The theoretical contribution lies in developing a middle-range theory, producing a theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey, contributing to the debate on the relationship between equality and democracy, and theorizing hybrid gender regimes and women's experiences of citizenship through the collection and analysis of data. Moreover, the methodological contribution entails using an alternative epistemological basis that political science has not typically implemented. Thus, our feminist-grounded theory study combines originality with a contribution to the domains of feminism and grounded theory.

Thirdly, we produce new avenues of research on contemporary Turkish politics: the AKP era changed the republican paradigm, redefined the role of traditional divisions in Turkey, and the ruling party arose as an anti-gender and familialist authoritarian force based on a national-religious structure too complex to be limited to conventional cleavages. This does not mean that polarization has been dissolved. On the contrary, as the theoretical model for the situation and prospects of the gender regime in Turkey proposes, polarization is a strategy of 'gendering de-democratization'. The fault lines are so deep that it is hard to fully understand the dynamics of contemporary Turkish politics by limiting them to cleavages like secularism-Islamism, reformism-conservatism, and other dualisms of the centre-periphery division (educated-non-educated; Western-nationalist; urban-rural, etc.). Once the traditional right-wing had been disintegrated, the AKP standardized its parts by exposing counter-publics (Kurds, secularists, etc.) to the religious (Sunni Muslim) identity of the (Turkish) nation and politicizing gender. The non-democratic nature of the regime (e.g., control of the media, lack of judicial independence, unfair elections, etc.) aided this process, bringing Turkey closer to the global tendency that politicizes gender for nationalist purposes.

Turkey, which has one of its most male-dominated, sexist, and conservative legislatures – taking into account the election of 3 members of HÜDA-PAR members on the AKP list and 5 YRP candidates in 2023, both of which demand the elimination of Law No. 6284 and the restriction of women's participation in public life – needs a resistance that protects its few remaining democratic institutions. Women can be powerful agents of citizenship in this contest, whether they do so in the Parliament (party boards, MPs...), the streets (activists), or the polls (voters). The political regime has

made women one of its most marginalized groups, but they have the power to change it. This is confirmed by new acts of citizenship they created in response to gendering de-democratization.

Limitations and avenues for further research

Despite the fact that the study of women's prospects of the gender regime in Turkey significantly contributes to the literature on gender in non-democratic political regimes, middle-range theories remain limited in their ability to generalize to a broader range of phenomena. However, when middle-range theories are used as an end in themselves, they become functioning, and concepts emerging from the data become enough to be incorporated into broader theoretical frameworks.

Although this study considers a variety of social groups, we recognize that more attention on particular groups is required. First, we did not give ordinary women a sufficient platform to show their views on the political regime. These women are the only ones represented in mass interviews and represent everyday women living in Turkey who experience systems of inequality unrelated to those of the other participants. We remember that this study takes a non-essentialist approach, so one does not gain full ownership of a situation by experiencing it. Nevertheless, we admit that some points of view are more easily recognized by those women who experience the events. In any case, their representativeness was guaranteed, as it represents 24.5% (P.1) of the participants. The other profiles represent 28.3% (P.2), 26.4% (P.4) and 20.8% (P.3), ensuring the representation of each one of them. However, the representativeness of ordinary women ought to be higher as they cover a higher portion of society. This limitation was due to our lack of ability to interview an abundant sample because, as this profile represents unknown women in the public space, we were limited to personal contacts and snowball sample outcomes.

In addition to ordinary women, as every AKP member who was contacted either did not respond or declined to participate, we did not interview its policymakers. So, the MHP and the VP (the party supported Erdoğan's election in 2018, despite his refusal of the VP participation in the Alliance in 2023) were the only representatives of the People's Alliance. To address this limitation, we sought out ordinary women who supported the ruling party. In this process, we used personal contacts and the support of academics who had conducted interviews with a similar sample. Also, we only interviewed three Kurdish women. Due to the lack of their voices, we conducted interviews with the three participants in a way that sought a collective perspective without undermining each participant's

individuality. They revealed themselves to be three responsive women, so this strategy succeeded. The lack of participants from the Black Sea region may also be a sample limitation. During the fieldwork, some participants highlighted the role of these women in the subsistence of their families, so an avenue for future research may be a comparative study including our findings and the conclusions in that region. In any case, this research may portray secular women more accurately. However, thanks to the responsiveness of Kurdish women and the active participation of veiled women who do not identify themselves with the mainstream secular opposition, we believe we have managed to represent the diversity of women's experiences of citizenship in the country.

Another subject with which this study lacks a focus is the impact that the opposition to gender equality has on the political regime. Although the conceptualization of gender regimes itself suggests an intersection between the two domains, the categories that emerged more prominently during the fieldwork, however, went in the opposite direction, focusing on the effects of the political regime's de-democratization on gender equality. This was due to some factors, including the fact that the research questions and the objectives emphasize women's experiences of citizenship. For this reason, the phenomenon was theorized as gendering de-democratization with the purpose of using it as an ongoing process that engages in the dynamics and experiences of citizenship. This approach calls for additional research to understand the other side of the coin, which means the consequences of the opposition to gender equality in political regimes.

Finally, further research should investigate how women and civil society, who are (now) aware of the consequences of 'gendering de-democratization', produce strategies to change the situation and promote gender equality in non-democratic political regimes. This research does not ignore the constraints that the agent may encounter as a result of the political regime because it is based on an approach that balances the role of the agent and the structure. However, it opens space for further research to focus on women's acts of citizenship. New forms of participation and civil society can be important mechanisms in this promotion.

Despite the widespread concern about gender equality, we are still far from achieving it. We have come far, but we are far from getting there and have strayed from the path. The recent wave of authoritarian and reactionary politics, as well as global opposition to gender equality, have created a new phenomenon. Understanding the link between gender and the political phenomenon must, therefore, more than ever, be an object of study in political science. Putting gender on the research agenda develops new ways of understanding politics and aids in explaining current and upcoming complex phenomena. So, the field of gender and politics should be given more attention within political

science, even because it contributes to the body of knowledge on the distribution of power and offers specific recommendations to address the issues raised by the UN 2030 agenda.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 33 > 28 JUNE 2022

I – Interviewer (the researcher)

I33 – Interviewee (Kibar Daşcı Özdemir, women's rights activist)

INT – Interpreter (the assistant)

BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW

I – Kibar, our conversation is already being recorded. Could you please introduce yourself and let me know more about you?

INT – Kendinizi öncelikle bize biraz tanıtabilir misiniz? Sizin hakkınızda biraz fikir edinmek istiyor.

I27 – Ben 61 yaşındayım. Işletme mezunuyum, aynı zaman da kooperatif açık öğretim bölümünde, örgün öğretimde işletme yönetimi okudum Sütçü İmam Üniversitesinde. Bir 10 yıl kadar kamuda görev yaptım Devlet Su İşleri'nde. Daha sonra kendi iş yerlerimi kurdum ve tekstil alanında hazır giyim mağazam vardı ve iş elbiseleri imalâtı yaptım. Aktif siyasetle uğraştım. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nde uzun yıllar siyaset yaptım. İl ilçe yöneticiliği yaptım. İl yönetim kurulu üyeliği yaptım. 4 dönem kurultay delegeliği yaptım. Ankara'da genel merkez kadın kollarının parti meclis üyesiydim. 1999'da seçilmiş milletvekiliyim Kahramanmaraş'tan. Kurduğum sivil toplum örgütleri var kadın derneği, kadın girişimciler derneği, DİSK'e bağlı tekstil işçileri sendikasının da burada kurucu başkanlığını yaptığım Kadın Platformu'nun kurucu başkanlığını yaptım. Aynı zamanda Uçan Süpürge Kahramanmaraş temsilciliğini bir dönem yaptım. Şu Kahramanmaraş Kadınlar Kooperatifinin kurucu başkanıyım hâlâ yürütmekteyim EŞİK ve Kadın Koordinasyonunun üyesiyim. Aktif siyaset ile bu dönem biraz aramıza mesafe koymuş durumdayız.

INT – Her name is Kibar, she is 61 years old and worked on business management at Sütçü Imam University. She worked for 10 years in public service before having a shop for working clothes and textile shopping. In 1999, she was chosen as an MP for Kahramanmaraş for CHP and is working now in KA.DER [Association for Support of Women Candidates] and DISK [Revolutionary Workers' Union]. She is also a member of the women's platforms Flying Broom and ESIK [Women's Platform for Equality] and Women's Coalition. She is not working for political parties for like 5 or 6 years.

I – What do you think are the biggest problems that women still have to deal with in the country?

INT – Şu an ülkede kadınların en çok karşılaştığı problem sizce nedir, engel ya da problem?

I27 – Yani özellikle biz bu konuda mücadeleye verilen kadınlarımızın hem kamuda hem biz hem özel sektörde hem de STKlarda kadın haklarıyla ilgili medeni kanunla ilgili bir geriye gidiş var ve bu geriye gidiş üzerinden bir mücadelemiz var. Toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliğinin sağlanabilmesi için hem siyasi partilerde hem kamuda hem STKlarda bunun mücadelesini veriyoruz. Özellikle işte geçen ay 36 tane kadın öldürüldü. Bu kadınların öldürülme nedenlerinin ekonomik ve sosyal siyasal nedenleri var elbette ki. Ama en kötüsü de adaletin yer bulmaması. Bu mücadeleleri çok zor yürütüyor olmamız ve adaletin uzun süre devam etmesi haksızlığı daha da büyüterek kadınların mağduriyetini arttırıyor. Hem İstanbul Sözleşmesi'nden geri çekilmesiyle ilgili medeni kanunun uygulanmasıyla ilgili hem kadınların nafakaları ile ilgili haklarından biri geriye gidiş var. Kürtajla ilgili bir geriye gidiş var. Bir de erken yaşta kadınların kız çocuklarının evliliğe zorlanması var. Eğitim haklarının özellikle tarikatlar eliyle zayıflatılması var. Kız çocuklarının eğitimiyle ilgili ambargo uygulamaları var. Dolayısıyla İslam ve inanç adı altında kadın haklarını tırpanlama var.

INT – She said she is working for women's rights and civil law. To the equality of women and men, we must consider both women's rights and civil law. In recent months, 36 women have been killed, showing how this is a problem in Turkey. This is an unfair situation and grows every day. Also, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. There is also the abortion situation as we don't implement civil law. And there is also child marriage and an embargo on child and women's education rights. They call this Islam, having a religious education, but they're just forcing the lack of women's rights.

I – Could you tell me more about that "embargo" on children and women's education?

INT – Bu kadınlar ve yani kız çocuklarının eğitimi hakkında konulan ambargolardan bahsettiniz. Bunu biraz bize açabilir misiniz?

I27 – Özellikle ehliyetsiz yeteneksiz, resmi olmayan kurumlar tarafından inanç adı altında kız çocuklarının erken evlendirilmesi ile ilgili oluşturdukları baskılar var. Bu baskılardan dolayı hem erken yaşta evlendirildikleri için eğitim hakları elinden alınmış oluyor. Tabii ve Türkiye'de bir ekonomik krizden kaynaklı ciddi şekilde derinleşen bir yoksulluk var. Bu yoksulluğun getirdiği aile içi şiddetin boyutları giderek artmakta. Pandemi ile bu tam doruk noktasına çıkmış vaziyette. Hem ekonomik hem sosyal ilişkilerden kaynaklı ciddi bir sıkıntı yaşanmakta. Biz kadın dernekleri olarak bu konuda bir mücadele yürütmekteyiz. Bu mücadelemizi özellikle yerel yönetimlerde kadınlar adına belediye bütçelerinin ne kadarı kadınların sosyal hayatını iyileştirmek için kullanılmış diye bir takibe başladık. Bu anlamda bir çalışma yürütüyoruz. Mahalle evleri var mı işte kadın sığınma evleri var mı, kreşler var mı? Yaşlı bakım hizmetleri var mı buna ilişkin çalışmalar yürütmekteyiz. Yerel yönetimleri bu konuda sorguluyoruz ve

sorgulamaya da devam ediyoruz. Dolayısıyla son 10 yılda kadın hakları üzerinden ciddi bir geriye gidiş var ve bu gidişatı da erkek egemen anlayış ve siyasetle birlikte daha da geliştirerek sürdüeüyorlar.

INT – She is talking about the unofficial organizations that see belief and religion as the top of their aim. And they force, especially child girls, to get married. Because of that, they cannot be educated. She talked about this when she said embargo. And there are also the economic crisis and domestic violence, and it's getting worse. With the pandemic, economic and social relations got worse in the country. She said that women's organizations work in this situation and are starting to follow the municipality budgets. They want to know if these budgets are being used to help women, children, and elderly people... If there are kindergartens or support for women suffering domestic violence. She said for the past ten years, we have gotten worse, and we have a men's hegemonic structure in this country that is getting worse and worse.

I – Why is it getting worse? The same party has held power in Turkey for 20 years, what differences do you find if you look back 20 years? And what consequences for women's lives in Turkey?

INT – 20 yıldır aynı partiyle yönetilmekte. Bu 20 yılda baktığımızda kadınlar nelerle yani ne gibi zorluklarla da sıkıntılarla karşılaştı? Bu 20 yılda değişen bir şey var mı kadınların hayatında?

I27 – Kadınların hayatında tabii ki olumsuz anlamda çok şey değişti ben özellikle kendi yere elimde buna ilişkin örnekler verebilirim. Cemaat ve tarikatların özellikle toplum üzerinde oluşturdukları baskıların sonuçları itibariyle kadınların kendi sosyal hayatlarından çok ciddi bir geriye gidiş var. Yani sürekli kadınların giyimleri ile onların cinsiyetiyle o namus anlayışıyla işte erkek arkadaşıyla yolda yürümesi onun için bir suç bir günah olarak nitelendirildi ve birlikte kadının başı açık olarak gelmesi bir günah olarak nitelendirilmektedir ve kadınlar üzerinde dini baskılar arttırılıyor. Sanki namus yalnız kadına özgü bir kavrammış gibi ve kadın üzerinden hesaplaşmalar yapılıyor. Sanki dini inançları yalnız kadınlar için geçerli sanki bütün din cinsiyet üzerine oluşturulmuş gibi bir anlayışla kadınlar üzerinden baskılar oluşturuluyor. Özellikle kadınların çalışma yaşamında eğitim hayatında mesleki anlamda yükselmeleri anlamında kapanmaları, mecburiymiş gibi bir hava estiriliyor. Özellikle kapalı olan kadınlar, tesettüre giren kadınlar elini ayağını peçeyle kapatan kadınlar ya da kapatan ama mutlaka kapalı kadınlar olması onları mesleklerinde yükseltmeye yeterli bir liyakat olarak görülecekti oysaki son derece de yetersiz bir noktada olmalarına rağmen torpillerle elde edilen diplomaları olmaları, cemaat mensubu olmaları, tarikat mensubu olmaları, onları yükselmesine yeterli gibi görülüyor. Medeniyeti çağdaş, demokrat, aydın ve kadın kimliğinin farkına varan eşitlikten yana, demokrasiden yana mücadele eden kadınların üzerinde baskılar tabii giderek artmış vaziyette. Hem bu kadınlar çalışma yaşamında herhangi bir bahaneyle uzaklaştırılıyor. Üniversitelerde akademisyense özgürlük talepleri noktasında hemen işten

atılıyor ya da bir sosyal medyada attığı bir tweet bir eleştiri yüzünden cezalandırılıyor. Buna ilişkin çok ciddi soru. Bunlar yaşanıyor, yaşanmaktadır.

INT – We had a negative change for 20 years because of religious groups, and women's situation got worse in social life. Religious groups talk about women's clothing... if a woman has a boyfriend and they hold their hands together in public... Women not wearing a headscarf is not a usual thing for religious groups. Religious groups put pressure on women, and society thinks that women must obey the rules. But men can do whatever they want. Also, nowadays women are forced to wear a headscarf to get a promotion in work or get a job when they're having an interview. She mentioned that a woman who believes in equality between men and women is under more pressure. There are some academicians on social media being punished for what they share and what they believe. Because of that, she thinks that if you support equality, the pressure will be bigger and bigger every day in this country.

I – So, there are women forced to wear a headscarf to get a job, am I right? And not only from your personal experience but also from the experiences you learned from women's associations, do you identify any other source of gender inequality in the market? Do you think women and men have the same opportunities?

INT – Kadınların bazı yerlerde yükselmek için kapanmaya zorlandıkarından vesaire durumlarından bahsettiniz. Özellikle bununla ilgili bir şey sormak istiyorum, kadınlar ve erkekler sizce aynı şanslara, aynı haklara, aynı şeylere sahip mi yani bu toplumda?

I27 – Hayır, aynı haklara sahip değiller. Bu çok net bir şekilde zaten görebiliyorsunuz. Örneğin vali yardımcılarının hepsi erkek, Emniyet Müdürü, Emniyet Müdürü yardımcıları, erkek Belediye Başkanı, belediye başkan yardımcıları, erkek üniversitede rektör, rektör yardımcıları erkek, bunu çoğaltabiliriz. Maraş'ta 8 tane milletvekili var, bir tane kadın var yedisi erkek işte. Maraş'taki bütün siyasi partilerin il başkanları, erkek işte belediye başkanları, 11 ilçenin 11'inde de belediye Başkanı erkek bu bunu böyle çoğaltabiliriz. Tabii ki erkek egemen anlayışın ürünü olarak bu resmi görebiliyorsunuz zaten. Şimdi bu hak mücadelesinde siyasi talepler noktasında siyasi partiler yasasını değiştirmeyen yine erkekler ve bu bizim kota taleplerimize ses çıkartmayan yine erkekler sonuçta imza yetkisi onlarda bizim eylem ve söylemlerimize biz cevap alamıyoruz. Yani kadının üniversite mezunu olması isteğinde iyi bir noktada olması, iyi bir eğitim alması, onun yükselmesine yeterli bir faktör değil bunun mutlaka bir torpille ya da bir siyasi anlayışla ya da bir erkek eliyle desteklenmesi gerekir ki o kadının yükselebilmesi açısından. Biz bunları birlik yaşamımızda çok yoğun bir şekilde zaten yaşıyoruz sonuçta. Evet, ben şimdi burada oturduğum yerde üzerimdeki elbise sıfır kollu. Şimdi ben dışarı çıkarken üstüme bir ceket alıp çıkmam gerekiyor. Oysaki benim kendi ailem böyle bir yaptırımı bana yok kolunu kapat, dışarı çıktığı ya da

elbiseni boyu uzun kısa diyen hiç kimse yok ama toplumsal baskıdan dolayı. Bana dışarı çıkarken üstüme bir ceket giymek zorunluluğu hissediyorum. Bu toplumsal baskıdan kaynaklı bu yasalarla sınırlandırılmış bir şey değil. Bu görünmeyen yasalarla sınırlandırılmış bir anlayış.

INT – She said no, women and men don't have the same opportunities. Governors are men, rectors in universities are men, and mayors in municipalities are mostly men. Kahramanmaraş elects eight MPs; one of them is a woman and seven of them are men. She says you can see men's hegemony structure in Turkey and politics and law can't be changed because of men. They have the signature power and didn't even listen to that kind of thought. They have the signature power and don't want to change. Also, she said that if a woman is well educated or good in everything, it's not enough. She must be supported with a political view or have a man with her who is powerful or something like that. She said in daily life we always see some situations like that. Also, she mentioned about her clothes. Her clothes don't have sleeves, so she has to recheck when she goes outside because everybody says, "Oh, you're wearing that kind of dress" or something like that. But she mentioned that her family never gave her this kind of education. She says it is due to social pressure.

I – OK. Let's now talk a little bit about the health services. What is your opinion about the women's healthcare program in Turkey?

INT – Peki Türkiye'de kadınların sağlık programları hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz kadınlara yönelik sağlık çalışmaları?

I27 – Şimdi kadınlara yönelik sağlık çalışması, sağlık ocakları var. Aynı zamandaki KETEM dediğimiz bu kanser taramaları yapan bir kurum var. Devlet hastaneleri var. Bu bunlara erişim noktasında temel sıkıntı çünkü eğer kırsaldaki bir kadını kocası sağlık sorunlarından dolayı alıp doktora getiremezse, getirmezse kadın o sağlık kurumuna ulaşamaz. Sonuçta bu kadınların tamamı için değil ama en azından %30 %40 gibi bir oranla kocasının onayıyla doktora gelebilen kadınlarımız var kırsaldan ve çünkü kadınların ekonomik özgürlüğü yok. Kocasının yol parası, doktor giderlerini ya da ilaçların yüzdelerini karşılamaları gerekiyor. O yüzden erkeklerin, kocalarının ya da babalarının onaylarına ihtiyaç duyan ciddi bir kesim olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Sağlık birimleri var ama bu her yerleşkede değil tabii ki işte mahallede köyde her yerde sağlık ocakları olmayabiliyor ama ilçelerin merkezlerinde, mahallelerinde var sağlık ocakları. KETEM şehir merkezinde sağlık il Müdürlüğü'ne bağlı olarak var. Şehir hastaneleri var. Tabii geri kalanları da özel sektörde özel hastaneler var. Ekonomisi iyi olan kadınlar buna erişim sağlayabiliyor ama ekonomisi ne kadar iyi olursa olsun sağlık konusunda yine eşinin desteğine ihtiyacı var.

INT – She said that we have some public hospitals and something like KETEM, which are cancer early detection and screening centers. However, reaching these is hard for a woman who lives in a village as she must get permission from her husband since she does not have economic freedom. Her husband has to pay for accommodation and hospital expenses. Because of that, they always have to get permission from a man, like her father or her husband. It depends. Also, she said she is not talking for all the women in Turkey. She's talking about 30 or 40% of them. Because if you have economic freedom, you can go to private hospitals to get screened and see some doctors.

I – And what about politics? Do you feel represented by any political party, institution, or politician?

INT – Kendinizi bir parti, bir politik oluşum ya da bir politikacı tarafından temsil edildiğimizi düşünüyor musunuz?

I27 – Şimdi ben o soruya geçmeden önce şöyle bir cevap vereyim dedim. Sağlık konusuyla ilgili ben bir kooperatif kurdum. Kahraman kadınlar kooperatifi, Maraş'ın ilk kadın kooperatifi bu kooperatifi kurarken, kadınların ekonomik özgürlüğe ulaşabilme yollarının birini açmak istedim kırsaldaki özellikle tarımla uğraşan gıda üretimi yapan kadınların ürünlerini satıp para kazanacakları bir alan yaratmaya çalıştık işte bu alanla ilgili de eğer burayı güçlendirip büyütebilir isek hem kendileri için hem çocukların eğitimi ve sağlığı için para kazanmalarına olanak sağlayacağız. Bu da onların biraz ekonomik özgürlüğüne katkı yapmış olacağız çünkü ekonomik özgürlüğü olmayan bireyin ne sosyal ne siyasal ne eğitim ne sağlık özgürlüğü maalesef olamıyor. Bunu böyle söylemenizi istiyorum.

INT – She talked about a corporation. She founded a corporation; it's the first women's corporation in Kahramanmaraş and is called Kahraman Kadınlar. She is trying to get some women to get their economic freedom. There, women from the villages sell their products and earn some money so they can achieve economic freedom. She mentioned that if you don't have economic freedom, you don't have social, political, health, or educational freedom. You can't get anything without economic freedom. She mentioned that.

INT – Kendinizi politik olarak deminki sorumuzu tekrar arar mısınız? Kendinize politik olarak temsil edilebildiğini düşünüyor musunuz?

I27 – Parlamentoda yani olan kadınlarımızın da erkek siyasal anlayışıyla siyaset yaptıkları için bu konuda onları yeterli bulmuyoruz. Dolayısıyla eğer zaten bizim temsilimiz söz konusu olsaydı parlamentoda %50 olurduk. Bakanlar kurulunda %50 olurduk bakanlar kurulunda bildiğim kadarıyla 2 tane kadın var. Tamamı erkek Cumhurbaşkanı erkek. Dolayısıyla parlamentodaki yapıya da baktığımız zaman kadınların kürsüde konuşabilmeleri için genel başkanlarından onay almaları gerekiyor. Bugüne kadar parlamentoda olan kadınlar kaç dakika kaç saniye kadın haklarını dile getirme konusunda

kürsüyü kullanabilmişlerdir? Ne kadar onlara izin verilmiştir? Buna zaten incelediğinizde bizim kadın temsili kadın hakları temsili noktasındaki yetersizliği somut bir şekilde görmüş olacaksınız zaten.

INT – She mentioned we have women MPs in the parliament, but they are not enough to represent us. Also, if we were well-represented, women would make up 50% of the Parliament. She mentioned that we have two women ministers in the Parliament/(government)[111], and even our women ministers cannot talk about women's rights for more than 5 minutes. So, we are not well represented.

I – And what about political participation? Are women participating in politics? I am not only thinking about the parliament, but, for example, demonstrations, street politics, online activism...

INT – Kadınlar siyasette de yeterli aktiflik de mi? Yani sadece milletvekili olarak değil de haklarını bilme ve uygulama konusunda sokakta haklarını arama konusunda online platformlar konusunda yine aktivizm konusunda nasıllar sizce?

I27 – Şimdi kadınların bu şehre göre içinde bulunduğu sosyal topluma göre sosyal sınıfa göre değişkenlik arz ediyor. Tabii ki İzmir'deki bir kadının hak arama noktasındaki sokaktaki mücadelesiyle Kahramanmaraş'taki kadın hak arama noktasındaki mücadelesi aynı değil. Biz burada kadınlara sokağa çıkartıp eylem yapma noktasına son derece zayıfız çok az ama İzmir'de yüzlerce binlerce kadın sokağa dökülüp hak talebinde bulunabiliyor. Dolayısıyla bölgesel, sınıfsal farklılıklar bu konuda değişkenlik arz ediyor. Kadın hakları noktasında sonuçta sistemin erkek egemen yapının anlayışının eğitiminin dayattığı bir fikri kadın sahip, kendini erkekle eşit görmeyen bir kadın kesimi de var. Bu hakları talep etmeyen bir kadın grubu da var ama kendini eşit ilerden biri olarak gören ve bunun için de mücadele eden bir kesim var. Biz bu kesimin içindeyiz.

INT – She said it depends on the city and social class you belong to. For example, in Izmir, you can see women demonstrating against the government and battling for their rights on the streets. But in Kahramanmaraş, we can't do something like that, she said. Also, she mentioned that there are women who think that men's hegemony is OK; that we are not equal, men and women are not equal, and they are not seeking their rights. However, there is the other side. She said, I belong to that side and always fought for my rights.

I – Why are such demonstrations possible in Izmir but not in Kahramanmaraş?

INT – Neden peki sizce İzmir'de böyle insanlar görebiliyoruz haklarını arayan kadınlar ama Kahramanmaraş 'ta çok zor oluyor bunu aramak?

[111] At that time, there was only a woman minister, Derya Yanık, the former Minister of Family and Social Policies. Ruhsar Pekcan, the former Minister of Trade, was succeeded by the AKP's parliamentary group leader Mehmet Muş, in April 2021.

I27 – Şimdi şey, İzmir'deki siyasi iklim daha demokrat ve sosyal demokrat bir yönetim var orada. Maraş'ta da sağ egemen muhafazakâr bir yönetim var. Bu 2 farklı siyasal iklim tamamen atmosferi değiştirmektedir.

INT – Because in Izmir there is a social democratic structure, while in Kahramanmaraş there is a far-right conservative structure.

I – I know you are running out of time. So, we are done here. Would you like to add anything more?

INT – Sorularımı bitirdim. Siz bir şey eklemek ister misiniz?

I27 – Ben bu söyleşi için size çok teşekkür ediyorum. Bu alanda emek sarf eden bir arkadaşımızı daha tanımak ve daha mutlu oldum. Bu çalışmaya katılmak, hakkı vermek isterim sizin bu çalışmayı yaptığınız kurum veya kuruluşun ayrıntılı bilgilerini de bana telefondan atarsanız sevinirim. Biz de şu an Kahramanmaraş'ta toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği noktasında belediyeleri takibe alıyoruz. Öyle bir çalışmamız var. Kadın koalisyonunu onun yürütüyoruz. Şu an hemen buradan çıkıp Sosyal Politikalar il müdürlüğü eylem planını izlemeye gideceğim. Teşekkür ederim.

INT – She thanked you for this interview and was proud of you for doing something like that. Well done. Also, she wants some information about your university, I can text her. She said the Women's Coalition is currently looking for municipal actions, so she immediately goes there to see what they have done. And she thanked you again.

I – OK. Thank you so much for agreeing to meet with me today. Cemre will send you the information you asked for as soon as possible. I'm pleased to meet you and wish you the very best.

INT – Çok teşekkür ediyorum. Vakit ayırdığınız için ben sizinle iletişime geçip size gerekli bilgileri yine bahsettiğim formları ileteceğim. Çok teşekkürler.

I27 – Ben teşekkür ediyorum.

I – Bye-bye. Thank you, Kibar.

I27 – Bye-bye.

00:33:26

END OF THE INTERVIEW

APPENDIX B

Semi-structured interview guide

The goal of this interview is to investigate women's political prospects in Turkey. We would like them to share experiences, political outlooks, and other information they consider relevant. We will cover topics like violence, employment, education, women's health, and representativeness. There are no right or wrong answers, the participant may stop it at any time and/or decline to answer any question. The interview will take around 45 minutes.

Verbal consent: Ask for permission to audio record the interview.

Framework	Key Questions	Key Prompts
Interviewee background		
Information about the participant	Can you introduce yourself? What set of political principles do you support? • How did you become part of the women's rights movement? • How did you get involved in politics? Why did you join the X party?	Political stance
Participant's views	Did you ever feel some discrimination for being a woman?	Hiring; promotion; sexual harassment; property; inheritance; divorce...
	In your opinion, what problems do women still face in Turkey?	Femicide; unemployment; education; violence; underrepresentation...
Gender Policies	What is your opinion about the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention?	

Violence	Why do you think that violence against women is so spread over the country? What is your opinion about the ongoing women's healthcare program?	Istanbul Convention; Law no. 6284...
Sexual and reproductive health		HPV vaccine; contraception; pap smear; c-sections, abortion...
Employment	Do women still face difficulties in terms of participation in the labour market?	Division of labour; informal economy
Education	Are there still barriers to girls' education in Turkey?	CEFMU; 4+4+4 system...
Politics	How do you exercise political rights? Do you feel represented by any political institution, political party, or politician?	Ministry of Family and Social Policies; TBMM...
Political Regime		
Gender regime	How do you assess the last two decades in Turkish politics? What consequences in terms of women's issues?	

Conclusion and Acknowledgments

Asking if there is anything else they would like to comment on that wasn't already asked. It will be sent a thank you email and a copy of the transcript if requested. To tack the opportunity to thank them for their time and for sharing their experiences and opinions.

ANNEX A

Processes of democratization and de-democratization



Source: Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 87).